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      ABSTRACT 
 
 “Self Defense and Sea Power: The Provincial Navies of the British Atlantic World, 1689-
1763,” explores the ways in which Anglo-American colonial governments in North America and 
the West Indies managed naval defense during imperial and border conflicts between the late 
seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries. With limited military assistance from the imperial 
government in London, provincial leaders built their own semi-permanent and temporary navies 
to protect commerce from Franco-Spanish privateers, pirates, and Native American naval forces.  
Provincial governments also utilized these fleets to spearhead sieges of enemy ports, support 
infantry operations on land, and to transport troops and supplies to warzones.  
By the mid-1740s, administrative changes within the British Admiralty along with 
increased Parliamentary oversight of colonial military campaigns led metropolitan authorities to 
massively increase the Royal Navy’s presence throughout the Western Atlantic world. By the 
1750s, the Crown’s ‘Royalization’ of coastal defense made the existence of numerous local 
American navies unnecessary. While increased imperial support for colonial military operations 
should have pleased Anglo-American officials, tensions between provincial authorities and 
Royal Navy officers over the impressment of American sailors and prize distribution soured this 
defensive partnership. When the Crown began to use the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade 
and tax policies in the 1760s, the legacy of a century of provincial naval defense played an 
important role in shaping the ways American dissidents resisted British authority at sea in the 





           GLOSSARY OF NAVAL TERMINOLOGY 
 
Note: The following glossary relies on modern scholarly descriptions of vessels from the period, 
c. 1680-1770. Period sources frequently diverged in how they classified various vessels. Most of 
the vessels listed below were primarily trading ships, and only became warships when impressed 
or hired out by colonial governments. Vessels were often classified by their ‘rig,’ or the ways in 
which the sails were arranged. For instance, a ‘fore-and-aft’ rigged vessel has a sail pointing 
towards the front (fore) of the vessel to the back (aft). The term “ship” usually referred to a 











Diagram of Masts on a Tall Ship, by author. Photograph of La Gloria, a modern Spanish Navy tall ship, taken by 
the author in Charleston, S.C. at the beginning of his dissertation research, Summer 2018.  
Brigantine:  Brigantines were typically small vessels under 100-tons. They had two masts. The 
foremast was square-rigged while the mainmast had a fore-and-aft rig. This differed slightly 
from a Brig, which was a two masted vessel that typically had square-sail rigs on both of its 
masts.1 After sloops, brigantines may have been the most common merchant vessel employed in 
provincial fleets.  
Frigate: A large, ship-rigged warship usually belonging to the Royal Navy, and in very rare 
cases, provincial navies. Typically, Royal Navy frigates sent to America were among the 
smallest “rated” warships. While first or second-rate warships with nearly one hundred guns 
would be reserved for European service, smaller fifth or sixth-rate frigates that carried between 
twenty and forty guns would serve in the New World.2 
                                                           
1 William Avery Baker, “Vessel Types of Colonial Massachusetts” in Collections of the Colonial Society of 
Massachusetts, Vol. 52: Sea Faring in Colonial Massachusetts (March 1980), pp. 18-20.  Colonial Society of 
Massachusetts https://www.colonialsociety.org/node/1973#fore, and John Robinson, George Francis Dow, The 
Sailing Ships of New England, 1607-1907 (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007), pp. 28-29. Retrieved from 
Google Books 
2 David Wilson “Protecting Trade by Suppressing Pirates: British Colonial and Metropolitan Responses to 
Atlantic Piracy, 1716-1726,” in The Golden Age of Piracy: The Rise, Fall, and Enduring Popularity of Pirates, ed. 
David Head. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018), p. 91. Google Play eBook edition.  
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Galley: The term ‘galley’ has been used to describe light-drafted rowing vessels since Classical 
Antiquity. In the British Atlantic world, the term had various meanings. Occasionally, a vessel 
named “X Galley” would simply be a regular trading vessel that had a hull specifically shaped 
for swifter sailing. On the other hand, some colonial governments particularly in the Southeast 
built light-draft “galleys” which relied on oars as their primary source of propulsion.3 See 
Chapter I and Chapter III for varying uses of galleys in New England’s and South Carolina’s 
provincial naval establishments.  
Ketch: A very small ocean-going trading or fishing vessel with a main mast and mizzen mast, 
but no foremast. In New England, these vessels were typically under 70-tons.4 See Chapter I for 
the use of ketches in New England’s early provincial navy.  
Periagua/Periauger/Piragua:  Inspired by Native American dug-out canoes, periaguas (spelled 
and pronounced in myriad ways) were small, swift vessels similar to galleys in that they were 
primarily powered by oars and occasionally by sails. These vessels were particularly common in 
the Southern colonies and the West Indies and were the main vessels of the South Carolina Scout 
Boat navy.5 
Schooner: Vessel with two masts that are rigged in a fore-and-aft pattern. Square sails could be 
added on top of the masts to make them topsail schooners. They were somewhat similar in 
appearance to brigantines but had narrower hulls, and their masts were more slanted.6 See 
Chapter III for examples of schooners used for provincial service in the War of Jenkin’s Ear.  
Shallop: typically, a very small, open-decked coastal work boat. Larger vessels often times 
carried shallops onboard to serve as auxiliaries when needed.7 
Sloop: The most common vessel in provincial navies, and perhaps the most commonly employed 
vessel in the British Atlantic world. In the North American (and provincial navy) context, a sloop 
usually describes a single-masted trading vessel with a fore-and-aft rig that could involve any 
number of sail types. These smaller vessels were typically under 100-tons and could operate in 
shallow waters off the coasts or on ocean-going missions.8 
Snow: A vessel extremely similar to a brig except for vessel with its rear mast (known as the 
‘trysail-mast’ due to its prominent fore-and-aft trysail that jutted out of the rear of the vessel) 
                                                           
3 Baker, “Vessel Types,” p. 22 and  Benerson Little, Pirate Hunting: The Fight Against Pirates, Privateers, 
and Sea Raiders from Antiquity to the Present (Washington: Potomac Books, 2010), p. 147. Google Play eBook 
Edition 
4 P.C. Coker, Charleston's Maritime Heritage, 1670-1865: An Illustrated History (Coker Craft, 1987), pp. 
xii-xiv and Baker, “Vessel Types,” pp. 12-13.  
5 Little, Pirate Hunting, pp. 140-141 and Larry Ivers,  This Torrent of Indians: War on the Southern 
Frontier, 1715-1728 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2016), pp. 104-105. Kindle eBook edition. 
6 Coker, Charleston’s Maritime Heritage, pp. xii-xiv.  
7 Baker, “Vessel Types,” pp. 13-15.   
8  Baker, “Vessel Types,” pp. 18-19, Coker, Charleston’s Maritime Heritage, pp. xii-xiv. Confusingly, the 
Royal Navy also used the term ‘sloop-of-war’ to describe a wide array of small-warships in this era.  See Ian 




close to its mainmast. The Massachusetts province snow Prince of Orange in Chapter III is a 
prime example.9 
Whale Boat: Whaleboats were extremely common small-craft employed primarily by New 
England mariners for whale-hunting but were also used throughout the colonies for various 
military missions. They were particularly useful for troop transport and could be powered by 








                                                           
9 Waldo Lincoln, The Province Snow “Prince of Orange” (Worcester: Press of Charles Hamilton, 1901), p. 
4 




Source: Public Domain Image. The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs: Print 
Collection, The New York Public Library. “A view of Charles Town the Capital of South Carolina” New York 
Public Library Digital Collections. https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-2d13-a3d9-e040-
e00a18064a99.  
 
This eighteenth century depiction of Charles Town, South Carolina’s waterfront includes many 
of the vessels that were common in provincial navies. On the far left is a typical single-masted 
trading sloop. Just behind the sailors in the foreground is a very small coastal sailing vessel, 
similar in structure to the periagua sailing canoes of the South Carolina provincial navy. In the 
center is a fully rigged ship, similar to British Royal Navy frigates. The two-masted vessel to the 






        1747 MAP OF NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES 
 
Source: A zoomed-in section of Bowen, E., “A complete system of geography. Being a description of all the 
countries, islands, cities, chief towns, harbours, lakes, and rivers, mountains, mines, &c. of the known world …, 
1747 edition.” While most of the regions consulted in this study are visible in this map, Halifax, Nova Scotia is not 











 Philadelphia was in danger. It was the autumn of 1747—the eighth year of the third 
global imperial war Britain had fought against its Franco-Spanish enemies in half a century—and 
French and Spanish privateers prowled for local commerce off the Pennsylvania coast. While the 
hundreds of thousands of Anglo-American colonists between Newfoundland and Barbados faced 
occasional terrestrial threats from hostile French, Spanish, and Native American armies, the 
largely coastal British American colonies and their ocean-bound commerce suffered even more 
so from Franco-Spanish commerce raiding. In the face of this imminent threat, the Pennsylvania 
legislature struggled to find a solution to protect vulnerable local merchant ships.  
While debates over coastal defense measures were common in every British province, the 
Quaker-dominated proprietary colony of Pennsylvania was unique. On the one hand proprietary 
colonies were essentially American fiefdoms that were privately owned by absentee landlords 
living in England, and thus were never guaranteed Royal military protection that colonies 
directly under the auspices of the Crown enjoyed.11 On the other hand, Pennsylvania’s governors 
struggled to convince the pacifistic and tight-fisted Quakers that dominated the Pennsylvania 
Assembly to expand the colony’s naval defenses.12  
What military measures could a colony without Royal Navy protection take to combat 
enemy privateers? The colony’s government could fund and direct the construction of a  local 
provincial navy. As early as 1634, the infant Massachusetts government had fitted out a guard 
                                                           
11 David Wilson “Protecting Trade by Suppressing Pirates: British Colonial and Metropolitan Responses to 
Atlantic Piracy, 1716-1726,” in The Golden Age of Piracy: The Rise, Fall, and Enduring Popularity of Pirates, ed. 
David Head. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2018), pp.98-99.  
12 Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering And Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 160-161.    
2 
 
ship with local resources and men.13 With Royal Navy involvement in North America and the 
West Indies limited before the second decade of the eighteenth century, Anglo-American 
governments frequently used local funds and sailors to build regional defense fleets to protect 
ports and commerce from enemy navies and pirates.14 On occasion, these provincial fleets could 
also be deployed in offensive campaigns against enemy port cities. While the American 
precedent for provincial navies extended back to the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
colonial governments found even more reason to build these local fleets when naval threats 
amplified during four global conflicts between Britain and its imperial/ Native foes: King 
William’s War (1689-1698), Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713), The War of Jenkin’s Ear/King 
George’s War (1739-1748), and the Seven Years War (1754-1763). With each ensuing conflict, 
the North American and West Indian provinces were drawn more and more into deadly battles 
for maritime hegemony in the New World.  
Early twentieth century historian Howard Chapin once remarked that “The American 
Navy did not spring forth full-fledged at the outbreak of the Revolution, like Pallas Athene from 
the head of Zeus. Its roots go back to the Colonial privateersmen and the naval expeditions 
against the French and Spanish.”15 And so it is in Philadelphia in 1747 where we find the 41-
year-old printer and politician, Benjamin Franklin—a future founder of the United States and 
Continental Navy—arguing for Philadelphians to support a local warship  to hunt down Franco-
Spanish privateers. In a pamphlet entitled Plain Truth, Franklin warned that the “Absence of 
[Royal Navy] Ships of War, during the greatest Part of the Year, from both Virginia and New-
                                                           
13 Charles O. Paullin, Colonial Army and Navy, Unpublished Manuscript. Charles Oscar Paullin papers, 
1931. MSS53033, Library of Congress, p. 45.   
14 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2004), p. 232.   
15 Howard Chapin, “New England Vessels in the Expedition against Louisbourg, 1745,” in The New 
England Historical and Genealogical Register, Vol. LXXVI (January, 1922), pp. 59-60.  
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York” left the port city vulnerable to maritime assaults. To secure their coast, Philadelphians 
should work together to bear the “Expence of a Vessel to guard our Trade.”16  
 Similar debates occurred throughout much of the British Atlantic when enemy privateers 
lurked off the coast, when pirates captured local merchant ships, or when the Crown called on 
colonial governments to initiate assaults on enemy port cities. Constructing and financing a local 
navy was no small task for colonial governments, and the manner in which provincial navies 
were created and funded varied from colony to colony. When provincial governments resorted to 
unpopular measures such as impressment of vessels and sailors, or when they instituted 
burdensome taxes to fund local defense measures, they risked igniting the potentially violent 
anger of the populace. Even when colonial governments successfully established a temporary or 
semi-permanent defense fleet, the associated costs often times aggravated already-potent internal 
sociopolitical tensions throughout the American colonies.  
 If the organization of provincial navies elevated tensions within Anglo-American 
colonies themselves, they also raised larger questions over the provincial-Royal relationship. 
Was the Crown or the colonies responsible for coastal security? Who would pay for provincial 
ships? Were American provincial ships equal to British warships, or subordinates? Who would 
man Royal Navy frigates in American waters? What could colonial governments do if Royal 
captains did not actively patrol for enemy vessels? These questions were never adequately 
answered in the pre-Revolutionary era, and numbered among the myriad cracks in the 
relationship between periphery and center that would shatter in the imperial crisis of the 1760s 
and 1770s.  
                                                           
16 Benjamin Franklin, “Plain Truth, 17 November 1747,” Founders Online, National Archives,. 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-03-02-0091. [Original source: The Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin, vol. 3, January 1, 1745, through June 30, 1750, ed. Leonard W. Labaree ( New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1961), pp. 180–204] 
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 This dissertation makes the case that between the 1680s and 1740s, Royal military 
neglect led Anglo-Americans throughout the British Atlantic world to build and utilize their own 
provincial navies against French, Spanish, Native, and piratical maritime threats. For the better 
part of a century, these provincial fleets secured Britain’s weak grasp on its American coastlines. 
Even when metropolitan authorities finally expanded the Royal Navy’s presence in its American 
colonies between the 1740s and 1750s, their piecemeal attempts to ‘royalize’ coastal defense 
were hampered by violent tensions between the Royal Navy and provincial authorities and 
sailors. When imperial authorities used the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies in the 
1760s, long-held anger at Royal Navy excesses coupled with a long legacy of local naval defense 
helped to shape the ways American Patriots resisted British authorities in the imperial crisis. 
Making a Historical and Historiographical Case for the Study of Provincial Navies 
 
In his 2012 monograph American Naval History, 1607-1865, renowned American naval 
historian Jonathan R. Dull argued that Anglo-Americans undertook “little independent naval 
activity.” While admitting that colonists frequently employed privateers—“privately built, 
owned, and manned but government-sanctioned armed vessel used chiefly to capture enemy 
merchant ships”—he still concluded that the “colonies did not have permanent armies or navies, 
and there was not even a maritime equivalent to the rudimentary military training provided by 
colonial militias.”17 I argue that this latter assertion overlooks the difference between local 
government-controlled war fleets—provincial navies—and private commerce raiders. I also 
contend this testifies to the increasingly problematic nature of the term “privateering” in colonial 
                                                           
17John R. Dull, American Naval History, 1607-1865: Overcoming the Colonial Legacy (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2012), pp. 2-10.  
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maritime scholarship. What was a vague and controversial term in the era covered by this 
dissertation continues to plague maritime military scholarship to this day.  
Part of the historical and historiographical confusion over the differences between 
provincial navies and privateers can be traced back to the multitudinous forms of naval warfare 
in the late medieval and Renaissance eras. Historian N.A.M. Rodger, who has done more than 
any other recent scholar to examine the origins of privateering and modern naval warfare, has 
argued that before the seventeenth century, there were several types of naval organization in 
European kingdoms. These included Royal impressment or hiring of vessels in times of war –
“Requisitioning” and “Chartering”—feudal or territorial customs that required certain regions or 
fiefdoms to build ships for a lord or king—“Feudal navies” and “Ship Musters, “local navies” 
built by regional governments, and “private” naval warfare (i.e. commercial vessels that took 
part in various types of combat with or without governmental permission). Rodger argues that 
when the Spanish Crown forbade any other European powers from accessing the riches or trade 
of the New World in the sixteenth century, England and other Northern European kingdoms 
encouraged private commercial warfare against the Spanish throughout the Atlantic world. This 
meant that irregular private naval warfare was “artificially preserved [in the Americas] long after 
it had disappeared from European waters.”18 
It was from ‘private naval warfare’ that Rodger contends that the seventeenth century 
term “privateer” originated. Up to the seventeenth century, private merchant ships often armed 
themselves and fought defensive actions against enemy raiders, took part in occasional pirate 
raids, or sought out permission for “reprisals” from their monarchs to retrieve stolen property. By 
                                                           
18 Rodger, “The New Atlantic: Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Century,” in John B. Hattendorf and Richard 
W. Unger, eds. War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2003), pp. 238-
247. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt81rtx  
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the sixteenth century, various European monarchs—plagued by constant religious warfare and 
their own lack of warships—began to license private warships to raid enemy commerce for 
profit. Despite these early cases of government-sanctioned commerce raiding, it took the English 
Crown until the late seventeenth century to fully codify the state’s role in private naval warfare, 
and more specifically to use the term “privateer” to describe private commerce raiders.19 While 
Rodger contends that northern European-style private naval warfare continued into the Americas, 
this dissertation also holds that older medieval traditions such as the impressment of local vessels 
and “local navies” also persisted in the Anglo-American colonies of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
In my own research, I have found Roger’s lament that “generations of scholars have 
made difficulties for themselves and their readers by using vague, anachronistic and 
contradictory language about private naval warfare” to ring true.20 In particular, I have found that 
the definition of the word “privateer” has only grown more expansive and vaguer throughout the 
centuries.  In a 1720 dictionary, privateering was simply defined as “a Vessel fitted out by one or 
more private Persons, with a Licence from the Prince or State, to prey upon the Enemy; also the 
Commander or Captain of such a Ship.” A few decades later, the famous British writer Samuel 
Johnson defined a privateer as a “a ship fitted out by private men to plunder enemies. He is at no 
charge for a fleet, further than providing privateers, wherewith his subjects carry on a pyratical 
                                                           
19 N.A.M. Rodger, “The Law and Language of Private Naval Warfare,” The Mariner's Mirror, Issue 100, 
No. 1 (2014), pp. 5-13.  Also see Shinsuke Satsuma, Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth 
Century: Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic (London: Boydell & Brewer, 2013), pp. 9-10. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt31nj7r.6.  
20 Rodger, “The Law and Language,” p. 5.  
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war at their own expence.”21 In both definitions from the period this dissertation covers,  
privateering was seen as an independently controlled activity, with tacit government acceptance.  
For the most part, I have found that provincial governments in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries followed the aforementioned definitions, using the term “privateer” or 
“private men of war” to describe privately licensed commerce raiders. When describing war 
vessels fitted out by colonial governments, they typically used terms like “sloop of war,” 
“province sloop,” “vessel fitted out at the expense of the government,” etc. This was not always 
the case, and I have certainly found many cases where provincial authorities built warships and 
called them “privateers.” Nevertheless, Anglo-American insistence that tax-funded provincial  
fleets were something more than privateers seems to have grown over time as these fleets grew 
in complexity. As will be seen in Chapter III, the battle over what made a vessel a “privateer” or 
a “warship” led to a transatlantic legal battle between provincial and Royal Navy captains in the 
1740s.  
 If privateering was an ill-defined term in the colonial era, later historians have done 
nothing to narrow its categorical grasp.  As early as the mid-1920s, historian Howard Chapin 
argued that privateer ships were “privately owned armed-vessels, which sailed under the flag and 
commission of some recognized government.” Chapin also maintains that by the 1700s, 
privateers included both sailors who mainly chose to attack enemy shipping with legal 
permission (privateers), and merchants who occasionally exercised the right as a sort of side job 
                                                           
21 Edward Phillips, The New World of Words: Or Universal English Dictionary (London: King's Arms, 
1720), no page number given. Google Books eBook. Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language: A 
Digital Edition of the 1755 Classic (1755, Reprint., Johnson Dictionary Online, 2012), p. 1573.    
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(letter-of-marque ships).  Chapin includes in this ‘privateering’ category colonial government-
owned ships,  and even ships impressed for emergency reasons.22  
Despite Chapin’s inclusion of these government-directed naval activities within the scope 
of “privateering,” one begins to wonder how “private” a government-directed expedition could 
be. The vagueness of Chapin’s handling of “privateering” becomes especially apparent when he 
calls New England Governor Edmund Andros’s privateering fleet the “beginnings of a colonial 
navy.”23  
 Historian Charles O. Paullin complicated the definition of “colonial navies” in the next 
decade. Where Chapin groups government-sponsored naval expeditions in with privateering, 
Paullin separates the two with great nuance. In his unpublished 1930s manuscript, Colonial Army 
and Navy, Paullin argues that “The war vessels of the American colonies were of two general 
classes: (1) vessels under the control of the state, and (2) privateers. The former were of three 
classes: (1) vessels owned by the state, (2) vessels hired by the state, and (3) vessels freely 
loaned to the state.” For Paullin, privateers were sailors given private commissions to pursue 
enemy commerce, while colonies maintained their own “war vessels.” Unlike Chapin, Paullin 
extends his examination of Anglo-American fleets well into the Seven Years War, and notes 
increasing complexity and naval organization in some cases throughout various colonies.  
 Despite his nuanced handling of the different Anglo-American naval forces throughout 
the pre-Revolutionary era, Paullin’s unpublished account seems to be a mere rough draft, and 
concludes on a very questionable claim. While admitting that colonial fleets could barely be 
called proper “navies” at all, and while admitting that Massachusetts had something of a 
                                                           
22Howard Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors: The First Century of American Colonial Privateering, 
1625-1725 (Martino Fine Books, 2017 Repr. 1926), pp. 7-8.  
23Chapin, Privateer Ships, p. 96.   
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“rudimentary navy” in the mid-18th-century, Paullin concludes that Anglo-Americans were 
“practically without a naval defense, except such as could be extemporized in emergencies.” 
Nevertheless, Paullin contends that from 1690 “they had the protection afforded by a few ships 
of the Royal Navy; and potentially of course, they, being a part of the British empire, were 
defended by the whole British Navy.”24 As I will discuss in this dissertation, the Royal Navy was 
anything but a reliable ally before the mid-18th-century.  
Later in the twentieth century, colonial military and naval historians such as W.A.B. 
Douglas, Larry Ivers and Carl Swanson used terms such as “sea militias,” “coast guards” and 
“provincial navies” to differentiate between provincial government-funded warships and 
commerce raiders with letters of marque.25 Nevertheless, more recent scholars seem to 
increasingly ignore the distinctions these twentieth century historians made between privateers 
and provincial navies. For instance, in a 2011 historiographical article, Starkey grouped 
merchantmen commissioned by governments to attack enemy vessels on a regular trading 
mission, “private men-of-war” dedicated to attacking enemy vessels and shipping lanes, and 
even government-managed private fleets in which “states collaborated with the private sector in 
a guerre de course” under the broad category of privateering.26 As the definition of privateering 
has widened in this way, it has become possible for scholars such as Jonathan Dull to ignore the 
                                                           
24 Paullin, “Colonial Army and Navy,” p. 71.  This also contrasts with N.A.M. Rodger’s recent argument 
that the Royal Navy rarely even patrolled American waters before 1713. See Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A 
Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 232.   
25W.A.B. Douglas, “The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749-1755: A Comment on Naval Policy,” The 
Canadian Historian Review, Volume 47, Number 1, March 1966, pp. 22-37,  Larry E. Ivers, British Drums On the 
Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1974), p. 165.  and Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 
1739-1748 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 50  
26David J. Starkey, “Voluntaries and Sea Robbers: A Review of the Academic Literature on Privateering, 
Corsairing, Buccaneering and Piracy,” The Mariner's Mirror 97:1 (2011) pp. 132-133.   
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fact that Anglo-Americans had semi-permanent, state-funded naval forces in the century 
preceding the American Revolution.  
All in all, with few exceptions, historians over the last century have largely only 
mentioned provincial navies in passing, or have allowed them to become assimilated into the 
ever-growing and murky category of privateering. While admitting the blurred lines between 
colonial navies and privateers—which I define as private commerce raiders operating 
independently with letters of marque—with this dissertation I propose to resurrect elements of 
Chapin’s and Paullin’s early twentieth century categorizations of provincial navies. In this study, 
I define a provincial navy (or provincial navy vessel) as a war vessel or group of war vessels  
directly funded by colonial American governments and crewed by Anglo-American sailors. 
These vessels could be guard ships used to protect commerce, temporarily impressed flotillas in 
emergencies—emergency fleets—or hastily assembled invasion fleets that colonial authorities 
armed to attack enemy ports. In most cases, these vessels were primarily small merchant vessels   
that were taken into service rather than purpose-built warships.  
Admittedly, even the term “provincial navy” has its limitations. While one could make 
the case that colonial transport and supply vessels should be included in this definition, I have 
decided to limit its scope in this definition to vessels that colonial governments specifically 
designated for combat missions. Additionally, there were times when colonial governments hired 
or impressed privateer ships into direct state service during emergencies. During situations in 
which independent privateers came under direct government control or command, I consider 
these vessels and their crews to be part of provincial navies.  
Ultimately, no comprehensive study has been completed up to this point about colonial 
British America’s provincial navies. While various studies about “privateering” writ large have 
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broached the topic of state-funded navies in colonial America, the vagueness of this category has 
limited their ability to fully analyze the ways in which provincial American governments built 
their own unique fleets.  
Historiographical Context of this Dissertation  
 
 At its broadest level, Self Defense and Sea Power  is a study of how Anglo-Americans 
managed coastal defense in the century preceding the American Revolution. Over all, this 
dissertation’s focus on how Anglo-American efforts to construct their own navies fits within 
larger historiographical discussions of the military relationship between periphery and center in 
the British Atlantic world, and contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the broader 
intersection between naval warfare and society in early America.  
 A common debate throughout Atlantic world historiography throughout the last half 
century has been “To what extent did the English (and later British) Crown exert military 
authority over its American colonies in the century preceding the Revolutionary War?” 
Ultimately, two schools of thought have arisen to answer this question. On the one hand, a 
minority viewpoint is advanced by Stephen Saunders Webb. In the 1979 book Governors-
General, Webb contests the early 20th-century historian Charles M. Andrew’s view that 
mercantilism guided Britain’s colonial policy in America.  Instead, Webb contends that English 
colonization efforts were largely driven by military concerns, and that  military governors used 
force to advance the Royal prerogative in their colonies.  Webb maintains this style of military 
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government continued into the 1720s, and—after a short period of imperial military neglect—
reappeared during the War of Jenkin’s Ear in 1739.27 
 Webb’s theory has been largely panned by Atlantic world historians throughout the last 
five decades. Historian Owen Stanwood has summarized scholarly opposition to Webb’s theory 
best by stating that most early American scholars operating under  “Atlantic and continental 
approaches, [have] tended to argue for the diffuseness and weakness of empires.”28 One 
representative example of a Webb critic is Jack Sosin. In his monograph English America and 
the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II, Sosin makes the case that in the 1680s Charles II 
abandoned an attempt to rule Jamaica by Royal prerogative when he realized the impossibility of 
funding a major Royal garrison to enforce his will there.29 Regarding Webb’s contention that the 
Crown ruled through military might in the Atlantic world, Sosin has argued that Royal officials 
“hardly demonstrated an intention, much less an ability, to dominate [their American subjects] 
by [military] force,” and that Anglo-American assemblies grew increasingly more autonomous 
over time.30 
 While critics have panned Webb’s contention that the Crown ruled colonial America via 
military might, they have largely come to accept a vision of the British Empire wherein Royal 
power and plans were limited by provincial political customs. This viewpoint has been most 
clearly advanced by Jack Greene, who has made the case that “pronouncements from the centers 
of early modern extended polities like the British Empire acquired constitutional legitimacy for 
                                                           
27  Stephen Saunders Webb, The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of Empire, 
1569-1681 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. xviii 
28 Owen Stanwood, Review of Marlborough’s America, William and Mary Quarterly 3, Vol. 71 (July 
2014), pp. 484-85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5309/willmaryquar.71.3.0484.  
29 Jack M. Sosin, English America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II: Transatlantic Politics, 
Commerce, and Kinship (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), pp. 180-181.  
30 Sosin, Review of 1676…,The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography Vol.  93, no. 2 (1985), pp. 
213-214. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4248807  
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the whole only through implicit or explicit ratification by the peripheries.”31  In essence, 
throughout much of the era covered in this study, Royal authority was only moderately enforced 
in the American colonies.  
 While historians who disagree with Webb’s ‘garrison government’ theory of Royal 
military rule point to the weakness of Royal executive authority throughout the colonies, they do 
not entirely discount that the metropole did ultimately expand its military and legislative reach. It 
would take time, however. Jack Greene has made the case that by the late 1740s, the Crown 
began to slowly retreat from its former laissez-faire attitude toward American governance, and 
began to intervene in colonial affairs more forcefully—i.e. giving colonial governors more 
specific instructions on how to run their provinces.32 In other words, Webb’s contention that the 
British government wanted to more directly rule its colonies is accurate, but was several decades 
premature. 
 If historians have noticed a stronger authoritarian legal shift in London by the mid-
eighteenth century, they have also noticed a growing use of Royal military power to enforce 
metropolitan goals during this era. Scholars have largely agreed that prior to the War of Jenkin’s 
Ear (c. 1739-1748), the British Royal Navy’s presence was minimal in the New World.33 While 
the Admiralty slowly increased the Royal fleet’s footprint in the Western Atlantic world 
(particularly in the West Indies), it would not be until the mid-century when Admiralty reformers 
would make the Royal Navy a dominant fighting force in the New World.  
                                                           
31 Jack Greene,  Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development In the Extended Polities of the British 
Empire and the United States, 1607-1788 (New York: Norton, 1990), p. xi  https://hdl-handle-
net.unh.idm.oclc.org/2027/heb.01359.  
32 Greene, Peripheries and Center, pp. 47-52.   
33 See Rodger, Command of the Ocean, p. 232.    
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Historians have taken note of Britain’s mid-century use of military power to support 
metropolitan aims in different ways. For instance, in his study on the evolution of British 
colonial military policy in the Americas, historian Kurt Nagel makes the case that by the 1730s 
London had come to realize the value of the American colonies to its imperial vision and became 
more willing to dispatch Royal troops to assist in military campaigns. Nagel contends that 
American colonial leaders were oblivious to the fact that greater Royal military involvement 
meant decreased provincial autonomy as imperial officials began to manage American military 
affairs more and more after the 1740s.34 
While Nagel’s focus was primarily on the involvement of British soldiers, other 
historians have seen the mid-eighteenth century as a period when the British government used 
the Royal Navy to enforce its vision of a centralized empire. Scholars who see the Royal Navy as 
an important tool of British imperial might in the second half of the eighteenth century generally 
follow Daniel Baugh’s conceptualization of Britain's ‘Blue-water’ strategy, in which Parliament 
came to support Britain’s military expansion vis-a-vis Royal Naval military power rather than 
through land warfare on the continent.35 For instance, Eliga Gould has argued that  Prime 
Minister William Pitt adopted  a Blue-water strategy that emphasized the usage of British sea 
power to help seize French possession in the Americas rather than in continental Europe. 
Britain’s successful shift to maritime war in the Americas ultimately inspired Parliament’s 
postwar attempt to subject the American colonies to greater metropolitan jurisdiction.36 
                                                           
34Kurt Nagel, Empire and Interest: British Colonial Defense Policy, 1689-1748 (Ph.D. Dissertation, The 
Johns Hopkins University, 1992), pp. 449-452, 511-513  
35 Daniel Baugh,  “Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815.” The International History Review Vol. 
10, no. 1 (1988), pp. 33-5. Jstor http://www.jstor.org/stable/40107088.  
36  Eliga Gould,  The Persistence of Empire : British Political Culture in the Age of the American 





Ultimately, scholars throughout the last several decades have made the case that while Britain’s 
military might was less pronounced in America prior to the mid-eighteenth century, the 
metropole did attempt to subject autonomous colonial governments to Parliamentary jurisdiction 
via a stronger Royal military presence after the Seven Years War.  
Where in this well-trod field of scholarly discussion about Britain’s military and political 
influence over its American colonies does this dissertation fit? Self Defense and Sea Power aims 
to examine the nearly century-long period (c. 1689-1754) in which the Royal Navy’s influence 
on American coastal defense was minimal. This dissertation ultimately revisits a frequently 
discussed topic (the level of British military intervention and metropolitan power projection in 
the colonies) within the scope of a widely ignored context (Anglo-American naval defense). I 
argue that Anglo-American governments were forced to  defend their own coasts because of 
Royal military neglect and that they played a fundamental role in securing Britain’s fragile hold 
on its maritime frontiers in the New World. Even as Royal guard ships started to appear in North 
American and West Indian waters with greater frequency after Queen Anne’s War, Royal 
captains constantly depended on provincial navy vessels to support their missions throughout the 
Atlantic world. When the metropolitan government attempted to use the Royal Navy to enforce 
unpopular policies during the imperial crisis of the 1760s-70s, the long legacy of independent 
American naval defense (coupled with an equally long legacy of resentment at Royal Navy 
inaction and impressment policies) helped to shape the ways in which American Patriots 
protested British authority.  
While this dissertation revisits Britain’s imperial military weakness in America from a 
new perspective, it also joins a growing scholarly discussion about the ways in which naval 
warfare transformed the course of the First British Empire in America (c. 1607-1783). Of course, 
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studies about the intersection between maritime history and British America’s political 
development are not new. Take for example Robert C. Ritchie's 1986 monograph Captain Kidd 
and the War against the Pirates, which examines the ways in which shifts in party politics in 
London in the 1690s transformed how the British Empire dealt with pirates throughout the 
Atlantic world and beyond.37 Nevertheless, scholars throughout the last decade in particular have 
shown a renewed interest in the intersections between matters of naval defense and colonial 
development.  
Much of this increased interest has come from historians of the Golden Age of Piracy. A 
prime example is Mark Hanna’s 2015 book Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 
1570-1740. Hanna argues that the rise and gradual fall of Anglo-American support for Atlantic 
piracy throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries points to larger trends in the 
relationship between the imperial center and colonial peripheries at the time. While colonial 
support for pirates was rife in the late seventeenth century and at the turn of the eighteenth 
century, various changing economic factors and imperial attempts to include colonial forces in 
the larger War on Pirates helped to unite Anglo-American opinion against the sea rovers. By the 
War of Jenkin's Ear (c. 1739-1748), a “sense of shared imperial goals and economic advantage 
united both English and American sailors and soldiers in defense of commercial predations 
against the Spanish.”38 In essence, initial support and the later rejection of Atlantic piracy 
testified to larger centralizing trends within the British Empire in America. On a similar note, 
this dissertation makes the case that American colonies consistently fitted out provincial navies 
                                                           
37 Robert Ritchie,  Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates (Boston: Harvard University, 1986), pp. 
233-234 in particular 
38Mark Hanna, Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2015), pp. 18-19   https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=4322232. 
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on a wide scale until the Royal Navy expanded its presence in the New World after the War of 
Jenkin’s Ear. 
This examination of Britain’s early American empire from a naval lens has not been 
limited to studies of the Golden Age of Piracy. For instance, in his 2019 book Storm of the Sea: 
Indians and Empires in the Atlantic's Age of Sail, Matthew Bahar argues that between the 
seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, the nations within the Wabanaki confederacy in New 
England and Canada defended their sovereignty from Anglo-American colonization by utilizing 
naval warfare and raids against their enemies.39 While the history of naval combat in colonial 
America has largely only focused on European combatants, Bahar reminds us that Native 
Americans not only utilized sea power, but could shape the course of colonization with naval 
warfare.  
It must be noted here that while this dissertation focuses on naval warfare, it is not a 
traditional military history account of battles and tactics. Additionally, while this dissertation 
considers social factors when discussing the plight of common sailors, it is not a work of 
maritime social history in the vein of historians such as Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh. 
Because no historians have yet fully examined colonial defense policies of Anglo-American 





                                                           
39Matthew Bahar, Storm of the Sea: Indians and Empires in the Atlantic’s Age of Sail (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2019), Kindle eBook edition, pp. 1-5.   
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Sources and Chapter Layout 
 
Considering that this dissertation is more or less an institutional history of early 
American navies (and the broader impact the operations of these fleets had on the provincial-
Royal relationship), I have largely relied on primary sources from provincial and Royal 
governmental records. Some of the best sources for the origins and financing of provincial navies 
come from the minutes and transcriptions of colonial legislative sessions. In other cases, I have 
relied on Admiralty trial records, particularly where provincial sailors and officers took part in 
court battles over prize money. More than any other source, these judicial proceedings give us an 
idea of the concerns provincial sailors had for their economic welfare, and the larger societal 
ramifications of local naval service.  
While American provincial records have been fairly accessible on digital databases, 
limited access on this side of the Atlantic to British (and Caribbean) government records 
necessitated archival research in the United Kingdom itself. At The National Archives in Kew,  I 
examined Royal Navy ship logs, captains’ letters, and other naval records that mentioned serving 
alongside provincial navies. While few Royal Navy sources were particularly verbose regarding 
Anglo-American provincial navies, there are some sections within these naval records where 
Royal officers’ opinions on their provincial compatriots is especially clear.  
 This dissertation unfolds over the course of four chapters. Chapter One traces the role 
provincial navies played in the first two imperial conflicts of this era: King William’s War 
(1689-1698) and Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713). It was in these early imperial conflicts where 
American governors and legislatures developed the prototypes of provincial fleets that they 
would draw on for every future colonial conflict. While Anglo-American officials demonstrated 
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the utility of temporary and semi-permanent local navies during these conflicts, they also came 
to realize the economic and social costs that came with maintaining these forces.  
 In Chapter Two, I examine how provincial governments on British America’s 
borderlands (Nova Scotia, New England, South Carolina, and the West Indies) continued to 
employ provincial navies even during a time of tacit imperial peace (c. 1713-1739). While 
Britain, France, and Spain largely avoided lengthy imperial wars during this era, Anglo-
American governments were still forced to defend their coasts and commerce from Native 
American and piratical threats, as well as from Spanish guarda costas. These provincial fleets 
not only secured Britain’s marginal grasp on its American maritime frontiers during fierce border 
conflicts, but they did so largely unassisted by imperial forces.  
 Chapter Three in many ways is the most pivotal chapter of the dissertation and explores 
the increasing divide between imperial center and colonial peripheries over the proper course of 
naval defense during the War of Jenkin’s Ear (1739-1748). While Britain agreed to establish a 
North American Royal Navy station for the first time (and even to bankroll some provincial 
navies), numerous difficulties arose that limited the effectiveness of this ‘Royalization’ of coastal 
defense. Royal Navy captains did not always cooperate with their provincial counterparts, Royal 
Navy impressment policies infuriated Americans, and inconsistent Parliamentary legislation 
regarding prizes all limited the potential of the provincial-Royal Navy defense partnership.  
 In Chapter Four, I explore how the expanded Royal Navy presence in North America 
during the Seven Years War (1754-1763) made extensive provincial navies unnecessary. As will 
be seen in the concluding chapter, even though overextended provincial governments should 
have welcomed the Royal Navy’s complete assumption of coastal defense with open arms, many 
of the issues from the last war—namely over impressment of American sailors—remained 
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unresolved and complicated provincial relations with the metropole. To add insult to injury, 
Britain’s use of the Royal Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies during the imperial crisis 
aroused the ire of Anglo-Americans from Massachusetts down to Georgia. As Patriot legislators 
and seamen took to the streets and seas to protest British authority, the long legacy of provincial 
naval warfare would help to shape the ways in which Anglo-Americans responded to 
centralization attempts by the metropole.  
     















Chapter I: The Rise of Provincial Navies in the First Imperial Wars, 1689-1713 
 
In 1688, English rebels dethroned the unpopular Catholic and absolutist King James II 
and installed the Dutch Protestant William of Orange and English Mary as the empire’s new 
monarchs. Shortly thereafter, Anglo-Americans initiated similar uprisings against the former 
king’s officials throughout several colonies. This religious and political revolution on both sides 
of the Atlantic not only transformed England’s Atlantic political make-up but triggered nearly 
two and a half decades of imperial conflict with France.1 Anglo-American provincial leaders 
from Canada to Barbados had previous military experience, but were woefully unprepared for 
the global conflicts with England’s imperial enemies known as the King William’s War (1689-
1698) and Queen Anne’s War (1702-1713).  
Historians have long recognized that these lengthy and expensive conflicts forced 
colonial governors to repeatedly rely on long standing civilian militias in lieu of red-coated 
Royal troops.2 In a 1987  historiographical synthesis of recent scholarly works regarding early 
American military defenses, Don Higginbotham observed that scholars had largely come to the 
conclusion that provincial militaries “had advanced from seventeenth-century militia 
to...eighteenth-century semiprofessional forces” in the decades preceding the American 
Revolution.3  
                                                           
1 Richard S. Dunn, “The Glorious Revolution and America,” Origins of Empire: British Overseas 
Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Nicholas Canny.. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
pp. 445-447. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=102745. 
2  Robert K. Jr. Wright, Continental Army, p. 6. (Washington: Center of Military History., 1983). U.S. 
Army, https://history.army.mil/books/RevWar/ContArmy/CA-fm.htm. Also see Douglas Leach, Arms for Empire: A 
Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1-41.  
Google Play eBook.  
3  Don Higginbotham, “The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal,” The William 
and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), p. 253. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1939664. 
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Arguably, a similar ‘military evolution’ is evident in colonial Anglo-American maritime 
defenses during the imperial clashes of 1689-1713 as well. This, however, can only be 
understood in light of Britain’s growing imperial naval commitments in North America. William 
R. Miles has argued that this period saw an increasing deployment of Royal Navy guard ships in 
the Anglo-American colonies alongside a colonial tendency to deploy “private warships, either 
carrying letters of marque (privateers) or ships owned, hired, commandeered or volunteered for 
duty at the behest of local government.”4 I make a distinction between privateers and 
government-controlled warships here, the latter being able to be broken down between regular 
standing ‘provincial navies’ and temporary ‘emergency fleets.’ Provincial leaders commissioned 
privateers and provincial fleets at various points, and the categorical difference between the  two 
methods of provincial naval defense (especially during Queen Anne’s War) were not always 
clear. While scholars have long recognized that independent privateering expanded from King 
William’s War to Queen Anne’s War, I will make the case that provincial governments from 
New England to Barbados also expanded their capacity to create standing and temporary 
provincial navies during these two conflicts.5  
Some provincial authorities (particularly in New England) had limited experience 
building their own fleets in previous conflicts. However, the widespread adoption of either 
standing or temporary provincial navies throughout the English Atlantic world in the long period 
                                                           
4 William R. Miles, The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, 1689-1713. Unpublished Master's 
Thesis. (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Saint Mary's University, 2000), p. 43.  
www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ56715.pdf  
5 For more on the increase in privateering, see Miles, The Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, 
p.p.53-54. In the 1960s, W.A.B. Douglass contended that the “use of a local naval force or sea militia...was well 
established in the American colonies” by the 1740s, but does not explain how. This chapter largely seeks to qualify 
that statement. See Douglass,  “The Sea Militia of Nova Scotia, 1749–1755: A Comment on Naval Policy,” The 
Canadian Historical Review Vol. 47, no. 1 (1966), p. 25. https://www.muse.jhu.edu/article/568408.The dichotomy 
between temporary and semi-regular provincial naval fleets first appears in Howard Chapin’s Privateer Ships and 
Sailors: The First Century of American Colonial Privateering, 1625-1725 (Toulon: Imprimerie G. Mouton, 1926),  
p. 8.  
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of war with the French and Spanish (c. 1689-1713) ensured that local naval expeditions—
ranging from the commissioning of provincial guard ships to provincial naval assaults on 
cities—would be a fundamental part of future Anglo-American military planning. Despite the 
utility of provincial navies, the financial and social costs of fitting them out often exacerbated 
long-standing tensions within Anglo-American communities and highlighted larger weaknesses 
in the imperial-provincial military relationship.6  
 
     Function of Provincial Navies in the Atlantic World 
 
 The New England colonies were among the first mainland provinces to outfit provincial 
naval forces in this era. Naval historian Oscar Paullin once remarked, Massachusetts “spent more 
upon ships of war than any other colony”  and had provincial naval defense vessels as early as 
1634.7 Nevertheless, colonies throughout the Atlantic world began to follow their example 
during the long imperial conflicts between 1689 and 1713. During the first two imperial wars, 
provincial governments from Massachusetts to Barbados fitted out semi-permanent and 
temporary provincial warships to guard commerce, defend coastal cities in emergencies, support 
infantry campaigns, and to spearhead assaults on enemy ports. These functions would go 
essentially unchanged for the rest of the period covered by this study. 
 Before any examination of provincial guardships is possible, one must understand the 
role of English metropolitan military intervention in the Atlantic world in the late seventeenth 
                                                           
6 Even though I will make the case that provincial authorities campaigned for an increased Royal Navy 
presence throughout the English Atlantic, Mark Hanna has also demonstrated how provincial authorities could see 
corrupt Royal Navy captains who did little to defend the colonists as “pirates” of sorts. See Hanna, Pirate Nests and 
the Rise of the British Empire, 1570-1740 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), pp. 223-227.  
7  Charles O. Paullin, Colonial Army and Navy, Unpublished Manuscript. Charles Oscar Paullin papers, 
1931. MSS53033, Library of Congress, p. 45.  
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century.  In this period, Royal Navy visitation to the North American continent (which as yet had 
no Royal Navy bases) before 1713 was largely limited to individual station ships and small 
fleets. Prior to the latter years of the War of the Spanish Succession, the English government 
devoted more military and financial resources to European battlefields than American 
campaigns. Imperial authorities typically only sent extensive Royal military assistance if Anglo-
Americans or their agents could create cost-effective plans for joint expeditions. All told, Crown 
officials typically expected Anglo-Americans to facilitate their own local defenses.8  
 Even though Westminster occasionally sent Royal squadrons to strike enemy targets in 
North America and West Indies during wartime, most Royal Navy vessels in the New World 
were assigned to convoy duty or acting as regional “station ships.” Royal ships escorting 
merchant fleets or guarding specific ports were typically smaller warships than those utilized for 
larger fleet operations in Europe. These smaller frigates included fourth rate frigates that had 
more than fifty guns, fifth rates that had between 30 and 48 guns, and sixth rates that had 
between 10 and 30 cannon guns aboard. On occasion, larger third rate warships that carried 
between 60 and 80 guns were sent on missions to the Caribbean, but they were a rare site in 
North America.9  
 In fact, the Royal Navy presence was always larger in the West Indies than in North 
America—a trend that would continue throughout much of the next century. 1701, while there 
were only a few Royal Navy station ships on the North American coastline, there were nine 
Royal Navy ships at Jamaica in addition to a Royal force of twenty-two vessels led by Admiral 
Benbow. The reasons for this uneven military distribution were many, including the colder 
conditions in mainland North America, the higher revenue of the plantation islands, the necessity 
                                                           
8 Miles, Royal Navy, pp. 3-4, 46-40.  
9 Miles, Royal Navy, pp. 7-8.   
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of threatening Spanish pretensions in the heart of its New World empire, and the British 
government’s yearning for control over the Spanish bullion trade in the Caribbean.10  As Queen 
Anne’s War progressed, Royal Naval involvement in the West Indian theatre also increased. 
Various factors led to the deployment of more Royal ships and the construction of more 
permanent victualling facilities in the Caribbean, including Royal interest in safeguarding ever-
expanding British commerce, a larger metropolitan desire to expand British control over the 
slave and bullion trade with the Spanish empire.11 While the seeds of greater Royal Naval 
involvement were being sown by the early 1700s in the Caribbean, the full ‘royalization’ of 
naval warfare in America would take more than half a century.  
Even with the presence of a Royal ship in port, tranquility and coastal security was never 
guaranteed. This was the case in 1686, when Admiralty authorities sent Captain John George 
                                                           
10 See Ruth Bourne, Queen Anne’s Navy in the West Indies (New Haven: University of New Haven, 1939), 
pp. 56-59, G.S. Graham, “The Naval Defence of British North America, 1739-1763,” pp. 95-96. Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, Vol. 30 (1948), Jstor https://www.jstor.org/stable/3678700,  Peter T. Bradley, British 
Maritime Enterprise in the New World From the Late Fifteenth to the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Lampeter: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1999), pp. 197-200,  and  Miles, Royal Navy, p. 66.    
11 Christian Buchet, “The Royal Navy and the Caribbean, 1689-1763,”  The Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 80, No. 
1, p. 37.  Taylor and Francis https://doi.org/10.1080/00253359.1994.10656482. In The British Maritime Enterprise, 
Peter T. Bradley qualifies the notion that the Royal Navy expanded its numbers in the West Indies: “During the 
reign of Queen Anne...a significant shift in the deployment of English naval vessels was the decision to endeavour to 
keep a regular striking force in those waters...thereby converting the Jamaica squadron into a permanent institution. 
Other individual warships were regularly attached to colonies such as Barbados and the Leeward Islands” (p. 202). 
The Royal Navy also expanded the sorts of ships it deployed in the West Indies. Ian McLaughlan had found that the 
Royal  Navy began to send smaller vessels including sloops to the Caribbean during the latter stages of the conflict. 
For more, see Ian McLaughlan, The Sloop of War, 1650-1763 (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2014), Google Play 
eBook, p. 79. For further reasons that imperial expansion occurred during Queen Anne’s War,  See Rodger, The 
Command of the Ocean, pp. 163-165, and Richard Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830 (Routledge, 
1999) pp. 164-168. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=165215. 
 Shinsuke Satsuma’s examination of ever-shifting attitudes regarding a “pro maritime war argument” is also 
extremely significant for this study. Satsuma argues that a distinctive argument for maritime warfare in Spanish 
America (for reasons of economic gain and due to military disadvantages during land campaigns) spread throughout 
the English government during Queen Anne’s War.  While the adherence to this paradigm rose and fell based on 
political events and alternating political parties in power throughout the conflict, the widespread push for maritime 
war encouraged various maritime campaigns against Spanish America, and significant legislation such as the 
America Act of 1708. While the push for maritime war against the Spanish Empire fluctuated and even declined 
after the conclusion of Queen Anne's War in 1713, it would reappear with force in 1739 at the beginning of the War 
of Jenkin's Ear. For more, see Satsuma,  Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century: Silver, 
Seapower, and the Atlantic (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2013), pp. 244-247.   
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with the small frigate H.M.S. Rose to guard Boston in 1686 after King James II’s establishment 
of the Dominion of New England. With enterprising administrators such as Edward Randolph 
and Governor-General Andros at the helm of the Dominion, James II hoped to consolidate royal 
power by combining the administrations of every colony between Massachusetts and New 
Jersey.12 Despite being a Royal Navy station ship captain in Boston,  George allegedly used his 
position for profiteering, served as a yes-man to Edmund Andros and Massachusetts official 
Joseph Dudley, and did little to secure the region’s frontiers, or to pursue pirates.13  
 During the late seventeenth century, Royal Navy recalcitrance in pirate hunting coincided 
with widespread provincial support for piracy against Spanish trade. As early as the 1670s when 
rulers in West Indian colonies such as Jamaica and Barbados began to shun pirates that had made 
sport of peacetime raids on Spanish targets, enterprising Anglo-American pirates sought out new 
markets in North American ports. These pirates found willing customers among proprietary and 
charter colonies with looser royal Royal governance, including Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
Carolina. Royal centralizers such as Edward Randolph began to associate support for piracy in 
traditional charter colonies such as Massachusetts with a worrisome provincial desire for 
political autonomy.14  
New Englanders welcomed pirates primarily for economic reasons. Spanish coinage was 
especially welcome in Boston during the postwar economic depression that followed the 
destructive King Philip’s War of the mid-1670s. During this conflict, Massachusetts authorities 
even employed a few former West Indian buccaneers familiar with guerilla combat as Indian-
                                                           
12  Mary Lou Lustig, The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637-1714 (Madison: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), pp. 134-139 
13Charles McLean Andrews, ed. “Introduction” in Original Narratives of Early American History: 
Narratives of the Insurrections 1675-1690 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), pp. 213-214.  
14 Hanna, Pirate Nests pp. 144-148. 
27 
 
hunters on a few land-based missions.  The region’s flirtation with piracy would soon come to an 
end, however. With increasing Spanish pressure on James II by the late 1680s, the king ordered 
Edmund Andros and his ally, the administrator Edward Randolph, to crack down on piracy. 
Ultimately, the king's proclamation lacked the legal specifics on how the officials were to 
proceed against pirates.15 Nevertheless, Andros remained determined to use the Royal frigate 
H.M.S. Rose and the temporary station ship H.M.S. Kingfisher to crack down on pirates, and 
English merchants violating the Navigation Acts. These Acts required Anglo-Americans to use 
English intermediaries to trade with other European empires.16  
Dominion authorities also hoped to bolster the Royal Navy’s patrols with provincial 
naval forces. This utilization of provincial warships to supplement Royal Navy patrols and 
cruises would ultimately become commonplace throughout the English Atlantic world.  On 25 
May 1687, Randolph suggested that “itt is necessary a Small vessell be provided for his 
Majesties Service On the Coasts…”17 Randolph’s suggestion ultimately led to the government’s 
purchase of the Speedwell ketch.18 Throughout the next several years, provincial authorities used 
the Speedwell for many tasks that would become routine for Massachusetts provincial navy 
vessels for years to come: transporting soldiers, supplies, and even high ranking officials to the 
contested Maine borderlands and Canada.19 While provincial governments could occasionally 
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hire privateers to conduct such missions, military vessels under their immediate control and 
supervision would prove to be more reliable for immediate strategic needs.  
By early 1688, Anglo-American tensions with the French and Native Americans on the 
Maine borderlands convinced Andros to increase the English military presence in that sector.20 
Part of Andros’s military preparations included expanding the provincial fleet. In 1690,  Andros 
reported that throughout 1688-9,  “The severall Vessells Imployed for the security of the Coast 
and fishery of that time were His Maties Sloope Mary21  John Alden Comandr,” the sloop Sarah, 
the Brigantine Samuel, and “His Maties New Sloope Speedwell  John Cooke Comandr finished 
and ready to take in stores and provisions for the Eastward.”22 It is worth noting that Andros 
neglected to mention at least one other provincial vessel that was in service, the sloop 
Resolution. Sloops were typically small, swift, single-masted merchant vessels.23 Andros’s navy, 
then, was largely built with lightly armed and quick vessels for coastal patrols and 
reconnaissance rather than large naval battles.  
In essence then, Andros’s sizable provincial navy served as a variegated general coastal 
defense force that could juggle multiple tasks alongside Royal Navy station ships. Despite its 
utility, however, international and local political controversies would soon end the operations of 
this fleet. Puritan New Englanders had begun to grow weary of Andros’s strict military discipline 
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on the Maine frontier as war broke out with hostile Native forces, and fumed over rumors that 
the Catholic King James II had a new child and heir.24 Additionally, many New Englanders had 
grown disillusioned with Andros’s widespread eradication of provincial legal autonomy and his 
Anglicanism. With news that the Dutch Protestant William of Orange had landed in England and 
dethroned King James II, Protestant rebels led bloodless revolts against James II's officials 
throughout many of the American colonies. In April, provincial authorities led over 2,000 
militiamen in a coup against Andros, and imprisoned him and other Dominion officials before 
sending them to England in early 1690.25  
The Royal Navy frigate H.M.S. Rose and Andros’s provincial navy both attracted the ire 
of the rioters that imprisoned Andros and his allies. Deserters from the Rose reported that the 
unpopular Captain George (with a Catholic lieutenant under him) planned to attack Boston with 
Andros and hand Boston over to the French. Deserters from the Royal frigate and Boston rebels 
dismasted the ship during the chaos of the April uprising.26 The rebels also seem to have 
disbanded the majority of Andros’s small provincial navy of a half-dozen provincial warships, 
and one shipbuilder even complained that they took the sails off an unnamed sloop that he had 
built for the Andros regime.27 While this sloop’s name was never mentioned, it is possible that 
this vessel was the Mary. With widespread contemporary rumors that one of Andros’s soldiers 
(unsurprisingly a Roman Catholic) planned to seize the Mary, it seems that New England 
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authorities had equal reason to fear that their “Papist” enemies would use Royal vessels and their 
own provincial ships against them.28  
Whatever the political motives of the New England rebels, the revolutionary government 
in Boston—with Simon Bradstreet as its new governor—would soon have its hands full with 
fallout from this uprising, an outbreak of piracy, and the beginning of an imperial war with 
France and its Native allies. While they disbanded the Rose and Andros’s provincial navy, 
Massachusetts authorities quickly reemployed some of the colony’s sloops to meet these threats. 
The new regime’s willingness to employ provincial vessels for naval defense highlights the fact 
that New Englanders were more than willing to employ provincial navies, but they did not want 
their political and religious enemies to have control over their local warships.  
Massachusetts officials continued Andros’s policy of depending on provincial vessels to 
guard the coasts after the Glorious Revolution, and even expanded on it. This was particularly 
evident in the mid-1690s, when the provincial government—concerned that Royal Navy ships 
would be useless in shallow shoal waters off the coast—commissioned the Province Galley. The 
Province Galley was a two-masted, ten-gun, warship that had oars to propel it through shallow 
waters and to pursue enemy craft. New England authorities designed the craft when Royal Navy 
frigates proved too large to pursue enemy craft in shoal waters off the coast. As it would happen, 
there would be two such Province Galleys throughout the rest of King William’s War and Queen 
Anne’s War.29  
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One contemporary critic complained that the initial Province Galley (which would later 
be replaced with a vessel of the same name) was a “small vessell about 70 Tuns...she carrys no 
Gunns close and to wit not be able to make any considerable Defence if [a number] should board 
for she may do sirvice upon some small priviters  but is not compariable” to a prize vessel that 
the Royal Navy had captured the year before and that had been in the service of the province.30  
Despite this criticism, the Province Galley would prove to be a major addition to Massachusetts’ 
defense capabilities. By the end of King William’s War, Massachusetts Governor Stoughton was 
able to brag that the Province Galley’s Captain Cyprian Southack and his crew were “constantly 
employed to cruise about the Capes and convoy vessels from Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, etc. between Massachusetts, Martha's Vineyard and Rhode Island. She has been of 
great service and the Commander has acquitted himself with great care and diligence, none of the 
vessels under his charge having miscarried.” The Province Galley not only served as a provincial 
guard ship for Massachusetts, but as a regional guardian for English commerce throughout the 
northern Atlantic.31 
 Massachusetts was not alone in its commissioning of provincial warships during the first 
two imperial wars in the Americas, as West Indian governments frequently fitted out local 
defense fleets. Early twentieth historian Ruth Bourne argued that Anglo-American governments 
in the Caribbean during the Queen Anne’s War were “helpless and open to the enemy, unwilling 
and almost unable to cooperate with each other.” For Bourne, neither “local sloops, 
merchantmen, privateers, nor convoys adequately reenforced the few naval cruisers” in the West 
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Indies.32  Despite this broad assertion, both primary evidence and subsequent scholars have 
emphasized the importance of provincial naval vessels in the West Indian theatre during King 
William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars.33 The importance of these vessels was heightened by the fact 
that the region’s Royal Navy forces struggled with tropical disease and a haphazard provisioning 
system.34 Depletion of Royal Navy manpower and supplies meant fewer Royal Navy warships 
could defend the island colonies. Fewer Royal guard ships necessitated the presence of more 
provincial guard vessels.  
  With hostile French or Spanish forces often only a few islands away, West Indian 
officials frequently went to great expense to shore up coastal defenses while waiting for much-
desired Royal Navy assistance. In a 1689 letter to the Lords of the Committee for Trade and 
Foreign Plantations (later known as the Board of Trade), the Leeward Islands’ Governor 
Christopher Codrington lamented that his government was forced to levy a heavy “Tax of one 
million of Sugar” to supply infantry units and provincial naval vessels, but also bragged that a 
“Privateer and my own two Sloopes are arrived here with a French Briganteen and two French 
Sloopes....”35  Codrington’s letter reveals not only one common source of funding for provincial 
guardships—local commerce taxes—but also the vague distinction between provincial warships 
and “privateers.” The malleability of terms describing government commissioned warships 
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became so vague by Queen Anne’s War, that one of Codrington’s successors—Governor Daniel 
Parke—would refer to a government-commissioned private raider as a “publick privateer.”36  
While categorical haziness between “privateers” and “provincial navies” would persist 
throughout much of the next century, most provincial officials seemed to draw a distinction 
between government-operated naval forces and privately-commissioned warships. One of the 
most dramatic instances of this distinction came at the beginning of Queen Anne’s War in 1702, 
when Barbadian authorities complained about the “inconveniences of granting Commissions to 
privateers at this time, for that the vessels taken up for the service of this Island and defending 
our coasts do want sailors,” and decided to prevent privateer ships from sailing while officials 
fitted out provincial “vessels of war.”37 While privateers were useful for raiding enemy 
commerce, local governments often preferred to have at least some vessels under their immediate 
command during emergencies and sustained military expeditions.  
 While colonies throughout the English Atlantic built  provincial navies to guard their 
commerce from enemy raiders whether or not Royal Navy forces were nearby, they also used 
provincial warships to spearhead expeditions against enemy ports and to support infantry 
operations on land. One clear example of provincial naval support of infantry operations 
occurred in the spring of 1703/4, when Massachusetts Governor Joseph Dudley expanded his 
colony’s militia and naval forces, and ordered the famous colonial ranger Colonel Benjamin 
Church to assault French-aligned Wabanakis on the Maine borderlands. 
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 Dudley and his partners in the provincial assembly cooperated to establish a provincial 
naval pay scale entitled an “Establishmt of the Pay for Vessels Taken up for War & Transports & 
Officers & Mariners Pay.” Aside from the Province Galley itself and a couple of Royal Navy 
frigates, the Massachusetts government’s financial establishment allowed the colony to fit out 
over twenty-five provincial warships and troop transports, and thirty-nine smaller whaleboats.38 
During the expedition, Church himself convinced the Royal Navy captains on his expedition that 
it was “very expedient and serviceable to the crown, that Captain Southack in the [Province 
Galley] should accompany them [on a patrol], which they did readily acquiesce with him in.”39 
Far from resenting the presence of provincial vessels on campaigns, Royal Navy officers came to 
depend on them for vital assistance.  
 While provincial warships were useful for offensive naval patrols and offensive 
campaigns, colonial governments also used them for diplomacy with various coastal Native 
nations.  For instance, in the spring of 1701 as war seemed more and more likely with France and 
Spain, the Massachusetts governor and council made various military preparations including 
reinforcing Castle William in Boston Harbor and the Province Galley. The Province Galley was 
to then escort government commissioners to “Casco bay, there to meet with and discourse the 
Eastern Indians; and to endeavour to hold them Steady to his Matys Interests and That the value 
of One hundred Pounds be sent by them for Presents.”40 While provincial naval power could be 
used for “soft power” expeditions such as this diplomatic voyage, New England’s provincial 
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naval forces were also used for military strikes on the colony’s Indigenous enemies. For instance, 
in May of 1705, the Boston Newsletter newspaper reported that Governor Dudley sent the 
Province Galley and another local vessel to pursue “5 or 6 Canoo's of Indians” that had attacked 
an English fishing shallop near Winter Harbor, Maine.41 In essence, provincial navies were both 
useful for diplomatic missions and punitive expeditions with  New England’s Native American 
partners and opponents.  
 It is important to note that provincial naval protection of the coasts and support for 
offensive military expeditions did not occur in vacuums. In fact, even as Dudley’s administration 
planned a major offensive against the Wabanaki, the Massachusetts government outfitted small 
sloops to guard merchant vessels between late 1703 and early 1704, and commissioned 
provincial warships to hunt down infamous privateer-turned-pirate John Quelch.42 
Massachusetts’ ability to wage three different provincial naval campaigns and patrols within the 
space of a few months points to a growing provincial commitment to naval warfare as long 
imperial wars dragged on. Yet this did not come without economic and political costs. For 
instance, in July of 1704 Dudley bragged that the General Court had “very frankly granted 
[£23,000]” to the fitting out of Church's naval and land expedition, but neighboring colonies 
were slow to help. He worried that citizens within Massachusetts were “oppressed with hard 
marches and great taxes” while its neighbors did not share the burden.43 As will be discussed 
below, concerns over taxes and insufficient naval assistance from other colonies were among the 
many larger sociopolitical and economic costs of provincial naval warfare.  
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 While colonial governments constantly employed provincial navies to facilitate 
diplomacy, to hunt down enemy raiders and to assist military expeditions (often simultaneously), 
the most consequential and controversial deployment of provincial navies during these first two 
imperial wars would be naval assaults on enemy port cities. In victory or defeat, provincial naval 
and land assaults on cities like French Quebec or Spanish St. Augustine were always costly in 
terms of money, shipping, munitions, and most importantly manpower. The Massachusetts 
government’s painless capture of the French Nova Scotian base at Port Royal (later Annapolis 
Royal) in early 1690 was uncharacteristic as far as colonial sieges went. In the late spring of 
1690, Sir William Phips led a force of more than 700 men on five vessels (including the 
provincial navy vessels Six Friends, Porcupine, and sloop Mary) to capture the French port. 
After the force arrived on 9 May, the small French garrison surrendered the town and ramshackle 
fort without firing a single shot. Phips's men sacked the town and enjoyed the simple victory.44 
 While Port Royal had been relatively easy to capture, the subsequent New England 
assault on Quebec later that summer would be an utter failure. Without Royal Navy ships at their 
disposal, colonial officials from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York planned a joint land 
assault on Montreal and Massachusetts-led naval assault on Quebec.45 This autonomous military 
alliance was more of a necessity than a preference for local military expenditure and command. 
In fact, from the very moment William and Mary took the throne, both New York and 
Massachusetts had made constant appeals for Royal military supplies.46 New Englanders in 
particular desired assistance from the Royal Navy as well. For instance, as early as March 1690, 
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Bostonian Elisha Hutchinson argued that “If his maj:tie would please Speedily to furnish us with 
two ffrigatts and Amunition” the taking of French Canada would be possible.47  
Despite the absence of Royal Navy ships, the expedition proceeded as planned. It is 
interesting that the editor of the first issue of the first newspaper ever published in English North 
America, the short-lived Publick Occurrences of Boston, boasted that that Massachusetts native 
Sir William Phips commanded a “Navy of two and thirty Sail; which went from hence the 
beginning of the last August” against Quebec.48 Phips’s massive colonial navy was largely made 
up of impressed vessels, was bankrolled by a large loan from Boston merchants, and involved as 
many as 2,300 soldiers and sailors.49  Unfortunately for the Anglo-Americans, the land assault on 
Montreal never fully materialized, and the sea attack on Quebec failed due to late-Autumn 
storms, a lack of supplies, and over 400 casualties due to disease and shipwrecks.50  
Authorities in Boston were distraught, and were quickly overwhelmed by angry mariners 
and soldiers, and a hefty expedition-related debt. Connecticut issued the first major taxes since 
Edmund Andros's rule, and the colony of Plymouth (which was soon to be subsumed by 
Massachusetts) raised taxes so high that they equaled nearly 10% of all taxed properties in the 
colony. Massachusetts' debt was compounded by the fact that its provincial authorities had 
borrowed so much from merchants, and some estimates placed its total debt at nearly £40,000. In 
response, the government in Boston took the controversial step of issuing paper bills of credit to 
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stimulate the shattered economy.51 One merchant, worried over the fervor of unpaid sailors and 
soldiers from the expedition, claimed  “...we have found a way to stop ye mouths & aswage ye 
passion of ye: soldiers & seamen by a new mint raised here of paper money...there are not many 
yt take it & they yt have it scarce know now what to do with it.”52 Despite these criticisms, 
scholars have long recognized that Massachusetts's novel adoption of paper money—partly 
inspired by provincial naval costs—set a standard for many other colonies to adopt paper 
currency to pay for immediate war-time measures throughout King William’s War and Queen 
Anne’s War.53  
Not every provincial naval assault on enemy ports occurred without imperial assistance. 
In 1707, Massachusetts and Royal Navy forces attempted to capture French Port Royal (which 
had reverted back to French control in the previous conflict). After the expedition’s defeat, a 
Scottish merchant and adventurer named Samuel Vetch campaigned for imperial officials to 
spearhead a major invasion of Louis XIV’s Canadian strongholds.54 Despite having largely 
ignored the Anglo-American war effort in the New World from 1702 to 1707, Whig authorities 
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in London took Vetch's proposals seriously due to an increasing war of attrition on the 
battlefields of Europe and thanks to pressure from various interested merchant groups.55  
By 1709, imperial officials approved Vetch’s plans to drive the French from Montreal 
and Quebec and expected provincial naval forces to play a major role. Queen Anne herself 
ordered Vetch to ensure that forces from New York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania build “six or 
more large Boats” and contract with the Iroquois to build canoes to help transport soldiers. 
Additionally, Queen Anne requested that New England build various flat-bottomed transport 
vessels, and that provincial authorities provide “able Pilots, whereof Capt Southweek [sic] to be 
one, & to go in his own Galley…”56  
That Queen Anne (or one of her Royal officials acting in her name) knew Southack by 
name is unsurprising considering the queen’s predecessor, King William, had personally 
rewarded Southack for effective privateering against the French in early 1693/4.57 What is 
striking, however, is her outright support of and dependence on provincial and Native naval 
resources throughout the northern colonies to support the proposed expedition against French 
Canada. Unfortunately for Vetch and his colonial partners, imperial authorities cancelled the 
1709 joint expedition without warning when peace talks seemed likely with Louis XIV that 
summer.58 Vetch protested that preparations had been costly, and that “our transports, flatt-
bottom'd boats, whale-boats, as well as our troops being all ready att 12 hours warning; and 
because the fleet is so long a coming that the lateness of the Expedition may endanger some of 
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the ships in their return to be blown off the coast…”59 Anglo-American and Iroquois diplomats 
traveled to London and convinced a new Tory administration in 1710 to recommit to Vetch’s 
plan.60 Royal officials sent two frigates and a bomb vessel from England to assist provincial 
forces take Port Royal, and three station frigates from New York and Boston joined the attack in 
early 1710.61 
For the first time on the North American continent, significant provincial and Royal Navy 
forces assaulted a major target together. The fact that provincial naval forces would defer to 
Royal Navy command is evident when Dudley and his Council advised that the Province Galley 
be “Disposed in the fleet at the Direction of the Commadore so Soon as they Shall be ready to 
proceed.”62  Royal Navy officials themselves asked for specific provincial naval support. For 
example, the captain of the H.M.S. Dragon asked the Massachusetts council for a local sloop to 
act as a “tender” to the Royal Navy vessels on the expedition.63 All told, over thirty provincial 
transports with 3,500 troops from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and 
Massachusetts joined Royal Navy vessels and the Province Galley in the successful capture of 
Port Royal in the autumn of 1710.64 
While provincial and imperial authorities alike rejoiced over the successful campaign, 
victories were not always guaranteed for even the largest joint expeditions. The following year, 
another Anglo-American campaign against Quebec failed after a major storm destroyed much of 
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the Royal and provincial fleet.65 Even before the storm, the disastrous operation was rife with 
desertion, and internecine disputes between Royal and provincial military officials over supplies 
and perceived dedication to the expedition.66 In particular, Royal military officials accused New 
Englanders of not providing sufficient naval support for the expedition—a barb more often fired 
by provincial authorities at the Royal Navy than the reverse.67  
While all the discussions of provincial naval warfare thus far have involved planned 
naval expeditions, Anglo-Americans often relied on impromptu and temporary impressment or 
hiring of vessels—emergency fleets—to ward off immediate threats. One of the clearest cases of 
this phenomenon occurred in Charles Town, South Carolina in the summer of 1706. A Franco-
Spanish invasion force—emboldened by news that a yellow fever epidemic had weakened 
Charles Town’s defenders—launched a major assault on the seaport.68 It is uncertain what level 
of resistance the Franco-Spanish invaders expected, but they were likely aware that the colony 
was a proprietary English colony without a Royal Navy guard ship.69  
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With an advanced warning from a New York privateer in the area, Governor Nathaniel 
Johnson organized a council of war, readied militia forces on land,  and the “Vessels that lay in 
harbour were ordered to be fitted (viz) three ships one Briganteen & two Sloops + a fire ship…” 
The fact that Johnson “ordered” these vessels to defend the colony implies they were impressed 
on the spot. Johnson commissioned Rhett as a Vice Admiral of this emergency fleet, and Rhett 
“hoisted ye Union Flag on board ye Crown Galley.”70 Rhett’s usage of that flag is particularly 
noteworthy considering its legal and political implications. Under English law, only Royal Navy 
vessels could fly the Union Jack. Merchant vessels were limited to flying a similar banner with a 
“white escutcheon” in the center.71  By flying the “Union Flag,” Rhett flouted imperial law, but 
perhaps intended to represent his makeshift fleet as the legitimate substitute for distant English 
forces. 
Ultimately, Rhett’s makeshift fleet of impressed merchant ships was successful.  Upon 
seeing Rhett’s hasty armada, the Franco-Spanish fleet retreated “in great hast + Confusion…” 
without any resistance. Soon thereafter, Rhett took command of both the New York privateer 
ship and a local sloop to chase off scattered Spanish vessels.  Even with the impressment of the 
aforementioned merchant ships, more volunteers joined Rhett in this final assault.  One 
contemporary bragged of the “severall Gentlemen and others who were willing to share in the 
Danger and [honor] of that design…”  Rhett’s naval forces were so successful that another 
observer boasted that with the “Providence of Almighty God,” the colony’s foes  “like a Second 
Spanish Armada” met with destruction before the “flourishing colony.”72 While not every 
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emergency fleet in colonial America stopped enemy invaders with such ease, Rhett’s 
straightforward success against a joint European invasion with mere merchant vessels and militia 
forces attests to the utility of makeshift provincial naval defenses throughout the first two 
imperial wars.  
Ultimately, as two long imperial conflicts raged between 1689 and 1713, the traditional 
New England habit of fitting out local defense vessels became an Atlantic world phenomenon. 
Colonists from New Hampshire to Barbados built semi-permanent guard vessels and impressed 
emergency fleets to conduct diplomacy, hunt pirates, assist the Royal Navy, besiege enemy 
settlements, support offensive operations, and to defend ports from imminent attack. While these 
provincial navies were useful for military purposes, these expensive fleets would also amplify 
internal colonial controversies and challenge the fragile relationship between periphery and 
center in the nascent British Empire.  
 
                    The Social and Economic Costs of Provincial Navies 
 
 Provincial navies often had social, political, and economic costs beyond what any 
colonial government had anticipated or expected. Although provincial governments built local 
fleets with the ostensible goal of defending their coastlines, the expenses and stresses associated 
with naval warfare amplified internal disputes over taxation, religion, race, and class. On a larger 
scale, provincial reliance on local naval defense and the Royal Navy’s inadequate protection of 
Britain’s possessions in the New World highlighted larger weaknesses in the imperial-provincial 
military relationship.  
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 Perhaps fewer historical examples better highlight the wider sociopolitical ramifications 
of provincial naval defense than the dramatic fate of Edmund Andros’s provincial navy after the 
Glorious Revolution of 1689, and the even more eventful story of his provincial sloop Mary. In 
June 1689, not long after New England rebels deposed Andros and dispersed his military forces, 
pirates began to attack local commerce. Provisional Governor Bradstreet and other officials 
ordered that “one Suitable Vessel be forthwith fitted out to Clear our Coast of Pyrats, which may 
be after Improved to transport Souldiers, Ammunition, and provisions for the Eastern 
Expedition, and from thence to Range the Coasts of Arcadia to Secure our fishing Vessels.”73  
Because Boston authorities refused to restore the local Royal Navy guard ship (due to its 
captain’s alleged Jacobitical and pro-Andros sentiments), they decided to use Andros’s 
remaining provincial vessels to hunt pirates.74 
 In August, provincial officials decided to send Captain Joseph Thaxter with the 
provincial sloop Resolution to go hunting for a pirate named Thomas Pound who had captured 
two vessels off the coast.75  Intriguingly, Pound was the former captain of the provincial sloop 
Mary and had even served as a pilot for the now-deposed Royal Navy Captain George.  It is 
worth noting here that provincial authorities rotated captains and officers of provincial ships on a 
frequent basis. After an initially unsuccessful hunt, in late September provincial authorities sent 
Captain Samuel Pease with the sloop Mary to search for the same vessel’s former-captain-
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turned-pirate.76 Pound’s forces, confident of their prowess, sent word to Boston via one of their 
victims that they would slaughter the entire crew of any “government sloop” sent out against 
them.77  
By early October, Pease and the crew of the Mary discovered and overpowered Pound's 
pirates  near Martha's Vineyard, but Captain Pease lost his life in the battle. Ultimately, the 
Boston court only executed the pirate responsible for killing Pease, and spared Pound and the 
rest of his men.78  New England divine Increase Mather praised that “small Vessel of Brisk 
Bostoneers, who in Their Majesties Name and under Their Colours, maintained a Bloody Fight 
with the Rogues and took them…” but alleged that Captain George of the H.M.S. Rose supplied 
the pirates with ammunition. It is not clear if this accusation is true, but some contemporaries 
including one of the accused pirates substantiated this claim.79  
 At the start of the new decade, New England agents defended their political revolution 
against Andros before the new king in London (William III), and also traded barbs with their 
former provincial overlord over his handling of the region’s coastal defense. In an undated letter 
from Bradstreet to the king, the aged governor detailed his plans to send Andros back to 
England, asked for the restoration of Massachusetts’ original charter,  and  briefly noted that he 
had been “necessitated to grant Commissions to suppress, bring in and secure” Pound and other 
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pirates.80 In contrast to Bradstreet’s promise that he was doing all that he could to hunt pirates, 
Andros blamed the new Massachusetts government for coastal insecurity. He took responsibility 
for the initial creation of the colony’s provincial navy, including the Mary and Speedwell) 
alongside two private vessels before the “subversion” of his regime. Andros complained that the 
rebels dispersed his forces, which led to Franco-Indigenous incursions that endangered the lives 
of Anglo-American colonists on the northern borderlands, the fisheries, and even the New 
England forests that helped supply raw materials for the Royal Navy. Without King William's 
intervention, Franco-Indigenous forces would destroy colonies that lacked “Provisions...Ships, 
Vessells, Seamen, and other Necessarys in New England Capable to supply or Transport any 
force…”81  
Massachusetts’s agents in London contested Andros’s criticisms, and insisted that Andros 
himself had mismanaged provincial naval forces during his controversial reign. They alleged that 
one of Andros’s Catholic military officers “had [been] suspected to be in a Plott for deserting and 
runing [sic] over with the Sloop Mary to the French.” They further accused Andros of 
mismanaging the provincial navy, namely having impressed private vessels for inane tasks 
without planning to use these forces for extensive coastal defense. Finally, they argued that 
Andros never paid his sailors, which added to the myriad internal issues in the colony. These 
accusations highlighted Massachusettsans’ growing anxiety over a suspected Franco-Catholic 
conspiracy to destroy their godly commonwealth.82 
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While Massachusetts's agents resented what they believed were Andros’s lies, they would 
soon face a much more material challenge connected to the revolt of 1689. New York’s newly 
appointed governor, Henry Sloughter, insisted that one of the Boston government’s two publicly 
funded sloops (likely referring to the Mary and Speedwell)  should be given to his colony since 
Andros had commissioned them under the guise of the Dominion of New England—the mega 
colony which New York had just recently been a part of. Based on the advice of the Lords of the 
Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations (the future Board of Trade that would handle 
colonial affairs), in April 1690 King William ordered that one of the publicly funded sloops be 
sent to Sloughter.83  
What ensued was a lengthy transatlantic argument over who owned the first provincial 
navy that Andros employed in 1688, whether they were publicly funded by taxpayers or not, and 
which vessels were in service by the time King William intervened in these disputes in early 
1690. The sources are often too contradictory or clear enough to make sense of.84 Perhaps this is 
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unsurprising considering the sociopolitical chaos that has followed political revolutions 
throughout history. Nevertheless, by 1691, Governor Sloughter’s successor in New York had at 
least considered sending one of the Royal Navy’s hired sloops, the Archangel, to go and seize the 
sole remaining sloop from Andros’s fleet—the Mary.85 While it appears that this seizure never 
happened, it is worth noting that extended debates over small provincial warships not only 
complicated the fallout from Massachusetts’ experience during the Glorious Revolution, but 
nearly led to bloodshed between New Englanders and Royal Naval forces from New York.    
If Massachusetts authorities thought their legal troubles with the sloop Mary were over, 
they were sadly mistaken. While the Mary’s former captain Thomas Pound had turned to piracy, 
its new skipper John Alden faced charges of witchcraft in the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692. In 
the years leading up to the witchcraft crisis, provincial authorities entrusted John Alden with 
various missions on the northern borderlands, including helping to free captives from Franco-
Indigenous forces. Critics claimed that Alden had done little to help captives, and only wished to 
trade with New England's enemies. This became especially apparent when Alden fled with 
ransom money for captives held by French authorities in 1691, and when he attacked a French 
vessel despite being granted safe passage by French negotiators. Alden's selfishness led to the 
continued captivity of various provincial officials, including his own son (John Alden, Jr.). It is 
possible that this corrupt behavior, coupled with accusations that Alden was responsible for an 
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Indigenous attack on York, Maine (and other miscellaneous charges including the fact that he 
had Indigenous lovers) inspired girls in Salem to accuse him of having a leading role in satanic 
rituals alongside accused-warlock and former minister George Burroughs.86   
While misdeeds on the northern borderlands may have inspired some of the accusations 
against Alden, historians have long seen the accusations against Alden within the context of 
larger provincial fears of incompetence or malevolence among the region’s leaders during the 
turbulent early years of King William’s War.  Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum have made 
the case that accusations against Alden, who was one of the “best-known men in New England,” 
came at a time when the girls in Salem were starting to accuse sundry provincial leaders of 
sorcery.87 Mary Beth Norton has made the case that many of the accusers at Salem were 
childhood survivors of massacres in King Philip's War, and “saw Alden's collusion with the 
Wabanakis, devil worshippers who had devastated their families, as an indication of his fidelity 
to Satan.”88   Louise A. Breen contends that Alden’s misdeeds while entrusted with his very real 
position of military authority coupled with his alleged role as an officer in a spectral legion of 
evil spoke to a growing “elite fear of pacts with Satan that could endanger the civil state” of New 
England.89 All told, Alden’s abuse of his position of authority within the colony’s provincial 
navy led to fears that the region’s coastal and spiritual security were both compromised. This 
fear was evident even before the 1692 witch craze, when the provincial government decided to 
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impose restrictions on his voyages with the Mary including forbidding him to transport trade 
goods or extra ammunition that might be given to the enemy, etc.90 
During the trial, Alden put up a fiery resistance to both the judges and his accusers—
some of whom were young girls and women descended from victims of Indigenous raids. When 
the accusers claimed that he made them fall to the ground by looking at them, Alden boldly 
asked the judge Bartholomew Gedney why he did not face a similar fate when he looked at him. 
Despite his initial plan to resist the witchcraft charges in the court room, Alden made the wise 
choice of escaping from confinement, weathered out the trials, and lived to be eighty years old.91  
Despite Alden’s ultimately happy fate, mistakes made during his provincial naval service 
contributed to the dramatic and lethal climate surrounding the infamous trials.  Ultimately, from 
1689 to 1692, Massachusetts's small provincial navy played an oversized role in amplifying 
colonial disputes surrounding the Glorious Revolution, battles with pirates, intercolonial 
rivalries,  and even the Salem witchcraft trials. These examples showed the widespread impact 
provincial navies played in the first major imperial contests of this era.  
If the sociopolitical ramifications of provincial naval warfare were high, so were the 
economic costs. In fact, the upkeep of a provincial warship could be just as expensive as the 
costs of paying a provincial militia unit. For instance, on 3 October 1704, Governor Joseph 
Dudley and his council ordered the colony’s treasurer to pay £191 to Captain Nathaniel Jarvis 
and the crew of the brigantine John & Abiel—a private vessel that had been hired as a “Vessel of 
War, in the late Expedition into the Bay of Fundey.” This accounted for 113 days of crew wages 
and vessel hire costs between April and August of 1703. The sum was reduced to £167 to 
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account for supplies taken from the commissary. That same day, Dudley’s council ordered the 
treasurer to pay a militia company £90 for a month of wages between June and July of 1703.92  
While it is true that the government paid the infantry company more money for a shorter 
service period, one must also consider that the colony had to pay for the constant upkeep and 
repair of its provincial warships as well. For instance, on 4 September 1702, Dudley and his 
council ordered the treasurer to pay Captain Cyprian Southack and various Boston businessmen 
£294 for “materials as cables, Sails, a new Boat...for his Maty Ship the Province Gally...and for 
workmanship of Carpenters and others in fitting said Ship...and Provisions for victualling the 
same.”93 Ultimately, the construction, hiring, upkeep, and provisioning of provincial naval 
vessels could rival if not exceed the costs of maintaining provincial regiments on land.  
The Barbadian government’s troubled attempt to keep a flotilla of guardships in 1702 and 
1703 highlighted the economic and social woes a large provincial navy could bring even in the 
wealthiest of England’s sugar colonies. In August of 1702, the Barbadian assembly resolved 
“that a levy of 6d. a head on negroes, be raised for a fund for setting out ships of war, and also 
that 6d. per tun on every ship arriving to this island shall be levied…” The next day the Barbados 
Council and Assembly together agreed to pass an act to encourage privateers, and to impress 
guns and men “for fitting out two vessels of war,” and believed it was “lawful and justifiable, it 
being” for Her Majesty, Queen Anne's service.94 Provincial officials proceeded to compile an 
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impressive fleet of four galleys, sloops, and brigantines.95 By early September, even as both 
legislative houses of the Barbadian government contemplated impressing men from privateer 
vessels because of manpower shortages, the Assembly paid for another vessel—the brigantine 
Larke. Around that same time, provincial officials fired Captain John Smith from his role as 
skipper of the provincial sloop Constant Jane. His sailors complained that he had beaten them 
during an attempt to impress them into provincial service.96  
With rising costs, dismissals of officers, and complaints from sailors, it was becoming 
apparent that this provincial navy brought more woes for the Barbadian government than it was 
worth. As if insufficient manpower and the abuse of sailors were not problematic enough, a week 
later the Barbadian Council and Assembly learned that the Constant Jane sloop had 
shipwrecked. Some in the government came to suspect that it was “wilfully run on shore by 
Thomas Driffield, Lt. of the vessel, and others” and initiated an investigation.97 To add insult to 
injury for the provincial government, by the end of September the crew of the brigantine 
Madeira mutinied and ran away with the ship.98  Nevertheless, despite these setbacks, the 
provincial government pushed on with matters of defense. Various assemblymen volunteered 
personal funds to repair a provincial vessel, and one official volunteered his own sloop to carry a 
warning about French privateers to a Royal Navy ship cruising with one of the island’s 
brigantines. Civic volunteerism could be costly, however, and the Assembly filed a petition to 
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London to consider the “growing charge of fitting out vessels of war to [Her Majesty’s]  
service…”99  
Despite the fact that provincial navies amplified sociopolitical and economic crises 
within the British colonies, the Royal Navy’s meek presence in the New World continued to 
force colonial governments to rely on provincial naval defense. Throughout King William’s War 
and much of Queen Anne’s War, Royal military assistance to the colonies (particularly outside 
of the West Indies) had been extremely limited. Nevertheless, as seen above, even those few 
Royal Navy guardships in colonial seaports during this era did not guarantee coastal security.  
Disputes between provincial authorities and Royal Navy captains could break out over several 
issues, including traditional battles over the chain of command, the business ventures of Royal 
Navy officers outside the parameters of their military duties, and the ever-controversial issue of 
impressment.100  
 Arguments over Royal Navy impressment policies in particular would remain a major 
cause of provincial-Royal Navy tensions for decades even after Parliament’s passage of the 
‘America Act of 1708,’ (a.k.a. The ‘Sixth of Anne’). With pressure from Caribbean merchant 
captains who lost untold numbers of sailors to Royal Navy press gangs, Parliament decided to act 
and limit Royal Navy impressment lest it damage lucrative Caribbean commerce. The Royal 
Navy was forbidden from impressing merchant sailors and privateersmen in the New World.  
While the legislation may have been intended to ease provincial tensions with Royal 
Navy commanders, the Sixth of Anne created more problems than solutions for Royal Navy 
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manpower. On the one hand, the law essentially limited Royal Navy commanders to the initial 
crews they left England with. On the other hand, the law did not specify whether or not 
provincial governors had the right to impress men for provincial naval service or for Royal Navy 
ships when requested. In response to numerous provincial queries over whether or not colonial 
governors had the right to initiate impressment, the Board of Trade gave inconsistent and vague 
answers. Westminster’s silence over the full extent of the ban encouraged the Admiralty to 
ignore the prohibition and to continue allowing its officers to impress at will by the 1720s.101 
While the Royal Navy’s leadership took until the 1720s to reinstate its impressment policies, 
provincial governments had never truly stopped the impressment of men and vessels into 
colonial service.  
Aside from disagreements over impressment, personality conflicts between provincial 
governors and Royal Navy officers often exacerbated an already bad working relationship 
between colonial and Royal military officials. Once again, a dramatic encounter involving the 
provincial sloop Mary serves as an illustrative example of growing tensions between provincial 
and Royal military leaders in this era. When King William appointed Sir William Phips—the 
veteran general of the 1690 Quebec expedition—as Massachusetts’s new governor in 1692, he 
gave him two Royal Navy ships—the H.M.S. Conception Prize (captained by Robert Fairfax)  
and the H.M.S. Nonsuch (captained by Richard Short). The captains and the governor disputed 
over joint failed business ventures, locations for coastal patrols, and over the provincial 
government's material support for the Royal ships.  The breaking point in this strained 
relationship came when Phips asked Short to send Royal Navy sailors to serve on the provincial 
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sloop Mary, and Short refused to help crew the provincial vessel. A physical altercation broke 
out between the two men on 4 January 1692/3 that would ultimately lead to Short’s 
imprisonment by provincial authorities and the Royal government’s eventual dismissal of Phips 
from his office.102 
Despite consistent tension over other matters with the Royal Navy, it was Phips’ forceful 
command to the Royal Navy to provide four sailors for the ever-unlucky sloop Mary that served 
as the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. Provincial naval officers proved their loyalty 
to Phips in subsequent legal proceedings. The sloop Mary's current Captain Nathaniel Hatch and 
a fellow officer deposed in court that Governor Phips struck Captain Short only after the latter 
used “Impertinent reflecting words” and leaned very close to the governor's face.103 On the same 
token, Phips had replaced Short with his gunner, Thomas Dobbs. Historians have suggested that 
he was a “favorite” of Phips, and it is unsurprising that Phips not only gave him the command of 
the Nonsuch, but also of the Province Galley by early 1694. It was in this latter capacity that 
Dobbs also testified on behalf of Phips.104 Ultimately, Governor Phips’ jealous battle for naval 
command with his Royal Navy station captains led to a near-riot on the Boston harbor front. This 
violent encounter and the participation of provincial naval officers in the legal proceedings 
                                                           
102 Miles, Royal Navy and Northeastern North America,  pp. 110-124, 137.   
103“Cap.t John March Comand.r of their Majts Fort at Pemaquid Called Fort William Henry & Capt 
Nathan^ll Hatch Comandr of their Majesties Sloope Mary in behalf of Sr William Phips,” in “Material relating to 
legal procceedings against]Sir William Phips, governor of Massachusetts Bay, by the Board of Trade, relating 
largely to several ships” (Petition; Correspondence; Report; Minutes; [[Legal]] Document, The National Archives, 
Kew, CO 5/858 1692/07/01-1694/01/19). 
http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_858_003   
104 See Miles, Royal Navy and Northeastern North America, pp. 135-136, Tapley, The Province Galley, p. 
2, and “The Deposition of Capt Thomas Dobins late Comander of their Majties Ship Nonsuch now Commander of 
their Majties Gally called the Province Gally…” in “Affadavits of various sailors and officials relating to the 
complaints of Jahleel Brenton and Richard Short against Sir William Phips”  (Legal Document, The National 




thereafter foreshadowed similar altercations that would occur between Anglo-American and 
Royal Navy officials throughout the Atlantic world in subsequent years.  
While disputes between provincial and Royal Navy officers damaged the military 
partnership between periphery and center on a microlevel, inconsistent messages from London 
regarding future Royal military intervention would foster confusion on a macro level. While the 
Crown did slowly increase Royal military intervention in some sectors by Queen Anne’s War, it 
never abandoned its “insistence on colonial military self sufficiency.” 105 This ethos, along with 
the still-limited nature of Royal military assistance encouraged Anglo-Americans to continue to 
rely on their own provincial navies.  
 Ultimately, throughout King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, Anglo-Americans 
came to depend more and more on temporary and semi-permanent provincial navies to secure 
their coasts and to wage offensive campaigns against enemy ports. While these forces were 
useful for immediate defense needs, their social and economic costs often outweighed their 
military utility. Despite these setbacks, continued imperial insistence on Anglo-American self 
defense  coupled with poor relations with Royal Navy guard ships forced provincial authorities 
to continue to depend on these provincial navies throughout the first two imperial wars and 
beyond.  
 Beginning with the Glorious Revolution in 1689, Anglo-Americans from New England to 
the West Indies continuously improvised flexible systems of provincial naval defense. Spurred 
on by a largely inactive Royal Navy, governors, councils, and legislatures impressed, hired, and 
built provincial naval vessels to attack enemy ports, and to defend local shipping. While these 
acts were often done out of necessity, the creation of provincial navies frequently amplified 
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already existing imperial, religious, political, and social tensions between colonists, and between 
Anglo-American governments and the Royal Navy. Despite these drawbacks, Anglo-Americans 
frequently created provincial navies and emergency fleets outside the realm of better-studied 
privateers for immediate security and long-term gain.  
While Anglo-Americans always preferred the protection of the Royal Navy, they came to 
find that during emergencies without immediate Royal help, they had no other resources to turn 
to but their own. At least in New England and Caribbean, even when large Royal Navy 
squadrons appeared in colonial ports, provincial governments still supplied vessels to supplement 
those vessels. By Queen Anne’s War, Royal knowledge of provincial naval strengths had 
expanded so much that Queen Anne herself personally requested that various late-war 
expeditions be accompanied by Anglo-American naval officers like Cyprian Southack. After 
Queen Anne’s War ended in 1713, imperial warfare technically ended between Britain and its 
enemies for twenty-six years. Nevertheless, the already troubled partnership between provincial 
navies and Royal military officials would be put to the test again when faced with dangerous and 













Chapter II. Provincial Navies and Irregular Warfare, 1713-1739 
 
 When Great Britain and its foes signed the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht that ended the War of 
the Spanish Succession, there were plenty of reasons why imperial officials hoped to avoid 
future wars with the French and Spanish. With the British South Sea Company’s newly acquired 
rights to trade slaves to Spanish colonies coupled with the profitability of illicit trade with 
Spanish colonists, imperial planners in London discouraged aggression against the Spanish in the 
Americas to protect these fragile new trade avenues.1 Additionally, even though Queen Anne’s 
government had expanded its financial borrowing and taxation powers during the war, Britain's 
coffers were drained by the enormous costs of the conflict. Even though Britain possessed a total 
standing fleet of nearly sixty serviceable ships in the navy by 1714, it would not be in any 
position to wage a major war for some time.2 
Despite post war weariness, various tensions—particularly over trade—throughout the 
Americas would constantly threaten this fragile period of imperial ‘peace’ from 1713 to 1739. 
Even with Spain’s grant of the asiento to Britain along with the right to trade one shipment of 
goods to Spanish colonies per year, myriad English smugglers continued to trade with Spanish-
American colonists in excess of this rule. Spanish colonial authorities allowed coast guard 
vessels known as guarda costas to seize English vessels with suspected Spanish trade goods on 
board. The potential for these seizures to boil into warfare emerged when Lord Archibald 
Hamilton--the governor of Jamaica—encouraged some extralegal reprisals against the Spanish 
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with his own privateers. Far from merely enforcing trade laws within Spanish territories, guarda 
costas frequently employed violence against English traders  throughout the Americas. Guarda 
costa violence ranged from raiding English shipping within English territorial waters, to 
particularly barbaric attacks—including the noteworthy incident in which Spanish sailors cut off 
the left ear of the merchant Captain Robert Jenkins.3 While some of these guarda costas had 
legitimate commissions from Spanish provincial officials, Anglo-Americans suspected that many 
of the Spanish captains feigned official support in order to justify outright piracy.4  
Spanish authorities themselves faced many of the problems with coastal defense as their 
British opponents. The Spanish Crown was rarely willing to dispatch warships from the Spanish 
Armada (the Spanish Navy) to defend its West Indian possessions, and even those few large 
warships that did make it to the Caribbean were often ineffective in pursuing quick smuggler 
vessels.5  By the 1680s, Spanish authorities in the West Indies began to create local fleets of 
small boats and vessels to defend their ports against attacks by buccaneers and to patrol against 
foreigners illegally harvesting logwood. These sort of Spanish provincial navies were deployed 
sporadically for the next forty years, but by the 1720s, Spanish authorities privatized the guarda 
costa fleets to save money—essentially making them privateers that thrived on seizing suspected 
foreign smugglers.6  
Spanish coast guard violence against English sailors was accompanied by a major 
scourge of piracy in the second and third decades of the century. Without military employment 
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after 1713, thousands of English sailors found work in Newfoundland fisheries or in log cutting 
in Belize. Scores of Anglo-American sailors also began independent and largely profitable 
campaigns against Spanish shipping. With rising opposition to illegal swashbuckling in formerly 
welcoming colonial ports,  Anglo-American pirates also began to attack their own countrymen to 
fund their ‘trade.’7 From 1715 to 1725, in what historians have come to call the ‘Golden Age of 
Piracy,’ thousands of these renegade English sailors and mariners from other nations would use 
the weakly-governed Bahamas to pillage and plunder throughout the Atlantic world. 8  
Aside from constant raids by guarda costas and pirates in the West Indies, imperial and 
provincial officials also faced terrestrial and maritime threats from powerful Native American 
nations within the borderlands of Britain’s continental empire.  For nearly a decade after their 
former French allies ceded their Acadian lands to the English, Wabanaki mariners waged their 
own naval war against Anglo-American colonists well into the late 1720’s.9 Around the same 
time,  Anglo-American officials in South Carolina faced terrestrial and maritime attacks by 
aggrieved Yamasee warriors after years of Carolinian trade corruption and enslavement of their 
Native American neighbors.10  
Even as Anglo-American and imperial officials faced ongoing piratical and Native 
threats, they worried over the constant specter of the return of imperial conflict. On occasion 
during this epoch of ‘imperial peace,’ Great Britain and Spain engaged in limited open warfare 
with one another (from 1718 to 1721, and from 1726 to 1729). Because standard European 
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dynastic tensions were the official causes of these short conflicts, the British Empire made no 
significant initiatives in the Western Hemisphere.11 Ironically,  it would be during a time of tacit 
peace in the early 1730s when Britain made its most successful move against Spain: the creation 
of the Georgia colony.  
This tense era also highlighted the continued pitfalls of Royal Navy intervention in the 
Americas. To be certain, the Royal Navy did make a number of important advances following 
the Treaty of Utrecht. Historian N.A.M. Rodger contends that during Robert Walpole's 
premiership in the 1720's and 30's, the “British Admiralty...achieved...the stability which had so 
long eluded it.” Advances during this period included various financial innovations, the presence 
of naval experts within the First Lords of the Admiralty, the growth of naval yards throughout 
the empire (including at Jamaica and Antigua), and more organized supply procurement.12 
Additionally, from 1721 to 1722,  the Royal Navy expanded its fleet of agile sloops in the West 
Indies to counter threats from pirates and guarda costas.13 
Notwithstanding its many administrative advances, internal political controversies within 
Britain and the wide array of irregular threats throughout the Atlantic world limited the Royal 
Navy’s effectiveness in the interwar period. At home, opposition to the Walpole administration 
grew after his lackluster and non-aggressive utilization of the Royal Navy during the late 1720s 
conflict with the Spanish. Historian Sarah Kinkel questions the notion that the Royal Navy was 
stronger than the French or Spanish navies in the 1720s and 1730s.14 Along with these 
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administrative limitations, several historians have also highlighted Britain’s inability to curb the 
multitude of military threats during this period. Historian Eliga Gould makes that case that while 
the British Empire was effective in curbing maritime piracy in the 1720s, its fights with guarda 
costas and Natives on the continent “underscored the limits on Britain’s ability to enforce its 
agreements with other European governments, one along the inland reaches of North America, 
the other in the coastal waters and shipping lanes of the Caribbean and the Western Atlantic.”15 
Additionally, historian Jeffers Lennox has recently challenged Ian K. Steele's description of the 
Atlantic as a “highway that was crossed with increasing safety and regularity over the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century…” Jeffers contends that even if the British did develop 
mastery of “The Atlantic highway,” Native maritime power and weak British naval defenses 
challenged imperial control over “local coasts and rivers” in the interwar period.16 
For all these reasons, British imperial officials still required provincial naval support—
particularly when it came to the war on piracy. Historian Mark Hanna describes the disruption of 
the Anglo-American ‘Golden Age of Piracy' as a result of “one of the first unified imperial 
projects.” For Hanna, this war on pirates pitted both the Royal Navy and “colonial captains” 
against pirates.17 More recently, David Wilson has made the case that pirate-hunting was not a 
unified military effort. For Wilson, private “colonial expeditions were small-scale-and 
reactionary...necessitated by the failures of metropolitan measures to curb piracy” and were 
                                                           
recent study contrasts starkly with Richard Harding’s contention that by 1730 by “the apparent power of the Royal 
Navy in the Caribbean was seen to be so great that merchants wanted operations curbed to prevent the Spanish trade 
being destroyed.” See Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare, pp. 189-192.  
15  Eliga Gould,  Among the Powers of the Earth : The American Revolution and the Making of a New 
World Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 91-92. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/reader.action?docID=3301062#  
16 Jeffers Lennox, Homelands and Empires : Indigenous Spaces, Imperial Fictions, and Competition for 
Territory in Northeastern North America, 1690–1763,  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017). pp. 70-71, 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cofc/detail.action?docID=4845014&pq-origsite=primo 
17 Hanna, Pirate Nests, p. 370.  
63 
 
“pragmatic responses by colonial governments…” Nonetheless, he contends, they often “proved 
much more effective in suppressing pirates than measures coordinated from the metropole.”18 
While Hanna and Wilson disagree as to the level of coordination between metropolitan and 
provincial authorities in the war against piracy, they both highlight a growing scholarly 
awareness of the continued importance of provincial navies during the interwar period. 
A note must be made here about the fluidity of the names of various maritime actors in 
this period. As has been previously mentioned, British authorities often accused Spanish coast 
guards of outright piracy and  some scholars have recently demonstrated how New England 
officials called Wabanaki mariners “pirates” to delegitimize their foes as mere criminals.19 Other 
historians have also categorized 18th-century piracy as one choice along a “continuum” of legal 
and illegal maritime activity.20  Such categorical fluidity was present amongst provincial naval 
forces as well, particularly in the West Indies. As during the previous two imperial wars, colonial 
officials referred to provincial naval operations with language varying from “private men of war” 
to “guard sloops” to “privateers” to “publick privateers.” With the onset of Spanish guarda 
costas after Queen Anne’s War, some colonial officials even called their own provincial guard 
vessels by derivations of that title.  
With strict definitions of privateering and piracy still very much up for debate in this 
period, it is unsurprising that Anglo-Americans continued to use many different names for their 
maritime defense options. As in the previous chapter, I argue there was a “provincial naval 
continuum” that ranged from state-funded and controlled warships to privateers with letters of 
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marque. While the argument over what made one a “privateer” versus a provincial “warship” 
was of minor importance during the interwar period,  this debate would cause major legal 
tensions between imperial periphery and center in the future War of Jenkin’s Ear.21  
Between 1713 and 1739,  Anglo-Americans fought a series of irregular conflicts with 
Native Americans, pirates, and Spanish guarda costas on the contested borderlands in Canada, 
Maine, South Carolina, and the West Indies. Spurred on by continued insufficient naval 
assistance from the parsimonious Royal government, provincial leaders relied on provincial 
navies to secure their coasts and Britain’s still tenuous hold on its American maritime frontiers.  
 
Provincial Navies and Imperial Borderlands: New England and Nova Scotia, 1715-1728 
 
 In the wake of Queen Anne’s War, violent clashes with Native Americans on the South 
Carolina and Acadian/New England borderlands forced Anglo-American officials on opposite 
ends of the mainland colonies to utilize provincial naval forces in similar ways. These border 
wars coincided with the ongoing Golden Age of Anglo-American piracy, and it was not 
uncommon for officials in both regions to have to navigate a complex of Native, piratical, and 
traditional imperial threats all at the same time.  
While Anglo-American officials in both regions continued to prefer elusive Royal 
military assistance, imperial authorities did little to ensure adequate Royal Navy protection for its 
many North American ports in the years following Queen Anne’s War.22 New England’s (and by 
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extension Nova Scotia’s) maritime expeditions against Native and piratical foes during this 
epoch demonstrated growing provincial naval self-reliance in the wake of inadequate Royal 
protection. This is not to say that provincial officials eschewed Royal assistance en total. For 
instance, when a pirate vessel was spotted off the coast during the spring of 1717, 
Massachusetts's governor dispatched “Capt. Cayley of His Majesty's Ship Rose, and Capt. Coffin 
in a Sloop well Arm'd and Man'd with 90 Men to go out in quest of the said Pirate.”23 Not long 
thereafter, however, the colony’s House of Representatives voted to continue the sloop “in the 
Service for the Defence of the Coast” until the next Royal Navy ship was to arrive.24 The 
Massachusetts legislature was willing to pay for a provincial sloop, but hoped to delegate the 
responsibility of naval defense on a Royal Navy frigate if possible. 
 Notwithstanding the preference for Royal Navy assistance, Anglo-Americans from Nova 
Scotia to Massachusetts found themselves largely alone in their borderland conflicts with the 
Wabanakis. After the English capture of Port Royal (later Annapolis Royal), Nova Scotia, in 
1710, imperial officials for the first time had to face how to exercise control over French 
colonists (Acadians), and various  Wabanaki tribes (including the Mi'kmaq, Abenaki, and 
Maliseets), all the while still dealing with military threats from French authorities.25 When 
French officials deeded much of their former Acadian colony to the English at Utrecht in 1713, 
angry Wabanaki leaders initiated a  decade-long maritime war against their Anglo-American 
neighbors throughout the coastline stretching from Newfoundland to Maine. Historian Matthew 
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Bahar contends that while the Wabanaki raided English vessels in order to preserve their regional 
hegemony, English officials considered Indigenous assaults on English shipping in the region to 
be outright ‘piracy.’26  
 The Wabanaki confederacy had nearly two centuries of experience in operating European 
vessels. As early as the sixteenth century, Wabanaki fishermen and mariners captured small 
sailboats called shallops that had been abandoned by European explorers. Throughout the 
following centuries, Wabanaki mariners stole or purchased similar small craft, and employed 
them in raiding or in trade missions. Interestingly, by the mid-seventeenth century, some 
Wabanaki naval officers even started to don European gentlemen’s clothing to assert their social 
status as leaders of naval crews.27 
By appearance, these raids mimicked the ongoing pirate scourge in the Caribbean in that 
Wabanaki mariners used light craft ranging from canoes to better armed shallops and sloops to 
swiftly move on their English prey.28 While shallops and other small craft were the preferred 
craft of Native naval forces, their colonial pursuers in New England’s provincial naval forces 
often had the same sort of craft. Historian Matthew Bahar’s description of Massachusetts’s 
“hulking, heavily armed, and consequently slow warships...[which] failed in their pursuit of 
more agile Indian mariners” over emphasizes the differences between both sides’ vessels.29 For 
instance, in 1723, a militia leader named Captain Heath led several men in whaleboats to ambush 
Wabanaki mariners in canoes. While many of the Natives escaped, the militiamen captured one 
“Canoo, one Gun, their Ammunition, and other stuff: the Canoo was shot through where the 
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Indians sat…”30  At the end of the day, both Wabanaki mariners and their provincial naval 
opponents relied on the same sorts of small sail-and-oared vessels to pursue their prey.  
  While independent Wabanaki raids could be devastating, tacit Franco-Acadian support 
of these raids amplified Anglo-American anxieties for their coastal security. Thanks to territorial 
vagueness in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, both Anglo-American and French officials claimed to 
own the island fisheries between the main peninsula of modern Nova Scotia and Cape Breton 
Island. In the treaty, the French had agreed to surrender ‘Acadia’—a region that they believed 
only included mainland Nova Scotia. Interwar disagreements over the status of the Canso Island 
fishery just off mainland Nova Scotia led to a state of near war between French and Anglo-
American authorities.  
After Massachusetts dispatched a Royal Navy guard ship to destroy the French fishery at 
Canso in 1716, Governor Saint-Ovide of Île Royale on Cape Breton Island—with French Royal 
support—encouraged Mi'kmaq forces to attack New England vessels in return.31 One dramatic 
episode in 1720 highlighted the dual threat posed by Franco-Indigenous raiders on the northern 
borderlands. An English report from Canso in the late summer detailed an attack by a “Company 
of Indians with some French assisting them.” The raiders surprised the English residents in their 
beds, stole their valuables, and transported the goods on French vessels. Even though the French 
governor at Cape Breton promised to prosecute any of his countrymen involved, the English 
correspondent believed that there was a “plain Confederacy between the French and Indians, to 
ruin the people and fishery here.” Subsequent interviews with French prisoners revealed that 
many of the Franco-Acadian sailors involved in the raid were fishermen angry over the loss of 
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the French fishery at Canso.32 By 1722, violent borderland tensions such as these would help fuel 
a four-year conflict with French-aligned Natives in the area known as ‘Father Rale's War’ 
(named for a renegade French priest) or ‘Dummer’s War’ (so called for the governor of 
Massachusetts after 1723).    
During the conflict, provincial naval forces would be vital to securing Britain’s feeble 
hold on its northern borderland. In August of 1720, Nova Scotia Governor Richard Philipps was 
confident that he could save the British government significant money by hiring a sloop to guard 
the coast against Anglo-American smugglers attempting to covertly trade with the French.33 Not 
long thereafter, he forwarded a petition from various colonists which described a merchant being 
forced to fit “out two small vessells in pursuit” of  Franco-Indigenous robbers. The colonists had 
begged for “men, arms and ammunition to enable them to defend the “rights of the Crowne of 
England,” and claimed that Native captains confessed to acting on official orders from the 
French-Canadian Governor Doucet. Alongside this account of provincial naval struggles with 
enemy raiders, Philipps sent a standard plea for Royal Navy assistance.34 Interestingly, Philipps 
both asserted that Anglo-Americans could defend their shores independently, but reiterated their 
desire for outside aid.   
Nova Scotians’ ability to defend their own shores was not lost on imperial officials. In 
December of 1720, the Board of Trade suggested that Nova Scotia Governor Richard Phillipps 
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should “be allow'd according to his own proposal to hire a sloop for the defence of that coast and 
the preventing of illegal trade there.” 35 Despite grumbling over delivery times from Boston 
shipmakers, Governor  Philipps did note that the “obtaining  thereof [was] cheifly oweing to your 
Lordshipps.”36  Even if the Board of Trade was influential in Philipps obtaining a military vessel 
(the William Augustus), differing imperial and provincial expectations for that vessel would 
cause transatlantic disagreements. Much of this is evident in Phillips’ petition to the Board of 
Trade begging for financial compensation for the guard vessel’s operating costs. According to 
Philipps, the Board of Trade asked Boston’s Royal Navy post captain, Thomas Durell, to survey 
coasts around Nova Scotia and Placentia. Durell said that such a thing was “impracticable with 
[His] Majesty's ship under his command and advised that a small vessel might be built at Boston. 
This the Governor [Philipps] was instructed to do, and gave a letter of credit to Capt. Durell, who 
contracted for it at Boston.”37  
Even though the Lords of the Treasury were of the “opinion that the Governor Col. 
Philips's charges should be reimbursed by the Navy,”  the Lords of the Admiralty argued in 1724 
that the Navy was not responsible for the sloop’s costs. Describing what would be imperial 
policy for the next two decades, the Lords declared that they would not assist Nova Scotia with 
its provincial navy project because “when vessels have been fitted out by the Governors of his 
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Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have [always] borne the charge thereof.” 
They did, however, make the meek promise that when Royal vessels were sent to guard the 
Newfoundland fishery that one of them would be “appointed to attend on Placentia and Nova 
Scotia” in winter months when it was too icy to operate in Newfoundland.38  The Lords of the 
Admiralty made it known that Anglo-American authorities were allowed to fit out their own 
provincial navies, but that they were to fund and operate them on their own. This vague 
statement would reflect the Royal policy towards provincial navies for the next two decades.   
It is important to note that the Royal Navy did not leave Nova Scotia entirely undefended 
during the troubles with the Wabanakis. W.A.B. Douglas writes that while the William Augustus 
and various governmentally hired privateers were vital for Canso’s survival,  the Royal Navy’s 
occasional presence during the period also “played an important part in resolving the Anglo-
French confrontation at Canso.” To illustrate this point, he describes one case from late 1725 in 
which the new lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia—Lawrence Armstrong—created a squadron 
of whaleboats to defend the Canso fishery. The diverse crews of these armed whaleboats 
included hired Native mariners from New England, Royal Navy sailors, and some of 
Armstrong’s own forces.39 Other scholars have also recognized provincial naval forces’ and 
privateers’ contributions to the Canso fishery’s survival. Historian Jeffers Lennox has recently 
made the case that even though imperial authorities wanted the William Augustus to be used for 
survey purposes, imperial expectations clashed with provincial needs to fit out the vessel to 
protect undefended shipping routes. For Lennox, provincial and imperial disagreements over the 
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William Augustus highlighted the lack of firm control that the British government had over North 
American waterways.40 Anglo-Americans did use the opportunity, however, to “fill in the gap” 
and defend their own coasts in this case. Historian John Grenier has argued that the “funds that 
Philipps devoted to [the] William Augustus proved money well spent.”  Captain Cyprian 
Southack, previous captain of Massachusetts' Province Galley and subsequent captain of the 
William Augustus, defended the fishery from “Indian attacks and [kept] open a line of 
communication between Canso and Annapolis Royal.”41 Not for the first time, provincial 
authorities supported British imperial aims without Royal funds and with limited Royal Navy 
assistance.  
 Nova Scotia’s southern neighbors in New England also harnessed their own provincial 
naval power to simultaneously fight Wabanaki mariners throughout Dummer’s War and the 
ongoing scourge of Anglo-American pirates. Contemporary observers critiqued the New 
England colonies’ naval response to this complex array of threats. For example, in June of 1722, 
James Franklin, a newspaper printer and older brother of the future founding father Benjamin 
Franklin, was arrested by Massachusetts authorities for mocking the colony's many delays in 
fitting out a vessel to hunt the pirate Edward Low.42    
More recently, Matthew Bahar has written that it was  only “exceptional colonists who 
gathered enough fortitude and firepower to hunt Indians at sea” but that they quickly “became 
the hunted.” He cites a case where Governor Dummer commissioned a small provincial sloop 
and fishing shallop to pursue an Indigenous schooner, only for both vessels to return empty 
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handed and heavily damaged. 43  While colonial forces did make numerous tactical blunders in 
the war of 1722-1726, Anglo-American authorities throughout the New England colonies 
succeeded in mustering several make-shift fleets to simultaneously fight both Wabanaki and 
Anglo-American piratical enemies with limited Royal Navy assistance. Massachusetts’ naval 
expansion at the beginning of the conflict in the summer of 1722 illustrates the region’s ability to 
harness multiple naval resources to combat disparate threats on a whim.  
 On 6 June 1722, Massachusetts Governor Samuel Shute and his council discussed news 
from Rhode Island about a “Pyrate Vessel on the Coast” which had captured a vessel from 
Charlestown, Massachusetts. They ordered Royal Navy Captain Thomas Durrel to take the 
H.M.S. Seahorse on a cruise to hunt for the “said Pyrate Vessel, and to guard and to Protect this 
Coast.”44 By that point, Rhode Island’s government had already sent two provincial sloops after 
the pirate.45 On 7 and 8 June,  a committee from both of Massachusetts’s legislative houses 
decided to expand the hunt against the pirate and voted to impress a sloop, and appointed 
Captain Peter Papillion to lead the expedition.  Aside from guaranteeing a month’s worth of 
provisions and funding for one hundred men, the committee promised a fair share of the “Goods, 
Wares & Merchandizes...that Shall be found on Board...So far as is Consistent with the Acts of, 
Parliament...And for Further Encouragement; That they be paid out of the publick Treasury” £10 
for every pirate killed or captured, as well as insurance for possible injuries.46 The colony’s 
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ability to raise a sloop and raise a crew with such speed while also funding expeditions against 
Natives was only possible because of its continued circulation of paper money.47  
 This growth of the web of maritime operations is evident in a 20 June letter from 
Archibald Cumings, a Boston custom officer,  to William Popple, the Secretary of the Board of 
Trade. Cumings reported  the “government of Rhode Island, fitted out two Sloops, in quest of” 
two pirate vessels while “this government fitted out a Ship, to go after them, the man of war 
being gone to Canso, to protect the fishery.” In a postscript, Cumings remarked that 
Massachusetts had deployed  “200 Men at ye Eastward and are Sending an 100 more as an 
Additional force” to fight Wabanaki mariners, and that the pirates continued to take prizes off the 
New England coast.48 Cumings’s letter hints at the multifaceted New England naval war against 
Anglo-American pirates and Wabanaki sailors. 
 Massachusetts’ naval involvement and cooperation with the Royal Navy only grew from 
there. Within a week of Cuming’s letter, on 27 June,  a committee from both legislative houses 
met to discuss the specifics of the campaign. Among the naval recommendations of the 
committee were that “Ten Whale Boats with very good Oars be provided, and sent to the Forces, 
for Enabling them to manage a sufficient Scout” and that a “Sloop be taken into the Province Pay 
for Transporting Men and Provisions…” Over the next few days,  the governor and assembly 
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also extended Captain Papillion’s pirate hunt for a month and ordered Captain Durell to patrol as 
well with the H.M.S. Seahorse.49  By late July, Massachusetts authorities decided to dispatch two 
sloops as far north as Nova Scotia to search for Wabanaki mariners that had kidnapped New 
England fishermen.50 The following month, Captain Durell, who had previously suggested Nova 
Scotians utilize provincial forces to defend their coasts, offered to man small provincial vessels 
with Royal Navy sailors to hunt down the same foes.51 Durell likely realized his own warship 
was too large to pursue the swift Abenaki light craft, and tapped into provincial naval resources 
to supplement his own mission to defend the coast.  
Not all maritime campaigning that summer originated with the Massachusetts 
government or the Royal Navy. On 27 June 1722, two civilians named Christian Newton and 
Margarett Blin [also spelled Blyn]  informed the House of Representatives that they had fitted 
out a sloop and crew to recapture loved ones taken by Wabanaki forces and requested arms from 
the provincial government for their crew. The next day, a committee from both houses agreed 
that thirty soldiers “under a proper Officer (whom His Excellency [Samuel Shute] be desired to 
Commissionate) with Provisions, Arms and Ammunition to be put on Board the Sloop offered by 
Margaret Blin...to repair as soon as may be to Passmaquada, and there to use their best 
Endeavours to recover [captives] from the Indians…” They also suggested that the militiamen 
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capture Indigenous captives if they could not liberate the New England captives.52  The rescue 
mission never commenced as Margarett’s husband—the sloop captain James Blin—and the other 
captives made a successful escape.53  
Throughout the rest of the summer, Wabanaki sailors captured scores of English vessels 
and kidnapped large numbers of Anglo-American colonists. This was only the beginning of what 
would be a four-year onslaught that would see Native chiefs leading formidable fleets—
including flotillas of a half dozen sloops and schooners—against New England and Nova Scotia 
mariners. In some cases, Wabanaki mariners found a willing market for English vessels at the 
French fortress of Louisbourg. For French authorities, Wabanaki raids on English shipping 
damaged their imperial competitors without requiring overt French involvement. 
Such widespread Wabanaki raiding with tacit French support inspired an expansion of 
New England’s provincial naval capabilities. Not long after Blin was rescued by a naval force 
from Boston, Governor Shute and his council impressed Captain Blin along with another ship 
captain to take militiamen and sailors to “Proceed...to [Chebucto, Nova Scotia], or Such harbour 
as they may hear the Vessels are in” to regain some ships and captives.54 The Boston Newsletter 
of 3 September 1722 reported that Blin succeeded in ransoming upwards of a dozen English 
crews. When Wabanaki mariners sought to execute some English prisoners in retaliation for 
recent English killings of their own people, Blin threatened to hang his own Native prisoners if 
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they did so—the threat of which convinced the Wabanakis to release their own prisoners.55  With 
Margaret Blin’s organization of a naval rescue mission for her husband, and James Blin’s own 
naval service on behalf of Governor Shute, records of the Blin family’s experiences give 
historians a rare glimpse into the impact provincial naval warfare had on families.  
It is important to note that provincial navies throughout the New England colonies often 
met their match when fighting relentless Wabanaki crews. For instance, militia officer Samuel 
Penhallow reported that after New Hampshire authorities dispatched two shallop crews to hunt 
down successful Wabanaki mariners in the summer of 1724, “through cowardice and folly were 
afraid to engage them.” A physician from Kittery, Maine led a smaller crew in pursuit of the 
same raiders, but the “enemy had two great guns and four pateraroes [swivel guns], which cut 
their shrouds and hindered [the English] pursuit for some time…” The Maine crew was forced 
back by Native reinforcements and severe casualties.56 Another contemporary observer noticed 
that provincial schooner crews had a hard time recruiting in Marblehead, Massachusetts as “so 
many of [the town peoples’] freinds and relations being now in the hands of the Indians are very 
backward to goe against them in a Hostile manner.”57 For residents in New England port cities, 
the naval war disrupted their economic and social networks to the core.  
While provincial naval forces and detached militia “marines” onboard local vessels were 
able to score some important victories by the end of 1722, including securing the Canso fishery 
from Native warriors, the Wabanaki confederacy continued a devastating offensive by land and 
sea on the northeastern borderlands for years to come. Even after New England forces 
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assassinated the Wabanaki’s Acadian ringleader, Father Rale, in 1724, Maliseet warriors levelled 
many Anglo-American homesteads on the Maine frontier.  
By 1725, however, Nova Scotia and Massachusetts emissaries made diplomatic headway 
when  they threatened French officials at Montreal and Louisbourg with a general assault on 
Franco-Acadian shipping and settlements if they did not cease their support of the Wabanaki war 
effort. The threat of a new European conflict in the region coupled with growing dissension 
within the Wabanaki ranks forced the French officials’ hand on the matter. By 1726, war-weary 
Anglo-American officials and their Native enemies had agreed to separate ceasefires in Nova 
Scotia and New England. Father Rale’s War was over, yet without any real victor. Historian John 
Grenier suggests that far from having a major victory, Massachusettsans and Nova Scotians had 
“merely survived the war and had grown as tired of it as the Indians had…”58 That survival, in a 
large part, depended on various New England authorities’ consistent deployment of transport 
sloops, guard vessels, whale boats, along with occasional cooperation with Royal Navy Captain 
Durell to pursue Anglo-American pirates—a threat that had never truly dissipated, even as the 
Massachusetts government directed most of its military attention to the fight against the 
Wabanaki.59  
The Massachusetts provincial navy’s typically amiable interwar relationship with the 
Royal Navy would sour in 1726 with new post captain James Cornwall. On 28 June 1726, after 
denying a request by Royal Navy Captain John St. Lo of the H.M.S. Ludlow Castle to impress 
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men to serve on his beleaguered vessel, Governor Dummer and his council discussed the 
activities of the pirate William Fly off the coast, and ordered that “a good Sailing Sloop or other 
Suitable Vessel be taken up for his Majties Service agst the Sd Pirate…” The council appointed 
William Atkinson (himself a victim of the pirate) as the captain and established a pay table of £8 
a month for the captain, his officers in “proportion,”  £4 for sailors,  a twenty shilling bounty for 
volunteering for service, and the usual promises of insurance for the wounded.60 The lieutenant-
governor would later boast about the “cheerful and ready appearance of [forty] voluntiers upon 
the bounty offer'd for that service” within six hours of the commencement of the recruitment 
drive.61 The sloop, Loyal Heart, was ready to sail.  
The next day, Dummer and the council dismissed Atkinson due to suspicions he had 
associated with the pirates and replaced him with Captain Thomas Little. They also discussed 
“threatening” letters that Lt. Governor Dummer had gotten from Captain St. Lo regarding the 
attempts to outfit a pirate-hunting sloop. They were shocked to find that Captain Cornwall had 
stopped the Loyal Heart  with the H.M.S. Sheerness in the middle of Boston Harbor.62 
According to a subsequent complaint by the Massachusetts governor to the king, Cornwall had 
demanded to know their business and threatened to fire on them. When Captain Little told them 
that they had a provincial commission to hunt pirates and tried to continue his voyage, Cornwall 
ordered his sailors to fire on the little provincial sloop. According to the lieutenant governor and 
                                                           
60 Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 28 June 1726. in “Minutes of the Council of Massachusetts Bay” 
(Minutes, The National Archives, Kew, CO 5/797 1726/03/03-1726/08/26). 
http://www.colonialamerica.amdigital.co.uk.unh.idm.oclc.org/Documents/Details/CO_5_797_006   
61 “Memorial of the Lt. Governor and Council of the Massachusetts Bay to the King,” 8 July 1726, in CSP 
Vol. 35, 1726-1727, eds. Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1936) pp. 96-115. British History Online. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/colonial/america-west-
indies/vol35/pp96-115.   
62 Council Minutes, Massachusetts, 29 June 1726, in “Minutes of the Council of the Province of the 
Massachusetts Bay," 29 June 1726. in "Minutes of the Council of Massachusetts Bay" (Minutes, The National 




council, Cornwall could not have been ignorant of their mission as Massachusetts authorities had 
already denied his own request to impress sailors to hunt pirates the day before. Dummer and his 
council argued this was “very far from answering your Majesties gracious intentions” in 
providing Royal Navy protection and complained that Cornwall had done little to actively defend 
the coast for the last two years. They asked for a new captain, and that governors have control 
over future Royal Navy guard vessel officers.63 
 Cornwall’s narrative of the events was notably different. In the Sheerness’s logbook entry 
for 1 July 1726, Cornwall wrote that that a “Sloop hauld of [sic] from ye Wharfe...Arm'd wth 6 
Guns & 4 Patterreroes, & as near as I could Guess about 40 hands, So unexpected a Sight could 
not but be Very Surprizing to me having not ye Least Infirmation…” Cornwall claimed that the 
sloop’s master [Little] promised he was going no farther than Castle William, ignored calls to 
board the Sheerness, and proceeded to sail anyway. This prompted Cornwall, who believed them 
to be “going a Pyrating,” to fire four times on the sloop, which anchored near the safety of Castle 
William with only limited damage to its sails. The drama was far from over, however. On 22 
July, Cornwall recorded that the “Sloop Said to be fitt'd out at ye Expence of this Goemt Arriv'd 
here & this Morning...hoisted a King Jack…” As will be recalled, this flag was solely reserved 
for Royal Navy vessels, but provincial warships frequently flouted this rule during operations. 
When Cornwall sent his men to forcibly take the King’s Jack down, a minor brawl occurred, and 
thirty provincial sailors with pistols and swords forced the Royal Navy men back.64  
  While one might conclude that Cornwall’s belligerence would substantially sour 
provincial opinions of the Royal Navy itself, this was far from the case. In their complaint to an 
aging King George I, Lt. Governor Dummer and his council asked for a new post captain and 
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greater provincial control over station ships. Furthermore, in the wider scope of provincial-Royal 
Navy relations in New England, the scuffle between the sailors of the Loyal Heart and the 
Sheerness was a departure from the mutually cooperative norm. When discussing an earlier 
dispute between New Englanders and a Royal Navy captain, historian Douglas Edward Leach 
wrote that such disputes “may not typify the behavior of royal naval officers in America, but 
they do illustrate the kind of self-assured arrogance that naval authority seemed to generate and 
that was so offensive to many colonists.”65 This resentful attitude was certainly evident in late 
August 1726, when the governor’s council and the colony’s legislature both commended Captain 
Little for “having handsomely Asserted and Defended the Honour of this His Majesty's 
Government of this Province, and of the Commission he had born...notwithstanding the Violent 
Opposition given him by Capt. James Cornwall...”66   
In the minds of New England and Nova Scotia officials, their provincial navies had 
secured their coastlines from Native and piratical threats for the “Honour of this His Majesty’s 
Government” even when the Royal Navy had stood in the way or neglected their defense. 
Despite occasional help from a limited number of Royal guard ships, provincially funded and 
designed navies from New England and Nova Scotia made greater efforts to protect British 
commerce and Canadian fisheries than imperial forces. 
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Provincial Navies and Imperial Borderlands: South Carolina, 1715-1727 
 
Even before Massachusetts and Nova Scotia authorities waged war against pirates and 
Native American naval forces on the northern borderlands, similar borderland maritime violence 
erupted to the south and southwest of Charles Town, South Carolina in 1715. Native nations 
such as the Yamasee began to resent the South Carolina government’s expansive goals, rumored 
plans of conquest,  and abusive traders that threatened to enslave debtors.67 By April of 1715, 
disaffected Yamasee officials killed two South Carolina traders and fired the proverbial first 
shots of the bloody Yamasee War. While the naval theatre of the war that will be considered 
below primarily pitted South Carolinians against their Yamassee foes south of Charles Town, the 
colony also warred against other disaffected Native groups on land such as the Creeks and 
Choctaws.68  
While disputes between Southern colonists and their Indigenous neighbors were not as 
tied to maritime matters as those in the northeast, both South Carolinians and the Yamasee had 
strong ties to the sea. Natives living on the South Carolina coast had long engaged in maritime 
endeavors and were particularly skilled in crafting periagua canoes for trade. Yamasee mariners 
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had even helped to man South Carolina’s scout boat navy until the 1715 war.69 Long before their 
conflict with the Carolinians, the Yamasee also frequently employed canoes to transport war 
parties to capture slaves from enemy tribes in the Florida hinterlands.70 
In yet another challenge to the prevailing notion that Indian wars were limited to land, the 
Yamasee nation and their Carolinian foes fought many of their battles on the coastal waters and 
streams near modern day Beaufort and Port Royal, South Carolina. Both the Yamasee and their 
South Carolina opponents preferred small craft like their contemporaries in the northeast, and 
typically fought from periaguas and small whale boats. After Governor Charles Craven led 
infantry forces to make a land-based stand against Yamasee onslaught south of Charles Town in 
mid-April of 1715, he directed the experienced frontiersmen Alexander Mackay and John 
Barnwell to lead a naval assault against the Yamasee village of Pocotaligo. By the end of April, 
Barnwell and Mackay led militiamen on small craft to seize Pocotaligo, and then seized a well-
defended Yamasee fort after scaling its walls amidst a hail of musketry.71  
By September, South Carolina scout boat crews had conducted several successful 
ambushes against Yamasee warriors on canoes, including actions that involved coordinated land-
based ambushes and musket/swivel gun fire from provincial vessels. The colony’s scout boat 
navy was essentially purpose built for these campaigns on the colony’s tidal borderlands. In 
historian Larry Ivers’ view, the scout boat mariners had evolved from mere scouts in the Queen 
Anne’s War to “marine commandos” by the end of 1715.72 While this modern analysis may 
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sound overly boastful of the provincial navy’s progress, at least one contemporary South 
Carolina parson bragged in October of 1715 that the worst of the crisis was over because “[as 
soon as a] party of Indians appear our Scouts give notice and they are beaten back.”73  
South Carolina’s swift deployment of scout boats and militiamen on canoes was effective 
in stemming the initial Native onslaught, but these victories belied the large extent to which 
South Carolina depended on outside assistance from neighboring governments and imperial 
forces throughout the conflict. For instance, in May of 1715, Governor Craven’s administration 
begged Governor Spotswood of Virginia for reinforcements, while also asking Captain Samuel 
Mead of the HMS Success—a passing Royal Navy warship—for supplies and to request direct 
help from London. While Mead refused both requests, he did agree to facilitate the purchase of 
weapons from Governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts.74 Dudley agreed to the arms sale 
despite his own ongoing fights with Wabanaki mariners. Ironically, only a month after sending 
the South Carolinians arms as they waged a naval and land war against the Yamasees, Dudley 
himself deployed “two sloops...with 30 men, each well arm'd…” to hunt down Wabanaki 
mariners that had captured New England fishermen.75 Even as New Englanders struggled against 
their own Native foes on the northern borderlands, they extended military aid to their 
compatriots facing similar issues on the Southern borderlands.  
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Despite outside assistance and some tactical success against the Yamasees by late 1715, 
South Carolina’s military situation was still dire. No account better describes the chaos than 
Captain Mead’s December 1715 letter to the Lords of the Admiralty. Upon a subsequent trip to 
Charles Town, Mead reported that he was shocked to find the city bereft of defenders, with “the 
[governor] gone to the Army, and a great many to [dive at] the Spanish Wreck off Cape Florida.” 
With rumors that African slaves planned to use the chaos to stage their own uprising, the 
lieutenant governor implored Meade to “send on Shore every night Twenty five, or thirty Men 
with Arms” to guard the city's powder magazine. The previously reticent Mead agreed to this 
plea.76  
Mead’s alarming description of the chaos in the proprietary capital would have been one 
of many flooding imperial offices in London in 1715 and 1716. Many South Carolinians 
themselves were beginning to resent the alleged military neglect of the colony’s Lords 
Proprietors and their expectations that the colonists should orchestrate their own defense. In 
response, many provincial leaders began to campaign for direct Royal governance and military 
aid. Historian Steven Oatis makes the case that when the Board of Trade conducted a formal 
inquiry into the supposed neglect in the summer of 1715, the Lords Proprietors demonstrated a 
financial unwillingness to assist their colonists coupled with an outright ignorance of the 
colony’s dire straits.77 This ignorance and neglect was especially apparent when it came to the 
proprietary opinion regarding South Carolina’s naval capabilities. In response to the Board of 
Trade’s query as to whether the Lords Proprietors would provide shipping to carry British troops 
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to the colony, they responded that “we do not doubt but the Governmt. of Carolina will send 
ships and provisions for their transportation.”78  
 The Lords Proprietors’ rosy view of South Carolina’s ability to transport British regulars 
across the Atlantic clashed with the growing human and economic costs of the conflict. Because 
the Yamasees had found refuge with sympathetic Spanish authorities in St. Augustine, Florida, 
they continued to harass South Carolinians, and even successfully ambushed one of the colony's 
scout boat crews near Port Royal in the summer of 1716.79 By 1716, South Carolina officials 
convinced the Cherokee—the traditional foes of the Yamassee nation’s own Creek allies—to 
join the war effort. This alliance with one of the strongest Southern Indigenous nations inspired 
several smaller neighboring tribes to join the English cause, and played a signal role in the 
colony’s pyrrhic victory over the Yamasee and Creek in 1717. Victory for the Carolinians came 
at a high cost, indeed; wartime losses included the deaths of over seven hundred colonists, food 
shortages, and nearly £116,000 sterling in war debt.80 Among the many expensive war measures 
that elevated this debt was South Carolina’s continuous deployment of “two scout boats of 10 
men each” beyond the conflict’s end.81 Growing military costs would also play a signal role in 
the colony’s decision to revolt against the Lords Proprietors in 1719. 
 While the fight with the Yamasee nearly brought the colony to ruin, it would soon face an 
equally daunting threat: pirates. While Anglo-American pirates did little to cripple South 
Carolina’s economy during the height of the Golden Age of Piracy, local anxiety over pirate 
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attacks was much more profound. The political ramifications of piracy for Charles Town were 
most colorfully illustrated by Captain Edward ‘Blackbeard’ Teach’s June 1718 blockade of the 
unguarded port city and subsequent attacks by Teach’s associate Charles Vane.82 Without any 
Royal Navy vessels nearby, Governor Robert Johnson “thô very unable both for want of men and 
money,” decided to commission militia officer Colonel William Rhett as a temporary Vice 
Admiral, and authorized him to assemble an emergency fleet of pirate hunters. Johnson recorded 
that “two sloops [the Henry and Sea Nymph], one commanded by Capt. [John] Masters and the 
other by Capt. [Fayrer] Hall with about, 130 men were gott ready wth. all the dispatch wee 
cou'd.”83  Even though the Royal Navy was far away from Charles Town at the time, Johnson 
clearly wanted Rhett’s provincial fleet to carry the trappings of a Royal Navy squadron when he 
ordered Rhett to fly “his Majesties Union Flagg” on his vessels. Royal mandates had long 
prohibited colonial vessels from flying the plain Royal Union Jack as that banner was reserved 
for Royal Navy ships alone. By flouting this law, perhaps Johnson consciously saw himself as an 
active substitute for the Royal Navy in their absence.84  
Rhett’s fleet never found Blackbeard or Vane, but they did capture the infamous 
‘Gentleman Pirate,’ Stede Bonnet, in a pitched naval battle off the coast of Cape Fear, North 
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Carolina in September of 1718.85 The government’s appropriation of Royal Navy trappings 
continued into the trial of Bonnet’s crew. For instance, when one of the accused pirates claimed 
they only engaged Rhett’s fleet because they thought they were being attacked by pirates 
themselves, South Carolina Chief Justice Nicholas Trott retorted: “And so one pirate might fight 
with another. But how could you think it was a Pirate, when he had King George's Colours?”86 
Even though provincial naval vessels were not part of the Royal Navy themselves, they adopted 
this exclusive Royal banner to legitimize their pirate hunting mission.  
Aside from provincial compensation, sailors on pirate hunting missions could also expect 
some level of reward from the home government in London. Thanks to King George I’s 1717 
promise of rewards for any sailors who captured unrepentant pirates, crews could expect 
financial gains up to £100 for the capture of a pirate captain, and lesser amounts for lower 
officers.87 The provincial government’s burden of repaying its sailors was also lightened by the 
division of ‘booty’ in vice admiralty hearings after Bonnet’s capture. Almost simultaneously 
with trial and execution in late 1718, Trott ensured that plunder from Bonnet’s vessel was split 
equitably among the sailors. 
 Oddly enough, Trott required some of Bonnet’s victims (merchant captains rescued by 
the South Carolina provincial Navy) to pay salvage fees. This forced at least two ‘rescued’ 
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merchant captains to surrender their vessels to the South Carolina government due to their 
inability to afford these fees. During these proceedings, Trott also ruled that an enslaved African 
named Ned Grant would be publicly auctioned off, and the proceeds of his sale would be used 
for prize money for the pirate hunters. Grant had been captured by Bonnet after escaping from 
his South Carolina master, and then had the misfortune of being recaptured by South Carolinians 
during the Battle of Cape Fear. Ironically, throughout these proceedings, the South Carolina 
government rewarded pirate hunters by seizing vessels from pirate victims, and by depriving 
humans of their freedom.88 
As the provincial government was able to ensure that pirate hunters were adequately 
reimbursed for their services, larger piratical and political threats awaited the ever-embattled 
colony as an eventful 1718 drew to an end. With reports of new pirate fleets off the coast 
Governor Johnson opted to expand his naval defenses and ordered a unique combination of scout 
boat patrols in the harbor and the impressment of an emergency fleet of merchant vessels to 
prevent the expected assault.89 This would be one of the few times where South Carolina 
combined its regular naval forces with an impressed merchant fleet.  
Worried about the damages that could come to their vessels after being impressed, 
several mariners complained to the provincial government and demanded assurances that they 
would be reimbursed for damages in battle. As financial negotiations continued, two pirate 
vessels under the command of Richard Worley appeared outside the harbor. Johnson dispatched 
the colony’s scout boats to prevent their landing on the city’s barrier islands, and then led  three 
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hundred sailors on four ships, and swiftly defeated the piratical duo.  Johnson immediately split 
the “small booty” from the captures amongst the captors.90 Once again, a timely deployment of 
an emergency fleet prevented Charles Town’s foes from sacking the city. 
While provincial victories over Bonnet and Worley raised Charlestonians’ morale, 
increased tensions with the Lords Proprietors prevented any true respite. Many within the 
provincial government were infuriated with the Proprietors for a number of reasons. High on the 
list of grievances was the fact that the Lords Proprietors vetoed the Assembly’s military finance 
laws from the Yamasee War, and that they failed to provide adequate military protection for their 
beleaguered and embattled colony.91   
 International politics would also play a role in heightening the crisis between the 
provincial government and its proprietary overlords. In response to Spanish attempts to expand 
their Mediterranean holdings in 1718, Britain and France had jointly declared war on the Iberian 
kingdom in the short-lived War of the Quadruple Alliance.92 As the South Carolina militia 
gathered to prevent a rumored Spanish invasion, angry politicos formed an ‘Association’ to 
discuss their dissatisfaction with the Lords Proprietors, fomented a bloodless coup, and installed 
a sympathetic governor that helped them to call for direct Royal governance. This coup would 
                                                           
90  Johnson, The History of the Pyrates, Vol. II pp. 325-328.  
91  Theodore H. Jabbs, South Carolina Colonial Militia, 1663-1733. Ph.D. diss., (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina, 1973) pp. 280-281, 340-345. Historians have recently challenged the notion that the primary issue 
with the Lords Proprietors was ineffective military protection. For instance, Hanno T. Scheerer has made the case 
that “constitutional issues rather than questions of defense lay at the core of the quarrels between the Carolina 
proprietors and their settlers.” See “The Proprietors Can't Undertake for What They Will Do: A Political 
Interpretation of the South Carolina Revolution of 1719,” in Creating and Contesting Carolina: Proprietary 
Histories, Michelle LeMaster and Bradford J. Woods, eds. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2013). 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/unh/detail.action?docID=2054770. 
92 Harding, Seapower, pp. 189-190.  
90 
 
forever be known in South Carolina as the ‘Bloodless Revolution of 1719,’ or simply the 
‘Revolution of 1719.’93 
For at least some anti-proprietary polemicists, proprietary indifference that necessitated 
provincial naval defense was a large justification for the ‘Revolution of 1719’ against the Lords 
Proprietors. For instance, in a 1726 pamphlet that challenged Proprietary attempts to retake the 
colony, South Carolinian Francis Yonge argued that one of the turning points that led to the coup 
was the Proprietors’ dismissal of a legislative session that had convened to find ways to settle 
military debts including the two missions against the pirates.94 For men like Yonge, Royal 
military protection was the only solution to their inadequate defenses. Even before King George 
I’s privy council agreed to “provisionally” facilitate Royal governance of the proprietary colony 
in August of 1720, Captain John Hildesley with the H.M.S. Flamborough became the first Royal 
Navy post captain in Charles Town.95 Seven years later, Yonge praised the king for having 
“Protected...Trade by His Ships of War, and [the] Country by His forces” ever since the Royal 
take-over.96 
While Yonge was quick to praise Royal Naval protection in his anti-Proprietary 
pamphlet, he neglected to mention that South Carolina’s provincial naval forces still continued to 
operate both alongside and independently of their new Royal Navy allies, and that the presence 
of the Royal Navy did not guarantee internal stability. This was especially apparent during the 
                                                           
93 Jabbs, South Carolina Colonial Militia, pp. 349-354, and “The Humble Address of the Representatives 
of the Inhabitants of the Said Province, Now Conven'd at Charles Town” in Francis Yonge, A Narrative of the 
Proceedings of the People of South-Carolina, in the Year 1719: and of the True Causes and Motives that Induced 
Them to Renounce Their Obedience to the Lords Proprietors, as Their Governors, and to Put Themselves Under the 
Immediate Government of the Crown, Volume 1 (London: 1726), pp. 31-32. Google Play eBook.  
94 Yonge, A Narrative, pp. 8-10.   
95 Charles Christopher Crittenden, “The Surrender of the Charter of Carolina” The North Carolina 
Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October, 1924), pp. 393-395. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23514374.pdfand 
Log Book of H.M.S. Flamborough, TNA, ADM 51/357 
96 Yonge, A Narrative, p. 40.  
91 
 
period stretching from 1715 to 1732, which early twentieth historian Verner Crane called South 
Carolina’s era of “Defense and Reconstruction.” Crane argued that South Carolina expanded its 
southern frontier defenses during this era with numerous forts to challenge Franco-Spanish and 
Native American incursions, including the 1716 establishment of a more permanent base at Port 
Royal for South Carolina’s two scout boats to operate out of.97  
Despite provincial protestations in early 1720 that naval defense costs on the Florida 
frontier continued to exacerbate South Carolina’s debt, the Board of Trade hinted at their desire 
for continued provincial naval efforts in September of that year. The Board expressed their desire 
that a fort should be built on the Altamaha River to the south of the colony (in what would 
become the colony of Georgia in the next decade), and were of the opinion that it would be 
difficult to do that without a Royal Navy guard ship. However, they proposed that in case a 
Royal ship was not available,  “that the [new Governor Francis Nicholson] be impower'd and 
have directions to hire a sloop or brigantine for this purpose upon his arrival in Carolina.”98 In 
essence, imperial authorities expected provincial authorities to fund their own naval defenses 
even as the Royal military presence expanded in the region. As it would happen, the king’s 
parsimonious Privy Council only provided a small unit of invalid redcoats, building materials, 
and a few officials to help with the fort’s construction. Ultimately provincial authorities not only 
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hired a merchant vessel and sailors to assist the expedition to build the fort, but used mariners 
from the scout boat navy to help build the fort.99  
While South Carolina authorities continued to rely on their own mariners to secure 
imperial aims in the interwar period, they also came to realize that the presence of the Royal 
Navy could exacerbate internal political issues and instability. For instance, some Royal Navy 
guard captains enmeshed themselves in local corruption and political dramas. Some provincial 
officials accused Captain John Hildesley of the H.M.S. Flamborough of partnering with 
provincial naval hero William Rhett in an illegal arms cartel to the Spanish in St. Augustine. The 
controversial Royal Navy captain also conspired with ousted governor Robert Johnson in an 
aborted attempt to retake his office in 1721.100  
Provincial authorities would be forced to draw on their own naval resources again when 
imperial conflict with Spain resurfaced for a second short time in the late 1720’s. Between 1727 
and 1729, South Carolinians faced an onslaught of Spanish privateer raids on their merchant 
shipping as well as ongoing fights with Yamasee and Creek forces on the southern borderlands. 
In a letter from September of 1727, one South Carolina merchant lamented that despite this 
combination of foes, heavy provincial taxation, and political uncertainty (namely the Lords 
Proprietors in London trying take back the colony) the citizens of Charles Town had “fitted out, 
at their own Expence, a Sloop [the Palmer, captained by one Thomas Montjoy] with 100 Men” 
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to hunt Spaniards alongside a Royal Navy guard ship, H.M.S. Scarborough.101  While other 
colonies with Royal Navy station ships occasionally fitted out their own provincial vessels (e.g. 
Massachusetts), it is ironic that South Carolina—a colony that had orchestrated a political coup 
in part to secure Royal naval protection—still felt the need to employ these vessels. 
Historian Nic Butler has found that the South Carolina Council’s decision to outfit that 
sloop coincided with the Royal Navy post captain George Anson’s requests to impress local 
sailors for the Scarborough. Butler contends that the overextended captain was already tasked 
with both hunting Spanish privateers and protecting merchant vessels, and likely found comfort 
in the colonial government’s decision to outfit a temporary “privateer” to defend the coast.  The 
governor’s council allowed the captain to impress sailors for his warship, even though 
contemporary British law (the 1708 ‘America Act,’ which was also known as the ‘Sixth of 
Anne’) forbade Royal Navy impressment in the Americas. Despite this prohibition, the extent to 
which it forbade all impressment was unclear, and no imperial guidance existed to clarify when 
it was acceptable for colonial governors and Royal Navy captains to impress seamen. By the 
1720s, after a decade of limited clarification over the law from Parliament, Admiralty officials 
had officially stopped requiring Royal Navy captains to avoid impressment—a unilateral 
decision that Parliament did little to challenge and which would have major ramifications in the 
decades to follow. 102 Not for the last time, a Royal official depended on provincial naval forces 
to support the Royal Navy’s meagre presence in the area.     
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By late September 1727, the  South Carolina General Assembly passed a comprehensive 
act that allocated funds for provincial naval and land forces to campaign against both Native and 
Spanish privateers, and included a specific pay table for sailors aboard the Palmer “Sloop of War 
Employ'd in Guarding These Coasts.” This was to be funded by taking paper currency returned 
to the treasurer from a previous “Act for Calling in and Sinking the Paper Bills,” and backing the 
paper money expenditure with renewed duties on the slave trade and liquor sales.103 This 
financial package of over £25,000 (in South Carolina currency) was especially impressive 
considering Middleton’s and the Commons House’s disagreements over expanding paper money 
then in circulation, as well as a recent Royal prohibition on extending paper money circulation in 
the colony.104  
Ultimately, Charles Town would wage a successful counteroffensive against Spanish and 
Indigenous forces throughout late 1727 and early 1728. In early January 1727/8, a Philadelphia 
newspaper reported that Mountjoy and the crew of the sloop Palmer retook a “ship belonging to 
London, which the Spaniards were carrying to the Havana; the ship and Goods was Praised and 
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one Half was allowed for Salvage,”  though other Spanish privateers still cruised off the coast.105 
Soon thereafter, an Indigenous attack on a militia patrol boat south of Charles Town coupled 
with an allegedly insulting letter from Florida’s Spanish governor convinced President 
Middleton to launch the long-planned assault on Yamasee lands near St. Augustine. Scout boat 
veteran Colonel Robert Barnwell—leading nearly one hundred English and allied Indigenous 
warriors on periaguas and other small craft—devastated several Yamasee villages there.106 This 
raid not only demoralized Spanish authorities in the area, but convinced many Spanish-aligned 
Natives that their imperial ally could not adequately protect them.107 
Not long thereafter, provincial officials would use local naval forces to assist a Royal 
Navy survey mission that would set the stage for future relations between both the Royal Navy 
and South Carolina navies.  President Middleton informed the Upper House of Assembly and the 
Commons House that he had news that the Lords of the Admiralty were planning to make Port 
Royal, South Carolina, a harbor for Royal Navy vessels to rendezvous in. Middleton contended 
that it “behove us to get Proper Persons and Craft to sound the Channels and make Such 
discovery as may Encourage the right honble the Lords of the Admiralty to prosecute their 
design…” A few days later, a joint committee from both houses consulted with both station 
captains Anson and Arnold, and concluded that the provincial government should provide the 
Royal Navy with “A Small Sloop [,] Two of the Largest Pilot Boats [,] The Two Scout Boats” 
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and buoys to complete the survey.108  One Royal Navy observer remarked that these “Scout 
Boats (in Number two) are maintained by the province, to guard the Rivers & Inlets from 
Indians, they are both periaguas, one wth ten oars the other wth eight; they Sail & row very 
well.”109  
This seemingly mundane survey highlights an interesting trend in this era: while 
provincial authorities campaigned for greater Royal Navy protection of their coasts, Royal Navy 
officials continued to rely on provincial naval forces to support their own assignments. This 
negotiation of responsibility for coastal defense between provincial and Royal Navy forces 
echoes concurrent arguments within the Board of Trade over whether or not to deploy more 
Royal troops to the colonies. While some authorities within the Board of Trade had developed an 
extensive plan for increasing Royal military forces in the colonies, many other imperial officials 
dissented from this view and expected the colonies to maintain the majority of their own 
defenses. The Royal Navy’s dependence on provincial naval assistance at Fort King George and 
in the Port Royal survey, as well as South Carolina’s continued independent naval expeditions in 
this period all highlight this reality.110  
On the empire’s contested northern and southern continental borderlands, imperial 
officials encouraged provincial officials to shore up imperial weaknesses with locally raised 
navies. While Anglo-Americans in Nova Scotia, New England, and South Carolina always pined 
for elusive Royal Navy assistance, they continued to pass legal and economic measures to ensure 
that provincial naval forces could fight simultaneous Native and piratical threats with or without 
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Royal assistance. Occasionally violent interactions between both naval forces foreshadowed 
larger rifts between imperial and provincial officials over the definitions and purposes of 
provincial navies in the next imperial war.  
      Provincial Navies, Privateers, Guarda Costas, and Pirates: The West Indies, 1713-1739  
 
 West Indian authorities faced an entirely different interwar situation than their North 
American compatriots. For instance, despite some North American naval expansion, the Royal 
Navy continued to devote more ships and resources to the rich Caribbean islands than their 
continental neighbors. While the Royal Navy expanded its operations in the West Indies during 
the previous two imperial wars, it ensured a more permanent presence in the West Indies with 
the construction of careening bases at Port Antonio, Jamaica and English Harbour, Antigua in the 
late 1720s.111  Historian Peter Earle has found that by the early 1720s, there were “nine Royal 
Navy vessels in the West Indies, five on the American coast and two or three in Newfoundland 
during the fishing season.”112  Another major difference from the continent was that Anglo-
American officials in the West Indies did not face major conflicts with Native tribes. They 
primarily dealt with Anglo-American pirates and Spanish guarda costas. It was also rare that 
Caribbean authorities ever deployed land forces or used provincial vessels to transport troops 
like their continental compatriots.  Finally, Caribbean authorities relied on privateering far more 
than provincial officials on the mainland.113 These differences between operational theatres can 
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be overplayed, however. Despite the regular presence of Royal Navy warships, imperial 
commanders were not always willing or able to pursue the light craft of Spanish guarda costas or 
English pirates. Just as with their compatriots on the mainland, Anglo-American officials in the 
Caribbean still often had to utilize their own naval resources to defend their shores and to secure 
British commerce between 1713 and 1739.  
Provincial naval efforts during this period were far from unified or consistent. Scholar 
David Wilson attributes the Royal and provincial governments’ eventual victory over Atlantic 
piracy to a “series of fragmented and distinctive campaigns, shaped and influenced in 
metropolitan and colonial contexts.” Building on this narrative of disjointed naval campaigns, I 
will make the case that Anglo-American provincial navies and privateers forged an uneasy and 
often tense partnership with the Royal Navy to secure the West Indian islands from piratical, 
guarda costas, and regular Spanish imperial threats throughout the interwar period. Even as the 
Royal Navy’s footprint increased in the region, Anglo-American authorities in the West Indies 
deployed provincial fleets and privateers when emergency situations required it.114  
This alliance must be understood in the context of inconsistent messages from the 
metropole regarding naval defense.  Noting that historian David Wilson has argued that London 
had little in the way of an organized plan to eradicate piracy during this period, other historians 
such as Shinsuke Satsuma and Sarah Kinkel have also recently emphasized that British naval 
policy was restrained. Satsuma has made the case that the ruling Whig party in London worried 
over offending potential trade opportunities during the two short conflicts with Spain and 
avoided an overly hostile naval policy. Kinkel has expanded on this point in arguing that the 
policy made the Royal Navy a “passive force focused on deterrence.” Kinkel has also argued that 
                                                           




Prime Minister Walpole’s administration detested privateering and considered it a pathway to 
piracy.115 This reticence was especially visible in the West Indies, where most of the tension with 
the Spanish Empire in the Americas came to a head. 
Imperial authorities did not, however, discourage provincial naval defense as a tool. As 
previously mentioned, when the Lords of the Admiralty refused to fund a provincial guard vessel 
in Nova Scotia in 1724, they argued “when vessels have been fitted out by the Governors of his 
Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have borne the charge thereof.” This 
laissez-faire attitude towards provincial naval defense was also apparent in the West Indies. In 
March of 1723, Barbadian Governor Worsley wrote to the Board of Trade about his fitting out a 
sloop “in the nature of a guarda costa” to assist the customs officer in pursuing smugglers. He 
wrote that he and the customs officer both had shares in the sloop and that the “expence will not 
be much to H.M. besides the maintaining the third part of the sloop...”116 In August, an unnamed 
imperial official (the editor of the Calendar of State Papers assumed this correspondent to be 
Charles Delafaye, the undersecretary of state for the Northern Department)  responded that the 
Worsley’s deployment of the sloop “employed in the Custom house affairs to prevent the 
running of goods, leave[s] no room to doubt but that step will be approved of,” and doubted even 
if the king would ask for a share in “so necessary a service.”117 With attitudes ranging from 
apathetic to enthusiastic, imperial officials neither strongly supported nor discouraged provincial 
naval defense in this period.  
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Any study of interwar provincial naval defenses in the Caribbean must first consider 
Governor Lord Archibald Hamilton of Jamaica’s major privateering debacle of 1715-1716. In 
1715, Hamilton commissioned around ten privateers with the declared purpose of curtailing 
Spanish guarda costa and other pirate activity around Jamaica. Despite these declared aims, 
many of these privateers engaged in outright piracy against Franco-Spanish shipping.  Historian 
E.T. Fox points out that far from being altruistic, Governor Hamilton had financial shares in 
these privateering-pirate voyages. Additionally, Hamilton was implicated with loyalties to 
Jacobite rebels, and Fox surmises that he may have intended this fleet to support that Stuart 
insurrection in 1715. Author Colin Woodward suggested this may have even been the start of a 
“colonial Jacobite navy.”118  
Whatever Hamilton’s actual motivations, one of his main defenses of his actions was the 
necessity of provincial naval defense when the Royal Navy’s presence had been lackluster 
immediately following Queen Anne’s War. To be certain, Hamilton could draw on his own past 
to substantiate this declared aim. During the final months of the war in 1712, Hamilton 
dispatched provincial “advice sloops” that acted as intelligence scouts.119 When questioned by 
Jamaican politicians in 1716 “what motive he had for granting ten Comissions in ye Space of a 
month for Suppressing of Pyrates when a Kings Ship and a Sloop attended this Island,” Hamilton 
gave a questionable answer: while he could not remember if one or more of the vessels were 
gone, he assumed that they probably were gone at the time, and that the station frigate was in bad 
shape.120 In a subsequent 1718 pamphlet, Hamilton clarified this answer and declared that local 
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merchants reeling from guarda costa attacks had complained about the “want of Ships of 
War...[and desired that] such a Naval Strength may be order'd for the Protection of the Island.”121 
Whatever the truth behind Hamilton's accusation, the fact that this was one of his main 
arguments of self-defense suggests that this was a common struggle throughout the West Indies.  
 In a twist of historical irony, Hamilton’s privateer fleet—ostensibly created for provincial 
naval security from Spanish ‘pirates’—helped to spearhead the Caribbean theatre of the Anglo-
American ‘Golden Age of Piracy.’ Even though Hamilton had dictated strict parameters in his 
letters of marque (including requiring his privateer captains to fly a privateer jack rather than the 
Royal Navy union jack), some of his captains eventually turned to outright piracy against their 
own countrymen. This group of Anglo-American pirates (including the likes of Benjamin 
Hornigold, and Edward “Blackbeard” Teach) would eventually transform the Bahamas into a 
major pirate base by 1716.122 Whatever Hamilton’s initial motives in commissioning his 
“privateer” fleet, his actions helped to spur on a wave of pirates that would force governors 
throughout the West Indies to expand their own provincial fleets to go pirate hunting.  
 Historians have largely characterized Britain’s immediate reaction to the growing pirate 
threat of 1716-1718, ranging from general amnesties to disorganized Royal Navy cruises, as 
inadequate. David Wilson has recently argued that Royal authorities did not respond to the pirate 
base in the Bahamas for nearly two years primarily because of postwar debt and general 
parsimony. By 1718, Wilson argues, Crown authorities finally supported a major campaign 
                                                           
121 Lord Archibald Hamilton, An Answer to an Anonymous Libel, Entitled, Articles Exhibited Against Lord 
Archibald Hamilton, Late Governour of Jamaica: With Sundry Depositions and Proofs Relating to the Same 
(London: 1718), p. 46.  
122  Hamilton, An Answer, p. 73, and Fox “Jacobitism,” pp. 283-4.  
102 
 
against the Bahamian pirate base because renowned privateer captain Woodes Rogers and 
private investors devised a colonization plan that required “minimal public expenditure.”123  
Even though Royal Navy vessels helped Rogers to clear New Providence Island of pirates during 
his July landing, by September all of his Royal Navy escorts had departed.124 
 With few naval defense options remaining, the experienced privateer and new governor 
of the Bahamas utilized local naval strength in creative (albeit dangerous) ways. With threats 
from Spanish Cuba and the unrepentant English pirate Charles Vane, Governor Rogers resorted 
to hiring former pirates including Benjamin Hornigold and John Cockram to hunt down their old 
associates, and ultimately met with some operational success. In a late October 1718 letter to the 
Board of Trade, Rogers—still bereft of Royal Naval aid, and limited to help from local ex-pirates 
and his own private ship the Delicia—suggested that any future Royal Navy vessels sent to the 
island should be under the direct command of the local government. With a small Royal Navy 
cruiser, Rogers “could joyne a sloop or two and men from the guarrison [sic] with the best of the 
people here and soon be out after any pirate…”125  
Rogers’ idea of a cooperative Royal-provincial pirate hunting force highlights what 
historian Mark Hanna has called “one of the first unified imperial projects.”126 Historians 
generally agree that a combination of provincial naval campaigns and Royal Navy cruises helped 
to mitigate the worst of the Anglo-American pirate threats by the 1720’s, but David Wilson has 
recently made the case that provincial campaigns (ranging from state-hired vessels to individual 
merchant captains who fought pirates while on trading journeys) were often more successful than 
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Royal Navy cruisers themselves.127 Though “unified” in cause against pirates and guarda costas, 
provincial and Royal naval forces were far from unified in mission or tactics in dealing with 
these threats. 
The uneasy relationship between West Indian privateers, provincial navies, and the Royal 
Navy would continue well into the next two decades as campaigns against pirates continued 
alongside a larger focus on Spain’s imperial threat. No island better exemplifies occasionally 
unified, but more frequently disparate provincial and Royal paths taken against piratical and 
Spanish threats than Jamaica’s experience from 1718 to 1729. In December of 1718, a pirate 
captain captured a merchant captain with a lucrative cargo, and Governor Sir Nathaniel Lawes 
dispatched two provincial crews in pursuit as “none of H.M. ships of war [were] then in 
harbour.” Lawes promised the sailors 1/3 of the shares of “whatever was recovered” as 
delineated by a recent Royal proclamation against pirates. The crews found the culprit—a 
Spanish pirate with a multiethnic crew—and fell back in defeat after a bloody engagement with 
over thirty-five sailors killed, and more wounded.128 
Soon after this defeat, Lawes informed his council that “Several Merchants had 
Voluntarily offered their Sloops Tackle and ffurniture and to fit them out on the Credit of the 
Country towards further pursuing the Pyrates...” The council agreed that “three Sloops should be 
forthwith sent out...be Arm'd and Victualled by the Government” and that the “Sloops be at the 
Risque of the Owners, and Mens Wages as the others had been before.” The council appointed 
specific captains, demanded they “Concert together and have the same Commisons and 
Instructions as the Two former.” What the council suggested was an interesting combination of a 
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governmentally directed naval assignment and a privateering mission guided by the ethos of 
“risk and reward.”129  
While the new provincial fleet was on its hunt, six Royal Navy warships arrived in 
Kingston Harbor. Far from praising the arrival of Royal military aid, Lawes complained to the 
Board of Trade that he had little control over the warships’ captains. In one case, Lawes—still 
ignorant of the recent declaration of war between Great Britain and Spain—complained that a 
Royal Navy captain failed to deliver his letter to the governor of Cuba inquiring about Spanish 
attacks on Jamaican shipping.130 Luckily for Lawes, those sloops “fitted out at the charge of the 
country in pursuit of the pirate yt. took the ship Kingston, are return'd with pretty good success” 
and recovered the vessel without firing a shot. Around the same time, Lawes reported that 
Jamaican “privateers have already made application for Commissions to act against the 
Spaniards, and I have with the advice of the Council issued some.”131 
Throughout the rest of the short-lived War of the Quadruple Alliance and beyond, Lawes 
and his successors struggled to harmonize Royal Navy and provincial maritime defense 
strategies and goals. This became immediately obvious in the Jamaica government’s decision to 
regularly employ guard sloops despite a Royal Navy presence throughout the 1720’s.132 
Desperate to fund regular provincial guard sloops while also cutting costs, Lawes informed the 
Board of Trade in late 1720 that he had agreed to the Jamaican Assembly’s levies on slave sales 
and proposal to tax Jewish residents £1,000 in order to fit two vessels for the “guarding the 
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coasts from pirates and other vessells from Trinidado [Cuba] who frequently commit 
depradations [sic] and acts of hostility both by sea and land upon us.”133  
While the politics surrounding Jamaica’s expansion of its provincial navy could lead to 
unjust treatment of its citizenry, they could also alienate Royal Navy officers like Admiral 
Edward Vernon. Tensions were already high between Vernon and Lawes’ administration when 
Vernon consistently involved himself in local affairs—ranging from attempting to extradite 
alleged Jacobites to England for trial to accusing Governor Lawes and his attorney general of 
smuggling.134 In late 1720, in a preface for an act to fit out guard sloops, the Jamaican Assembly 
made the following barb: “Whereas...H.M. ships of war ordered here for the encouragement of 
trade and defence of this Island have not so effectually answered the end for which they were 
sent hither...whereby a great many...vessels as well belonging to this his said Island...have been 
taken in sight thereof by pirates and vessels fitted out and commissioned by the subjects of the 
King of Spain under pretence of guarding their own coast…” Vernon responded to this 
accusation in a letter to the Admiralty, claiming that Royal Navy ships were not equipped to 
chase after Spanish-sponsored pirates in small craft, and that the Assembly’s accusation was a 
“lying preamble.”135 Just as with the arrival of the Royal Navy in South Carolina in the 1720s, 
Jamaicans came to believe that not all of their coastal defense measures could be left to imperial 
authorities alone. By April of 1721, Lawes was confident enough to brag to London that “I am 
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told our adjacent Spanish Governors are grown more cautious in granting commissions to guard 
de la coasts especially since the country sloops have been cruiseing round about the Island.”136  
Despite this pattern of provincial naval defense in Jamaica, the story of the island’s 
maritime defenses in the 1720’s was not one of total animosity with the Royal Navy, and as it 
happened the Royal Navy could also be more dependable than their provincial counterparts at 
times. For instance, In February of 1724/5, the next governor—Henry Bentinck, the Duke of 
Portland—disagreed with the Assembly over various legislation and attributed the failure of a 
new coastal security bill to this dispute. The governor bragged that “I have not sufferd your 
Coast to lye Naked, The Commadore having at my instance (very readily indeed) commanded 
his Majesties Snow to that Station...”137 The duke reported to the Board of Trade that “I prevaild 
wth. the Commadore to order one of H.M. sloops to supply the want of the guard sloop,” that the 
Assembly accepted this, and hoped to use the initial money for a provincial guard sloop to 
suppress an ongoing slave rebellion.138 At least in this case, the Royal Navy was more 
dependable in terms of coastal defense than their provincial counterparts.  
The disparate views over the best course of naval protection became even more evident in 
1726. An anonymous pamphleteer appealed to the Royal government for permission to enact 
reprisals against Spanish guarda costas for shipping losses, and later decried the alleged 
inactivity of large Royal Navy warships to pursue swift foes, as well as the inability of the island 
to keep financing expensive provincial guard sloops.  The governor did admit, however, various 
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137  Letter from the Duke of Portland…, 8 February 1724/5, TNA CO 137/16  
138 Governor the Duke of Portland to the Council of Trade and Plantations, 8 February 1724/5 in CSP Vol. 
34, 1724-1725, Cecil Headlam and Arthur Percival Newton, eds,   (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936), 




political disagreements with the Lords of Admiralty as well as the “negligent and disrespectfull 
behaviour of most of the Sea Officers” in the area.139 The pamphleteer and the governor may 
have disagreed over the Royal Navy’s use in hunting guarda costas, but they both highlighted 
major problems that threatened the province’s naval security: heavy financial costs for provincial 
officials in outfitting local defense fleets,  and personal disputes between local officials and 
Royal Navy officers.   
Notwithstanding the lack of cohesion between provincial forces and the Royal Navy, 
both Anglo-American and Royal officials in Jamaica continued to rely on this uneasy balance of 
provincial and Royal Naval protection when a second (though largely uneventful) imperial 
conflict broke out again with Spain in 1726. While its causes were imperial disputes in Europe, 
local tensions in the West Indies—particularly an uptick in guarda costa attacks—provided a 
tense American background for this renewed (though brief) war.140 From 1726 to 1727, Vice 
Admiral Francis Hosier led an infamous attempt to blockade the Spanish treasure fleet in Porto 
Bello, Panama. Over three thousand Royal Navy sailors, including Hosier himself, would die 
from an epidemic of yellow fever during the failed blockade.141  
Jamaican participation in Hosier’s campaign was limited, but when King George II sent a 
letter in the spring of 1729 warning that Spain had plans to invade the island, Jamaican 
authorities scrambled to ready both the Royal Navy and to expand local maritime defenses. The 
Jamaican government’s naval defense plan proved that provincial and Royal Navy vessels could 
operate in tandem on a large scale if needed. On 7 April 1729, Commodore St. Loe promised 
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Jamaican Governor Robert Hunter that he “shall be ready to come into any Measure with Your 
Excellency for its safety, and shall keep those Ships that are with me in readiness to go upon any 
Service...” and already had some of his vessels scouting for Spanish fleets around the island.   
While these ships were cruising, Governor Hunter devised a plan for the defense of 
Kingston Harbor that relied almost entirely on merchant vessels. He proposed quickly training 
sailors from each ship to operate artillery at the fort, and that various merchant vessels should be 
armed, reinforced, and strategically placed to prevent landings. In the case of a successful 
Spanish incursion, the merchant captains were to fall back to Kingston and land their men. The 
merchant captains were to keep a “strict discipline amongst their People according to the Law of 
Arms,” and financial insurance would be provided for wounded sailors and the families of sailors 
killed in action. His council agreed to these proposals, and only added that sailors on land would 
be put under the command of the local militia.142  While no Spanish invasion would reach 
Jamaica’s shores, Governor Hunter’s simultaneous reliance on Royal Navy cruisers for external 
scouting and merchant vessels for emergency defense exemplified the ways in which a Royal-
provincial naval alliance could work on the field.  
Even after the short War of the Quadruple Alliance concluded in 1729, Anglo-American 
officials in Jamaica and other islands would still rely on both Royal Navy and provincial naval 
forces to combat guarda costas. Historian Richard Harding has found that of the seventy-seven 
British vessels taken by guarda costas between 1713 and 1731, 34% of these vessels were taken 
after 1727.  Negotiations in the early 1730s between Spain and Britain to end both English 
smuggling and Spanish guarda costa activity failed, and Spain and France renewed their ancient 
alliance in 1733—a worrisome prospect for the Walpole Administration.143  
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Just as tensions were heating up with Spain, Rear Admiral Charles Stewart agreed to 
dispatch Royal Navy warships to seek restitution for Jamaica ships that had been taken by 
guarda costas in the autumn of 1732.144 Even this newly proactive stance did not eliminate the 
need for provincial naval activity. A few months after this decision, a Spanish vessel seized an 
English sloop in the harbor of Port Morant Jamaica, and  “Two Sloops were immediately order'd 
to go in quest of the said Pirate.”145 Though the master of the sloop was released by the Spanish 
and restitution made, Anglo-American authorities had still felt it necessary to send what were 
likely provincial sloops out to look for the missing merchant.146  
Despite growing Royal Naval involvement in the region by the early 1730s, provincial 
naval activity continued in many areas. In early 1735, a Spanish guarda costa with over 120 
Hands “most Negroes and Mollattoes” with two prize sloops in tow, attacked an English sloop 
and forced it to run ashore on the Isle of Saba. His “Excellency General Matthew...instantly 
fitted out a Sloop of his own with sixty Men to go in quest of the Pirate and her prizes.” Even 
though he could not find the guarda costa, the "Example was followed by another gentleman 
who fitted out a Sloop at his own Expence,” but did not have enough sailors himself. With the 
guarda costa still at large, “till better Measures can be thought of, out of his great Generosity,  is 
fitting out his Sloop a second time for the Security of the homeward-bound Ships...”147 Even at 
this late date, merely four years before the next great imperial contest (the War of Jenkin’s Ear), 
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West Indian officials still felt the need to fit out small provincial vessels “till better Measures” 
(perhaps adequate Royal Naval assistance) could be thought of. 
From 1713 to 1739, colonial governors and assemblies in the West Indies juggled various 
maritime defense options, ranging from commission privateers to developing standing provincial 
navies to relying on Royal Navy assistance. With major threats from Anglo-American pirates 
and Spanish guarda costas, they came to rely on a loose combination of provincial and Royal 
Naval responses to these enemies. While imperial authorities did not discourage provincial naval 
activity, their restrained naval response to these threats perpetuated regional instability in the 
West Indies and forced provincial governors to use their own resources to defend their shores—
and to help secure the West Indies for the Empire at large.  
  From the end of Queen Anne’s War in 1713 to the beginning of the War of Jenkin’s Ear 
in 1739,  Anglo-American officials on Britain’s North American borderlands and in the West 
Indies navigated a maelstrom of piratical, Native, and imperial maritime threats by developing 
flexible systems of provincial naval defense.  Though occasionally deploying privateers, colonial 
officials on the contested borderlands of New England, Nova Scotia, and South Carolina 
depended on centrally controlled emergency fleets and guard vessels to pursue Abenaki, 
Yamassee, and Anglo-American raiders.  While occasionally outfitting guard vessels like their 
continental brethren, West Indian officials dispatched impressed vessels, privateers, and  guarda 
costas and pirates. Though imperial officials expanded the Royal Navy’s physical presence 
throughout the Atlantic world in the interwar period, parsimony, operational difficulties, and a 
guiding ethos of military restraint ensured that provincial naval forces would be necessary to 





Chapter III. The War of Jenkin’s Ear and the Incomplete ‘Royalization’ of Provincial 
Navies, 1739-1754 
 
 When Great Britain declared war on Spain in 1739 after nearly a generation of relative 
peace with its traditional foes, few imperial officials could have expected a nine-year conflict 
that would ultimately pit them against the French as well. This conflict, the War of Jenkin’s Ear 
(which eventually bled into a larger imperial and European conflict called the War of the 
Austrian Succession/King George’s War) was different from the wars against Louis XIV in that 
it was largely inspired by maritime tensions.1 By the late 1730s, after a series of failed 
negotiations over British navigation rights and Spanish guarda costa activity, Prime Minister 
Robert Walpole’s political foes convinced his ministry to declare war on the Spanish.2   
 This fight against the Spanish had roots in navigation disputes in the West Indies, but also 
in territorial disputes on the North American mainland that directly involved provincial naval 
forces. With borderland conflicts common between South Carolina (Britain’s southernmost 
colony) and the Spanish and their Native allies throughout the last century, British statesman 
James Edward Oglethorpe and other imperial officials planned a ‘buffer’ colony for the region 
south of South Carolina called Georgia. Pleased with this arrangement, South Carolina’s 
legislature immediately sent the scout boat Carolina with ten sailors to protect Georgia’s earliest 
settlers in early 1733. The Carolina—along with several other small provincial vessels—would 
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prove to be vital in Oglethorpe’s provocative military expansion south of Savannah at Frederica, 
Georgia in 1736.3 
 British expansion in Georgia (backed by provincial naval craft) inflamed Spanish 
authorities at St. Augustine, and competing Anglo-Spanish claims on the Georgia coast had all 
the potential to blow up into all-out war. This border dispute took on greater imperial dimensions 
when Oglethorpe and his Spanish counterpart, Governor Francisco de Moral y Sánchez, agreed 
to cease expansion and let their respective overlords in Europe decide the Florida-Georgia line. 
The British Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, took a hard line against rumored Spanish 
military plans to invade Georgia and promised to protect the fledgling colony. He also secured 
Oglethorpe a place as the overall military commander of both South Carolina and Georgia. When 
Spain demanded a complete British withdrawal from Georgia, pro-war politicians and even King 
George II agreed to send Royal Navy reinforcements and British troops to the New World.4 It is 
telling that British military expansion in Georgia—largely contingent on provincial naval 
assistance—would ultimately help propel the British Empire to war against Spain in 1739. 
Any study of provincial navies in the War of Jenkin’s Ear must consider the massive 
expansion of the Royal Navy’s war making capabilities in this period. By all accounts, the Royal 
Navy had achieved “naval supremacy” by the end of the war in 1748.5 When the Newcastle 
ministry made the final push for war in 1739, the Royal Navy had over 117 vessels in serviceable 
or nearly serviceable condition, twenty of which were stationed in North America and the West 
Indies. In terms of finance, Walpole’s reduction of the national debt in the interwar period 
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coupled with a decades-old banking and finance system allowed Britain to bankroll the war 
effort.6 Logistical improvements also occurred throughout the war, including the direct 
Admiralty takeover of victualling for Royal Navy ships in Jamaica—a task that had previously 
been handled by inefficient private merchants.7 
The Royal Navy’s leadership also made leaps towards professionalization during the 
nine-year conflict, although the Admiralty’s transformation of the Navy into a more regimented 
and uniform fighting force would take years to complete. In late 1744, when the Duke of 
Bedford became the first Lord of the Admiralty, he brought with him a host of new Admiralty 
Lords (Anson, Sandwich, and Grenville) that one scholar has described as a “generation of 
politician administrators.” Between the mid-1740s and early 1750s, the new admiralty politicos 
successfully cemented the Admiralty at the helm of Britain’s disorganized naval bureaucratic 
web, instituted stricter discipline for the navy, advocated for more offensive naval warfare 
(particularly in North America), ordered officers to wear uniforms for the first time, and ordered 
the construction of more powerful warships.8   
Coinciding with the Royal Navy’s administrative reform and expansion in the War of 
Jenkin’s Ear was the massive growth of privateering. In fact, there were more privateers in the 
War of Jenkin’s Ear than in any previous conflict. Even though Britain encouraged the practice, 
it struggled to codify and enforce new regulations on the rapidly growing practice.9 Historian 
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Carl Swanson holds that privateering was especially popular with empires during this period as 
“belligerents' sea power was augmented, yet national treasuries did not have to pay the cost.”10  
While privateering expanded during this conflict more than ever, so too did the 
proliferation of colony-funded provincial navies. While borderland colonies had funded some 
small provincial forces in the interwar period, the war prompted Anglo-American provinces 
between Nova Scotia and Barbados to fund guard vessels and local navies on a much larger scale 
than ever before. Dozens of small, medium, and large provincial warships (e.g. the South 
Carolina galley Charles Town, the Massachusetts frigate Massachusetts, and the Rhode Island 
sloop Tartar) patrolled shipping routes, intercepted enemy privateers, and spearheaded naval 
assaults on enemy ports such as Fortress Louisbourg and St. Augustine. In essence, provincial 
naval forces returned to the offensive and defensive tasks they had taken up in Queen Anne’s 
War, but on a much larger scale. For instance, for the first time, Massachusetts provincial vessels 
hunted for Spanish prey as far south as the Carolinas, and Rhode Island’s guard sloop transported 
its colony’s troops to the West Indies for operations in Cuba.11  
What is especially astounding for this era, however, is the scale on which provincial 
navies from various American colonies cooperated with one another, and the extent to which 
Anglo-Americans throughout the British Atlantic became aware of other provinces’ naval 
activities. Much of this can be attributed to the growth in trade and correspondence in the 
decades leading up to the War of Jenkin’s Ear. By 1740, increasingly regularized ship traffic 
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along with mail and newspaper circulation increased in the Atlantic world and transformed the 
British Empire “from a rimless wheel of dissimilar trades into a linked community…”12 In this 
growing Atlantic web of commerce and travel, Anglo-Americans became aware of other 
colonies’ provincial naval efforts, and shared experiences of coastal defense. Take for instance a 
1743 South Carolina newspaper report that “The Boston Province Snow (Prince of Orange 
[Italics mine]) commanded by Capt. [Edward] Tyng, was spoke with on Wednesday last,  
cruizing off our Bar.”13  Where provincial navies had operated on mostly regional terms before, 
by the 1740s, colonial vessels had begun to patrol waters far beyond their regional homeports.  
The fact that Anglo-Americans from multiple colonies began to coordinate provincial 
naval warfare on a large scale reflects larger sociopolitical trends occurring throughout the 
British Atlantic world at the time. By the 1730s, the British government had come to expect 
Anglo-Americans to defend themselves, but also had become willing to deploy large Royal 
military forces in the New World. Even though the Admiralty stationed more Royal Navy guard 
vessels in the colonies, the King's ships were not able to fully meet the colonies' wartime defense 
needs—a factor that inspired the continued growth of provincial guard ships alongside an 
increasing Royal Navy presence in North America. The contemporary metropolitan policy of 
encouraging colonial participation in battle alongside Royal forces inspired the Walpole 
ministry’s 1739-1740 plan to attack an unspecified major Spanish port in the West Indies with 
both the Royal Navy, British regulars and a large force of provincial soldiers from several 
colonies. This force famously met defeat in its attempt to take the Spanish South American port 
of Cartagena.14 
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 Notwithstanding the ultimate failure of the expedition, the British government not only 
expected the bulk of Anglo-Americans to build a large army to attack a distant target, but also to 
“provide victuals, transports, and all other necessaries” for the American soldiers sent to the 
West Indies until the Crown could reimburse the colonies. British authorities also promised 
assistance by Royal Navy commissioners in finding private transports.15 From the precipice of 
the conflict, imperial officials counted on some level of provincial naval transport for American 
troops. Nevertheless, this growing imperial reliance on provincial naval assistance would be 
tempered by the British government’s unwillingness to create a coherent policy or strategy 
regarding Anglo-American navies. 
Throughout the War of Jenkin’s Ear, two seemingly divergent trends emerged that would 
forever change the Royal-provincial naval defense partnership. On the one hand, Parliament’s 
willingness to bankroll some provincial fleets and expeditions demonstrated metropolitan 
recognition of the importance of Anglo-American sea power for the first time. On the other hand, 
vagueness in Parliamentary legislation regarding prize distribution coupled with Royal Navy 
misconduct throughout the war angered Anglo-American officials, limited the utility of joint 
expeditions, and set the stage for future conflict between Americans and the Royal Navy.16 
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“Where the King’s Ships Are Not:” Provincial Naval Warfare in the Southern Colonies, 
and Imperial Involvement, 1739-44 
  
Maritime tensions were the main causes of the War of Jenkin’s Ear.  Nevertheless, 
throughout much of the first half of the conflict, Royal Navy vessels failed to adequately protect 
the North American shoreline from Spanish privateers—prompting nearly universal adoption of 
provincial guardships, and growing awareness amongst Anglo-Americans of their own (and their 
neighbors’) maritime potential. After paying scant attention to colonial naval defense concerns 
for the first few years of the conflict, outcries over Royal Navy negligence on the Carolina 
station coupled with General Oglethorpe’s campaign for financial compensation for outfitting a 
provincial navy inspired Parliament to support provincial naval forces for the first major time. 
In an April 1740 report to the Board of Trade, Royal customs surveyor and administrator, 
Robert Dinwiddie, estimated that Anglo-Americans from Newfoundland to the West Indies 
operated over 2,000 seagoing vessels, while British vessels travelling to the colonies numbered 
around 1,000. Dinwiddie guessed there were around 24,680 sailors operating out of Britain’s 
Atlantic colonies at that time.17 Whatever the accuracy of this report, by the beginning of the 
War of Jenkin’s Ear, imperial officials—and Britons at large—were becoming increasingly 
aware of the scale of growing  provincial naval capabilities.   
This growing awareness is also evident in an April 1740 pamphlet by Irish newsman and 
printer, George Faulkner. Faulkner argued that the American colonies were “so well peopled, 
and have such a Number of Ships and Sailors, that they are both able and willing to put out 40 or 
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118 
 
50 large Ships of Force at their own Expence.” He maintained that if governments from New 
England to the West Indies should provide over forty galleys “built in the Nature of the French 
or Spanish Gallies, their Men exercised to Arms as our Foot are,” they could capture St. 
Augustine and other Spanish ports. Faulkner contended that these swift oared vessels—with 
roots in Greco-Roman navies of antiquity—would be suitable for action in the West Indies as 
they had been in the Mediterranean for millennia, and that provincial naval efforts would give 
the Royal Navy more room to operate elsewhere.  Faulkner would later claim that “What gives 
us the greater Certainty of Success in this War, is, the great Strength and vast Trade our 
Plantations in America have acquired since the last War...,” but did admit Royal military 
assistance would still be necessary to some extent.18 
While Faulkner’s assumptions that Spanish ports could be easily taken by provincial 
fleets were belied by the various defeats Anglo-Americans would face throughout the war,  he 
was far from the only European to appreciate Anglo-Americans’ growing provincial maritime 
power at the time. A few years later in April of 1745, Admiral Peter Warren—a Royal Navy 
official who had previously worked alongside provincial fleets in the failed attack on St. 
Augustine in 1740 and who would soon fight alongside them in the siege of Louisbourg—wrote 
Whitehall should encourage every colony to fit out their own provincial navies that would be on 
the “same footing” as Royal ships.19 
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Problematically, imperial officials never created such a standard policy based on 
Warren’s suggestion, and provincial officials continued their forebears’ policy of funding local 
navies on their own. In fact, Anglo-Americans not only took the initiative to defend their coasts 
from growing numbers of Spanish privateers, but began to appreciate and study the naval efforts 
of their neighbors for the first time.20 The scale of this universal provincial naval response is best 
illustrated by Lt. Governor George Thomas’s (and his successors’) long battles with the Quaker-
dominated Pennsylvania Assembly over maritime defense.  
In 1741, Thomas complained to the assembly that it would be “very disreputable to this 
Province...to remain inactive, When Boston, Rhode Island, & New York, are fitting out Vessels 
of fforce [sic] to secure their Navigation by attacking the Enemy.” Three years later (after France 
joined the Spanish in the war against the British), Thomas—still at odds with the Quakers over 
the same issue—argued that Pennsylvania should fit out a provincial guard ship to fight 
privateers as “the Governments of New-England, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, enter'd early 
into this Method…Virginia has been lately obliged, from the Disability of the King's Ships upon 
that Station to do the same.” Thomas also argued that the Royal Navy’s protection was 
inadequate.21 With growing news that other colonies built provincial navies, Thomas contended 
that Pennsylvania’s very honor as an English colony was at stake.   
While Thomas’s pleas to the assembly reveal growing provincial awareness of Anglo-
American naval power throughout the course of the conflict, it was his temporary successor—
acting President Anthony Palmer—who best summarized the state of provincial naval activity by 
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the end of the war. In the summer of 1748, Palmer tried to convince the Assembly that the 
colony should fit out a “Ship-of-War” to assist a Royal Navy sloop in the area. After all, the 
“neighbouring Colonies of New England, New York, Virginia, South Carolina, or the West India 
Islands...have almost all at times found it necessary, notwithstanding the Guardships station'd 
among them, to fit out Vessels of War to act in conjunction with those Guardships, or 
independant [sic] of them as Circumstances required.”  Not only were those vessels useful, 
“being immediately under the Command of their respective Governments...obliged to 
Cruize...where...the King's Ships are not,” but they were also signs that a colony was not 
unwilling to “do all in its own Power” to assist Royal military efforts.22  In essence, by 1748, 
provincial naval defense was not only a wartime necessity for many Anglo-Americans, but a 
necessary show of loyalty to the Crown. 
Naval operations in South Carolina and Georgia in the first four years of the conflict (c. 
1740-1744) illustrate not only the tensions between provincial and Royal Navy forces, but the 
events that led Parliament to consider funding provincial naval forces for the first time. General 
James Oglethorpe in Georgia and his colleagues in South Carolina had long depended on a loose 
confederation of standing provincial navies (largely centered around both colonies’ scout boat 
systems) and Royal Navy guard ships. Francis Moore, an English travel writer who spent time in 
Georgia before the war broke out, described the prewar responsibilities of provincial naval forces 
on the Georgia coast and the sorts of sailors who manned Oglethorpe’s scout boats. He wrote 
that a scout boat was a “strong-built swift Boat, with three swivel Guns and ten Oars, kept for the 
visiting the River-Passages, and Islands, and for preventing the Incursions of Enemies, or 
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Runaways…” Regarding the sailors, he wrote that the crew was composed of men “bred in 
America, bold and hardy, who lie out in the Woods...Most of them are good Hunters or 
Fishers...”23 All told, by 1736, Oglethorpe employed around four small crews of Georgia and 
South Carolina scout boat and periagua sailors. These vessels operated under Oglethorpe’s 
direction independently, but also at times in tandem with the resident Royal Navy sloop Hawk.24  
Paying for this substantial provincial fleet was more complicated in Georgia than in 
colonies with governors and assemblies. Georgia was technically a private colony run by a board 
of Trustees in London, but these Trustees depended on substantial yearly Parliamentary grants 
for the colony’s civil and military maintenance. By 1738, Walpole promised the Trustees that the 
imperial government would cover the colony’s military costs if the Trustees continued to apply 
to Parliament for grants for non-military costs.25 Despite this assurance, no immediate funds 
came from London for local forces, and Oglethorpe ended up personally funding his provincial 
navy for the first few years of the conflict while holding out hope that Parliament would 
eventually reimburse him.26 
Oglethorpe’s naval activities were closely followed by British observers from the very 
beginning of the war. The 1740 edition of the widely circulated news journal The Gentleman's 
Magazine reported that British privateers were beginning to use Frederica, Georgia as a base to 
raid Spanish shipping. Additionally, it reported that in November of 1739, Spanish raiders 
massacred and decapitated some of Oglethorpe's Scottish highlander rangers. One of 
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Oglethorpe's scout boats reported the alarm to the general, and Oglethorpe immediately “ordered 
several Boats to be got ready, by which we imagine he intends to retaliate this Hostility.”27  
It was earlier in that tense Autumn of 1739 that Oglethorpe received King George’s 
military instructions: to “make an Attempt upon the Spanish Settlement at St Augustine” if he 
could get the cooperation of the South Carolina government, and to encourage privateering 
against Spanish shipping.28 While Oglethorpe would ultimately lead a major siege of the Spanish 
city with naval and infantry assistance from both South Carolina and the Royal Navy throughout 
the first half of 1740, the expedition—like the contemporaneous attack on Cartagena de las 
Indias—was an utter failure. In the immediate months and years following the defeat, 
contemporaries and historians alike have argued over who was most responsible for the 
campaign’s failure.29 Despite controversy over the defeat and tensions between provincial and 
Royal forces, the unsuccessful siege inspired long-lasting innovations in the provincial naval 
capabilities of both South Carolina and Georgia.  
From the very beginning of the joint campaign, tensions were high. After a successful 
raid on Spanish forts north of St. Augustine in the late winter, a confident Oglethorpe implored 
South Carolina to assist him with the capture of the Spanish capital. Even though Oglethorpe and 
Royal Navy Captain Vincent Pearce consistently tried to convince South Carolina authorities to 
commit sufficient funds and troops to assist in the siege, it would not be until early April that 
they agreed to send assistance—notably refusing to provide engineers or a deadline for when 
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they would be ready. Even when the South Carolina legislature agreed to provide assistance, they 
still required an immediate loan from Oglethorpe in pounds sterling to outfit their troops and 
vessels.30 
 Despite this haggling, Benjamin Franklin’s Pennsylvania Gazette reported in May that 
by early April “the [South Carolina] General Assembly have empower'd...the Lieutenant 
Governor to raise a Regiment of Foot, and a Troop of Rangers to assist General Oglethorpe...in 
Conjunction with several of his Majesty’s Ships of War: as also to provide Sloops, Boats, Guns” 
and other necessities.31 Indeed, contemporary estimates of both colonies’ provincial fleets during 
the expedition highlight the scale of this undertaking. In April of 1740, Oglethorpe reported that 
he employed three sloops, a long boat, a schooner, and numerous armed small boats including a 
“Colony Periagua being a Guard De Coast.” This fleet included over 140 sailors and officers, 
and cost Oglethorpe an extraordinary sum of £453 a month.32 South Carolina’s government 
provided an armed schooner with 54 “Volunteers and their [enslaved] Negroes,” and numerous 
“Craft, Viz: 3 Sloops, one of which attended the [Royal Navy] Men of War,” with 20 sailors in 
total, and “14 Schooners and Decked Boats” which employed over 56 armed men and sailors.33  
While the Pennsylvania Gazette bragged that the naval efforts were done in 
“conjunction” with the Royal Navy, provincial officials largely placed their naval forces under 
the command of Commodore Vincent Pearce—captain of the H.M.S. Flamborough, and at least 
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eight other frigates and smaller Royal Navy vessels.34 Pearce and his squadron’s general 
relationship with provincial authorities and forces can best be described as tense. Throughout this 
campaign and the rest of the war, southern provincial authorities and Royal Navy commanders 
recognized that Royal Navy forces needed provincial naval assistance, but regularly clashed over 
logistics and tactics. One major operational tension was anger over Royal Navy impressment 
policies.  Even though Parliament had banned impressment in American colonies in 1708 with 
the ‘Sixth of Anne,’ Admiralty officials stopped requiring personnel-depleted Royal Navy station 
captains to follow this act by the mid-1720’s. These impressments continued throughout the war, 
and Parliament gave them official sanction in 1746 when it condoned impressment in mainland 
North America, but banned it in the more lucrative West Indies colonies—a double standard that 
infuriated many Anglo-Americans.35  
While colonial governments did still periodically opt to “Impress a Sufficient number of 
men and make provision for their subsistence” to man provincial navy vessels, Royal Navy 
impressment was far more frequent and far more unpopular.36 This sentiment was particularly 
evident during the preparations for the attack on St. Augustine. A privateer named Captain Davis 
sailed south to Tybee Island, Georgia,  after “his Men [were] impressed into the Men of War, and 
himself engaged in much Controversy at Law...[which] put a full End now to any farther 
Thoughts about privateering…” He chose to “admit the Sloop he had with him into the publick 
Service, among so many others employed” by Oglethorpe. Davis’s decision to join Oglethorpe’s 
provincial navy not only hints at the possibility that provincial service could be an occasional 
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escape from Royal Navy impressment, but also highlights the malleability between independent 
privateering and provincial navies.37  
In a more extreme case, the South Carolina Gazette claimed that on 17 May, a press gang 
from the H.M.S Tartar tried to impress several sailors from the merchant ship Caesar in Charles 
Town Harbor, and in an ensuing scuffle, Royal sailors killed one of the merchant men.38 
Governor William Bull wanted to have the man responsible for the killing put on trial, but the 
Royal Navy captain and his crew set sail for St. Augustine before proceedings could begin. This 
evasion of the law, argues military historian James P. Herson, “made for bad press and may have 
contributed to poor contemporary and historical hindsight…” regarding the siege—and 
particularly regarding Pearce and his Royal Navy squadron.39  
While impressment surely soured some contemporary and future scholarly opinions of 
Pearce and his squadron, by all accounts the provincial and Royal Navies largely cooperated 
before, during, and even after the disastrous siege. Royal Navy officers also continued to 
recognize the utility of provincial navies throughout the campaign.  For instance, in late 1739, 
Captain Peter Warren (who would eventually serve under Pearce's command at the siege) and the 
crew of the H.M.S. Squirrel had captured a Spanish schooner, and Warren asked the South 
Carolina government to operate the schooner with ten local sailors as an “Advice Boat to bring 
any Intelligence...for the Service of this Government.”40  
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During the preparations for the siege in the spring of 1740, Pearce himself surveyed one 
Captain Thomas Walker’s schooner at Governor Bull's request, and made the case that “it would 
be best for the Province if she should be bought.” The colony never purchased the vessel. 
Nevertheless, a few months later during the final weeks of the siege, Pearce wrote Governor Bull 
and asked him for the schooner’s presence to assist the Royal Navy flotilla. The governor not 
only hired Walker’s schooner, but fitted it with provincial sailors to assist the Royal forces.41 It is 
worth noting that the South Carolina government agreed to this task despite having previously 
purchased another schooner (the Pearl), which was captained by a Royal Navy officer, and was 
likely crewed by local sailors.42  All in all, it seems Royal Navy officers were more than happy to 
utilize South Carolina’s provincial naval resources—whether through unpopular methods of 
impressment, or more routine requests for provincial vessels to assist Royal Navy ships. 
While provincial and Royal forces faced many challenges throughout the several weeks 
of the siege, one of their primary obstacles was the presence of six well-armed Spanish half-
galleys in St. Augustine’s Matanzas’s Bay. In a stroke of fortune for the Governor Manuel de 
Montiano, Cuba's governor had agreed to send him the six sleek vessels, and nearly two-hundred 
sailors. This assistance came during a period in April when no British ships were patrolling the 
Florida coast—a critical mistake during the preparations for the siege. These half-galleys had 
cannons at fore and aft, but Montiano added guns on their starboard and port sides as well. These 
swift vessels, with only one mast each and a shallow draft, allowed the St. Augustine garrison 
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nearly total command of Matanzas Bay by the time Oglethorpe’s invasion force arrived by early 
May.43 
 By early June, Commodore Pearce feared the upcoming hurricane season, and warned 
Oglethorpe that he could only expect Royal Navy assistance into early July. By mid-June, this 
impending deadline, combined with sundry mishaps including the Spanish defeat of the English 
garrison at nearby Fort Mose and the Royal Navy’s failure to prevent Spanish ships from 
resupplying the city’s garrison, left provincial leaders desperate for a quick solution to taking the 
well-fortified town.44 Throughout much of the second half of June, Colonel Alexander 
Vanderdussen—overall commander of South Carolina’s troops—continuously offered to 
spearhead a joint provincial-Royal Navy assault on the Spanish half-galleys. With support from 
Captain Warren, Vanderdussen promised Commodore Pearce that he could provide at least eight 
small boats and various canoes to transport his troops, to transport his men alongside the Royal 
Navy. Pearce wavered between supporting and dismissing the attack, but ultimately decided the 
assault would be too dangerous. Within days, storms forced the warships out to sea, Cuban 
resupply vessels once more made it to the St. Augustine garrison, and the siege was all but 
over.45 
 Contemporaries and historians have long debated whether provincial forces or the Royal 
Navy was more culpable for the ignominious withdrawal from the siege in early July. Historian 
Trevor Reese makes the convincing case that imperial support for the expedition was limited as 
most Royal Navy forces in the Americas were concerned with the concurrent siege of Cartagena 
de las Indias. Reese contends that imperial preference for control over the more lucrative Spanish 
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West Indies prevailed over provincial North American desires for a strong assault on St. 
Augustine.46 Whatever fault imperial authorities had for the failure, many of the leading figures 
in the siege blamed each other for the defeat. Historian Douglas Edward Leach observes that 
between 1740 and 1743, South Carolinians, British army officers, and Oglethorpe’s allies 
engaged in a pamphlet war over the controversy.47 Indeed, in one example, a South Carolina 
legislative committee complained that Commodore Pearce was “always declaring himself ready 
to give any assistance but never giving any at all,” and was unreasonable in his dismissal of 
Vanderdussen's plan of attack. Perhaps most damning, the Commodore had left South Carolina's 
“Province Schooner,” (presumably the Pearl) to “shift for herself” at the mouth of Matanzas Bay 
without any assistance from the Royal Navy.48   
 Whatever criticism South Carolina legislators had for specific Royal Navy commanders, 
the colony’s Commons House of Assembly still admitted a firm reliance on imperial protection. 
In a letter to King George II immediately following the withdrawal from St. Augustine, 
provincial legislators lamented the expedition’s costs, but thanked the monarch for the 
“Assistance of so many of your Majesty's Ships of War, the good Effect of which we have 
already in many Instances, experienced.”49  Both Pearce’s requests for provincial schooners, and 
provincial willingness to place local ships and crews under the commands of Royal Navy 
officers demonstrated some of this “Good effect.” Even in the wake of disaster, provincial-Royal 
Naval cooperation was possible to some degree, if clouded by infighting. 
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 With little time to recuperate from the defeat at St. Augustine in 1740, Lt. Governor Bull 
in South Carolina and General Oglethorpe in Georgia both had to adapt their provincial naval 
establishments to increasing waves of privateer attacks against the two colonies’ shipping.  In 
fact, historian Carl Swanson has attributed the British failure at St. Augustine to an increased 
onslaught against the Carolina coast. This wave of enemy privateering between 1740 and 1742 
stretched as far north as New York.  By the end of the war, Spanish and French privateers would 
capture 736 English vessels in North America and the West Indies. Swanson suggests that while 
Royal Navy station ships did cruise after enemy privateers throughout the war, the task was 
sometimes too large for the navy to handle.50   
Despite the Admiralty Board’s October 1740 instructions for Royal Navy ships to expand 
their patrols off the South Carolina and Georgia coasts, their presence was inadequate to defend 
local commerce. Provincial anger at alleged Royal Navy indolence would inspire repeated 
provincial petitions for greater naval assistance from London.51 This is evident in Lt. Governor 
Bull’s October 1741 letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Lt. Governor Bull, wherein he decried 
“...the Interruption [Spanish privateers] give to the Trade of this Province; more especially at this 
time when his Majesty's Ship Phoenix is unfit for service...[and] his Majesty's Ship Tartar” was 
due to leave soon—a fact that would leave the province defenceless and ripe for raiding. Even 
when the Carolina Royal Navy station ships pursued Spanish privateers, they evaded capture by 
sailing into shallow water. Lt. Governor Bull pleaded with the Duke of Newcastle to send 
material and laborers to help build shallow-water galleys to pursue these privateers.52 If imperial 
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authorities provided materials to build light-draft and swift row galleys, South Carolina’s 
government could potentially save money on vessel construction while also fighting enemy 
vessels in shoal waters where Royal Navy frigates were unable to sail.  
 In fact, Bull’s desire to expand the colony’s small-boat service extended back to July of 
1740. Immediately following the retreat from St. Augustine in July, the governor informed the 
Commons House that:  
“When I consider the Situation of our Southern Frontier...by the Spaniards in their Row Galleys, 
which are capable of coming into any of our Inlets...where our larger Vessels cannot get at them; 
and be ready to intersept any of our Craft, and also encourage the Desertion of our Slaves...The 
best and cheapest Way to disappoint such Attempts would be to [have] 4 or 6 Boats fitted with a 
6 Pounder, and several Swivel Guns, Oars…”53 
 
In essence, Bull not only feared that Spanish light craft would raid local commerce, but 
that they would foment social disarray by encouraging slaves to run away from plantations. This 
warning should have concerned the planter-heavy Commons House. Only a year before, 
enslaved Africans along the Stono River—just a few miles south of Charles Town—rose up 
against their masters and killed several inhabitants in what would become known as the ‘Stono 
Rebellion.’ The rebels tried to flee south to Spanish Florida where the governor had promised 
freedom to any English-held slave that made it to St. Augustine. In their journey southward, the 
rebels tried to hold off South Carolina militiamen that had been sent to pursue them, but they 
were overpowered. Soon thereafter, South Carolina authorities executed the captured rebels.54  
Despite fears of ongoing slave revolts, the Assembly initially tabled the governor’s plans 
for a galley fleet. By mid-December, the assembly agreed to ask the King for six galleys while 
also reluctantly agreeing to fund local construction of two of the craft. The reasoning for this 
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move is unclear, but perhaps provincial authorities hoped for greater imperial assistance while 
providing for the possibility of being refused.55 Whatever the assembly’s reasoning, the move to 
finance local galleys was ultimately sound. While the Board of Trade ultimately forwarded the 
colony’s request for galleys to the Duke of Newcastle, there is no indication he ever agreed to the 
proposal, and Lt. Governor Bull was still campaigning for Royal involvement in the project by 
the end of 1741.56 In the spring of 1741, General Oglethorpe also requested galleys (among other 
supplies) from the home government and lamented the lack of Royal Navy protection on the 
Georgia station. Imperial officials ultimately did not grant his requests either.57  
All in all, the British government’s opinion on the colonies’ provincial navies by the end 
of 1742 is best summed up by the Privy Council’s decision in November of that year to not 
provide cannon for South Carolina’s two newly built galleys (the Beaufort and the Charles 
Town). Upon reviewing a plea from Lt. Governor Bull to provide nine-pound cannon for the 
vessels, a committee from the Privy Council deliberated on the matter for nearly a year with the 
colony’s agent and with the Ordnance Board, and finally came to the conclusion that “as these 
[row galleys] are intended to Secure the Inland passages of the Province the said Board 
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conceives that the Inhabitants ought to furnish themselves with such Ordnance otherwise the rest 
of His Majestys Colonys may hereafter Solicit the like favour.”58 This default assumption that 
Anglo-Americans should fund their own provincial navies mirrored the Admiralty’s 1724 refusal 
to assist a Nova Scotia provincial guard ship, and declaration that “when vessels have been fitted 
out by the Governors of his Majesty's Islands or Plantations abroad, the inhabitants have borne 
the charge thereof.”59   
Whereas British authorities expected South Carolina’s “Inhabitants” to fund and crew the 
galleys, it is worth examining who the “inhabitants” of the colony were that crewed these two 
small warships. The surprising amount of demographic information on the galleys’ crews allows 
us a rare opportunity to examine the diverse backgrounds of sailors within the South Carolina 
provincial navy. Early on in their service in the summer 1742, neither galley was well-manned, 
and one of the crews on the provincial establishment was as small as three men. Realizing he 
needed a light craft to accompany him on one of his cruises, Royal Navy Captain Hamar of the 
H.M.S. Flamborough felt “Obliged to Man her Out of His Majesty's Ship under my Comand.”60  
 By July of 1742,  provincial authorities hastily impressed and recruited soldiers, sailors, 
and ships for a relief mission to aid General Oglethorpe as Spanish forces invaded Georgia. 
News reports and subsequent petitions indicated that there were 126 white and 14 black men 
(presumably enslaved and free, but sources are unclear) on both galleys. While these unusually 
large crews likely indicated the presence of soldiers being transported southward in addition to 
sailors, these numbers also likely attest to the racial diversity of the naval crews as well.61 
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Despite the colony’s recent experience with a major slave rebellion and restrictions on the rights 
of free and enslaved Africans to carry weapons, it is clear that South Carolina’s ruling class still 
depended on the labor of black mariners and soldiers to support the war effort against the 
Spanish.62 In addition to racial diversity, there is evidence that at least one Jewish sailor (known 
only as Mr. Hart) served on board the Charles Town when it sank with its ten man crew in a 
squall in 1743. Interestingly, Hart was the only man named in the South Carolina Gazette’s 
notice of the tragedy.63  
While imperial authorities were not quite ready to directly support provincial naval 
efforts, mercantile anger over Royal Navy negligence was beginning to make an impact at 
Westminster, and provincial naval activity played a role. Particularly useful for the colony’s 
pleas for naval assistance was a rising lobby of London merchants intimately connected with 
Carolina’s trade, and who had powerful connections within the British government.64  In early 
1742, Parliament listened to various testimonies by merchants and ship captains directly affected 
by alleged Royal Navy negligence in the southern colonies. Virginia merchants and traders 
claimed privateers purposefully cruised after Chesapeake commerce because they knew the 
station captain, Sir Yelverton Peyton, was unwilling to cruise after the enemy or protect the 
trade. One merchant shared a letter from Thomas Lee—a Royal council member in Virginia—
that complained that “the guardships guarded them so little, that they hired two sloops to secure 
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their trade.” South Carolina's agent, James Crokatt, briefed Parliament on the Royal Navy's 
history in Charles Town dating back to the first guard ship in 1719, and argued that they 
currently had the smallest number of guard ships to date (Captain Charles Fanshawe’s Phoenix, 
and Captain George Townsend’s Tartar—the same captain whose press gang was implicated 
with the murder of a sailor who resisted impressment in the weeks leading up to the St. 
Augustine expedition).   
Crokatt continued in his complaint, noting that Royal Navy captains frequently impressed 
sailors, extorted local merchants, and rarely left port to cruise after the enemy. At one point 
before departing for England, Fanshawe refused to lend Royal sailors to fit out a provincial sloop 
to pursue the Spanish. In response to all these affronts, South Carolina’s government acted in the 
same manner as Virginia, and the “government fitted out two sloops, which, the first time they 
sailed, took a Spanish privatier.”65 It is noteworthy that one of the private captains Charles 
Town’s government contracted with to defend the coast was New England privateer Captain 
John Rous, future hero of the 1745 Siege of Louisbourg and future Royal Navy captain. Even 
though Rous was a privateer by trade,  the provincial government (along with local merchants) 
gave him provisions, guaranteed bounties for Spanish privateers and enabled him to impress 
sailors. Rouse was, as one scholar has put it, a  “quasi-governmental coast guard” captain.66 
Rous’s example further testifies to the blurred lines between provincial naval and privateer 
service, and also demonstrates that Anglo-American officials were supportive of impressment so 
long as it was by their authority as opposed to the Royal Navy.   
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Ultimately, the Parliamentary committee that heard the complaints concluded that “due 
and necessary care had not been taken to keep a proper number of his Majesty's ships employed” 
in protecting English commerce, and wanted the rest of the House of Commons to “bring in a bill 
for the better protecting and securing the trade and navigation of this kingdom…”67 Historian 
H.W. Richmond has argued that Admiralty resistance led to the bill’s failure, as it “contained 
stringent clauses to tie the stationed ships securely to their stations and allow their Captains no 
liberty of action.” In practice, the bill would have given colonial governors and councils near 
total control over station ships' orders. Despite the legal failure, with rising complaints from 
many different colonies over Royal Navy performance, stronger instructions were given to Royal 
Navy captains to work with governors.68  
With significant pressure from trading interest groups and increasing numbers of ships 
lost to Spanish privateers in the Americas (on top of numerous accounts of provincial navies 
forming to fill in for reticent Royal Navy commanders), imperial authorities committed to more 
than just a change of rhetoric in instructions to new Royal Navy station captains. The 1742 
edition of the Scots Magazine reported that an Admiralty court martial commenced on 9 June  
“to inquire into the conduct of Sir Yelverton Petyon, late Captain of the Hector, and Captain 
Fanshaw, late Captain of the Phoenix, during the time they were stationed at Virginia and South 
Carolina. The court adjudged Sir Yelverton to be dismissed as a Captain of the Royal navy; and 
adjudged Captain Fanshaw to be mulcted six months pay for the use of the chest at Chatham.”69 
 Even before court martialing these captains, Admiralty officials had dispatched Captain 
Charles Hardy with the HMS Rye (alongside the sloop HMS Hawke) to replace Fanshawe, and 
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gave him specific instructions to be more proactive in hunting Spanish privateers and convoying 
merchant vessels than his predecessor.70 Whatever the tone change in these instructions, many 
provincial authorities in Charles Town did not consider Hardy’s arrival to be an improvement 
upon Fanshawe, with some South Carolina elites accusing Hardy of being as inactive as his 
predecessor.71 While provincial authorities would never be completely happy with Royal Navy 
station captains, these actions did signal that imperial authorities were beginning to take coastal 
defense in the Southern colonies more seriously.  
As Charlestonians continued to allege that Royal Navy captains on their station were 
inactive, General Oglethorpe in Georgia would have appreciated any permanent Royal Navy 
presence on the Georgia coast. Not long after the defeat at St. Augustine, Oglethorpe formed a 
“Marine Company of Boatmen” with recruits from Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina, and 
which operated heavily armed scout boats alongside the regular scout boat service. Whatever the 
novelty of American marines, small craft could not take on Spanish privateers at sea.  With most 
British warships staying centered at Charles Town, Oglethorpe had expanded his own provincial 
navy to include the schooner Walker and the Faulcon and St. Philip sloops. He had purchased 
these ships in Charles Town,  crewed them with South Carolina sailors, and used redcoats from 
the British Army’s 42nd Regiment of Foot to act as marines on these larger vessels.72  
Indeed, Oglethorpe had every reason to be confident in these provincial forces. In a 
December 1741 letter to the Georgia Trustees' accountant, Oglethorpe had justified his  
provincial navy's existence by pointing to Captain Fanshawe's and Captain Townsend's inability 
to curb Spanish privateering outside Charles Town. He bragged that his own provincial forces 
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had “already forced one of the Enemys Sloops on Shore…”73 In a June 1742 “List of the Military 
Strength of Carolina & Georgia,”  Oglethorpe reported thirteen vessels in the colony’s service, 
ranging from the “guard schooner” to small boats that various infantry regiments used. 
Excluding soldiers that manned the latter craft, Oglethorpe’s provincial navy exceeded one 
hundred sailors. It is telling that he excluded South Carolina’s scout boats or galleys, and briefly 
mentioned the “Men of War Stationed at Charles Town” at the end of the report.74 
Around the same time Oglethorpe filed that report in June of 1742, the general received 
intelligence of a large Spanish invasion force that was likely headed for coastal Georgia, and he 
forwarded the news to Charles Town. Oglethorpe’s successful defense of the colony highlighted 
further flaws in the uneasy relationship between provincial and Royal Navy forces. The invasion 
threat prompted Governor Bull and his council to summon Captain Hardy and Captain Franklin 
of the recently arrived H.M.S. Rose on 18 June to discuss the best method to assist their southern 
neighbors. Though Hardy informed the council that his ship was too damaged to sail south at that 
time, Frankland offered to take his vessel, the H.M.S. Flamborough (now captained by Joseph 
Hamar), and the Charles Town galley with him on the way back to his own home station in the 
Bahamas.  
Rather than keeping his promise, Frankland abandoned the flotilla early on, and Hamar 
himself took his own vessel, two small Royal Navy sloops, and the Charles Town Galley to 
assist Oglethorpe. Hamar made it to St. Simon, Georgia by 13 July, but ordered his flotilla to 
retreat back to South Carolina when he sighted the numerically superior Spanish invasion force 
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of forty vessels. Captain Hardy—having finished the Rye’s repairs—led a subsequent joint 
provincial-Royal relief force with six colonial vessels, only to discover that the Spaniards had 
fled by that point. Much to the chagrin of the South Carolina government, Hardy ordered the 
provincial vessels to return home, and decided against hunting for what remained of the Spanish 
forces as he feared they may have sailed to attack South Carolina’s weakly defended Port Royal 
district.75  
While the provincial relief force that accompanied Hardy did not see much action, the 
fact that the colony was able to send out six armed vessels with more than 600 sailors and 78 
guns testifies to the colony’s growing provincial naval establishment. Each provincial naval 
captain was given a letter that ordered them to obey orders from Captain Hardy. Bull and his 
council also commanded each captain to follow “Articles and Orders for the regulating and better 
[Government] of the Vessels & Forces by sea fitted out from Charles Town...pursuant to ye 
direction of the Statute of the 13th of Charles the 2d: Chapter 9th.”76 If these articles of war 
resembled that late seventeenth century statute for the Royal Navy, they would have mandated 
public worship for sailors, listed various punishments for sundry crimes, detailed how prizes 
were to be distributed, etc. In essence, the South Carolina government considered its provincial 
naval forces subordinate to Royal Navy authority, but also bound by the same standards and 
rules the Royal Navy operated under.77 
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While South Carolina’s provincial forces and their Royal Navy allies sailed confusedly 
back and forth between both colonies, Oglethorpe’s small army of one thousand men and even 
smaller provincial navy fended off a Spanish army twice its size, as well as a substantial Spanish 
fleet. After scattered skirmishes with enemy forces for several days,  Oglethorpe found enough 
time to organize his infantry forces at strategic locations. By 5 July, Spanish Governor Montiano 
led his force of 36 vessels  ranging from ships to galleys into St. Simon’s Sound,  and set the 
scene for one of the largest battles an Anglo-American provincial navy would ever engage in.  
Aside from a few of his own privately owned vessels, Oglethorpe had impressed several 
merchant ships and their crews in the sound and fitted out the largest—the Success—as his 
flagship. Oglethorpe added twenty guns on board, crewed it with sailors, British regulars, and his 
own provincial marine company.78 According to a member of the Success's crew, Oglethorpe 
“came on board of us, and made a handsome Speech, encouraging us to stand by our Liberties 
and Country...He was convinced they were much superiour in Number, but then he was sure his 
Men were much better, and did not doubt (with the Favour of God) but he would get the 
Advantage.”79 Oglethorpe’s provincial navy as well as gunners at Fort St. Simons traded cannon 
fire with the vastly superior Spanish force for hours, and Oglethorpe’s men ably resisted their 
opponents’ attempts to board the vessels. Despite the provincial navy’s stand, the Spaniards sunk 
one of Oglethorpe’s sloops, destroyed one of his land batteries, and broke through the Georgian 
lines—successfully sailing up the sound and landing the main invasion force. Though his naval 
forces were not adequate to stop the Spanish onslaught, Oglethorpe’s land forces defeated the 
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Spanish invaders in several engagements throughout the next several weeks, and forced them 
back to Florida.  For now, the British hold on Georgia was secure.80 
While Oglethorpe’s victory over the Spanish invasion was noteworthy, some South 
Carolina authorities criticized Royal Navy Captain Hardy’s “returning hither, before so 
considerable a part of the Service as the destroying the Enemys Strength by Sea: And for which 
Our Shipping were fitted out at so considerable an Expence…”81Some scholars have attributed 
the colony’s dispute with Hardy to the well-established acrimony between the colony and Royal 
Navy officers, as well as disputes over who had authority over station ships.82  
As ever,  tensions between provincial officials and the Royal Navy could be overplayed, 
and Hardy did finally agree to lead provincial and Royal Navy vessels in a major expedition in 
the late summer.  The October 1742 edition of The American Weekly Mercury reported that 
Hardy led a mixed force of  six Royal Navy ships and sloops, “Four Provincial Vessels,” and the 
two South Carolina galleys to hunt for Spanish forces outside St. Augustine. General Oglethorpe 
joined the fleet with his own schooner and various “small craft.” On 27 August, the “Provincial 
Vessels received their orders from the Commodore,” and a few of them scouted Matanzas bay 
where they sighted the infamous Spanish half-galleys that had caused both colonies so much 
trouble. The next day, both colonies' provincial navies opened fire at the galley crews from 
outside the bay. Although the Spanish wounded a few provincial sailors, the South Carolina 
galleys were able to cause enough structural damage to force the Spanish back to the protection 
of the Castillo de San Marcos.83 Although nothing significant was accomplished in this 
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scrimmage, it did demonstrate that provincial and Royal Navy forces could work together to 
some extent. Such coordination would have been useful at the Siege of St. Augustine two years 
earlier.  
Even this level of moderate cooperation between the Royal Navy and provincial forces 
would do little to assuage Anglo-American authorities who were becoming irate over the 
growing costs of naval defense as the war dragged on. By mid-1743, Oglethorpe had gotten little 
assurance from London that his extensive military expenditures would be reimbursed, and he 
travelled to England to directly appeal his case to the House of Commons.84 In March of 1744, 
Oglethorpe—himself a veteran member of Parliament—spoke before the House of Commons, 
highlighted the tenuous position of the empire’s southernmost American colony, and effectively 
convinced the imperial government to reimburse his expenditures of more than £66,000.85 More 
than  £22,000 of the reimbursement directly covered provincial vessels purchases, upkeep, and 
pay.86  
While Parliament reimbursed Oglethorpe, it also officially placed Georgia’s soldiers as 
well as provincial naval forces on a Royal pay establishment similar to that of the British army.87 
For the first time in colonial history, the imperial government officially supported a provincial 
navy. Imperial funding of Georgia’s provincial navy indicated a sea change in imperial attitudes 
to provincial maritime forces. Though not incorporated into the Royal Navy by any means, the 
same government that built first-rate warships at Portsmouth, England bankrolled schooners and 
scout boats in coastal Georgia.  
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While Parliament agreed to fund provincial forces in Georgia in 1744, this assistance did 
little to secure the rest of the North American coastline. When France joined Spain in the war 
that same year, provincial officials from Nova Scotia to South Carolina still relied on local funds 
to fit out provincial navies to assist Royal Navy station ships. The British government’s 
willingness to hear provincial complaints over Royal Navy inactivity in 1742 and its decision to 
fund Georgia’s provincial navy in 1744 created the potential for a mutually beneficial maritime 
defense alliance between periphery and center.   
Limited Support: The Growth and Limits of Imperial Support for Provincial Navies, 1744-
1754.   
 In 1744, Parliament changed the matrix of provincial naval defense forever by agreeing 
to fund Georgia’s provincial navy. When France declared war on the British in 1744, imperial 
recognition and support of provincial navies would extend to Nova Scotia and New England. 
Despite growing metropolitan support for provincial forces, inconsistent imperial policies 
towards provincial navies combined with growing provincial anger at Royal Navy excesses to 
limit the effectiveness of the burgeoning Royal-provincial naval partnership.  
 Legal battles related to provincial navies, prize money, and impressment were the results 
of various Parliamentary acts such as the 1740 “Act for the more effectual securing and 
encouraging the trade of his Majesty's British subjects to America, and for the encouragement of 
seamen to enter into his Majesty's service” (13 Geo 3, c. 4),  the 1744 “Act for the Better 
Encouragement of Seamen in his Majesty's Service, and Privateers, to Annoy the Enemy” (17 
Geo. 2. c. 34), and the 1746 “Act for the Better Encouragement of the Trade of His Majesty’s 
Sugar Colonies in America” (19 Geo. 2, c. 30).  The 1740 act removed impressment protections 
for privateers and tightened some admiralty court proceedings but offered bounty money for both 
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privateers and Royal Navy sailors for enemy captures. The 1744 privateering act created tighter 
rules for adjudicating prizes in prize courts than had previously been enforced and attempted to 
enforce discipline on privateers by making crimes and misdemeanors on privateer ships subject 
to the same punishments as in the Royal Navy.88  
Even as the British government began to fund Oglethorpe’s provincial navy on an official 
military establishment and support various provincial naval efforts throughout the latter years of 
the war, it failed to differentiate between privateers and provincial government fleets in one of 
the imperial government’s largest attempts to regulate privateering. Vague language  such as 
“encouragement of the officers and seamen of his Majesty's ships of war, and the officers and 
seamen of all other British ships and vessels, having commissions, or letters of marque…” did 
not directly recognize colonial governments’ own naval forces even though Parliament was well 
aware of them by now.89  
It is important to note that Anglo-Americans themselves still often failed to differentiate 
between commerce raiders with letters of marque and government-funded warships, calling both 
“privateers” at random.90 Even though this dissertation insists on a difference between provincial 
government-funded naval forces and private commerce raiders with letters of marque, the 
difference was not always obvious to eighteenth century observers. Nevertheless, Westminster’s 
failure to include the colonies’ regular naval forces in prize court legislation would lead to legal 
battles between agents for New England’s provincial navy and the Royal Navy for years to 
come.  
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While Parliament failed to set an imperial standard for provincial navies in 1744, it also 
exacerbated the Royal Navy’s quickly souring relationship with its Anglo-American subjects 
with its 1746 act to encourage Caribbean trade. In the act, Parliament banned most Royal Navy 
impressment in the lucrative Caribbean—notably giving the Royal Navy leeway to impress 
seamen in North American colonies. Historian Christopher Magra argues that this act “quickly 
produced a disaffected, rebellious spirit in North America.”91 By 1747, anger at Royal Navy 
impressment would lead to violent riots in Boston.  
Both imperial vagueness regarding provincial navies as well as increasing tensions with 
the Royal Navy would come to a head as the momentum of the war shifted to the empire’s 
northernmost colonies near French Canada in 1744. While provincial authorities had outfitted 
navies to fight Spanish privateers in the first few years of the war, the reopening of hostilities 
with France in 1744 sent the region into a panic. With earlier notification of the commencement 
of hostilities than their English foes, the French governor of Louisbourg on Isle Royale,  the 
Seigneur Du Quesnel, dispatched two privateers and an invasion force to attack the Anglo-
American base at Canso. The force quickly captured the English settlement, as well as its solitary 
Royal Navy guard sloop.92 
Almost immediately, authorities throughout the northeastern colonies mobilized their 
provincial naval forces to counter the French onslaught. Massachusetts Governor William 
Shirley's quick dispatch of the provincial snow Prince of Orange with soldiers played at least 
some role in repelling Du Quesnel’s forces from taking Annapolis Royal that summer.93 
Massachusetts' quick response was a result of the maturation of what could be called New 
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England’s provincial naval network. After nearly a century of commissioning tax-funded ships, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut each could boast of a complex “naval 
establishment” of sorts that involved bureaucratic government committees that procured vessels 
and regulated pay for officers and sailors.94 New England’s provincial naval network had 
reached such a point by mid-1744 that Rhode Island’s government was able to facilitate several 
joint patrol cruises between its province sloop, Tartar, and Connecticut’s province sloop, 
Defence. At one point, Captain Prentice of the Defence even made the friendly boast that “We 
can out sail the Rhode Island sloop much...We beat their tip top boats at Rhode Island to their 
great mortification.”95 
Despite this cooperation between New England governments early in the war, the 
region’s provincial navies suffered from the Royal Navy’s largest ailment: perennial manpower 
shortages.96 To offset this issue, in the summer of 1744,  the Massachusetts governor, council, 
and assembly passed the “Act for the more effectual guarding and securing our Sea Coasts, and 
for the Encouragement of Seamen to enlist themselves in the Province Snow or such Vessels of 
War as shall be commissioned and fitted out by this or other of his Majesty's Governments.” This 
act granted sailors of provincial warships total claims over captured French shipping and cargo, 
and £3 bounties for the capturing or killing of enemy sailors. The act also awarded £3 to 
provincial navy crews from other colonies, privateers, and merchant ships with letters of marque 
for every enemy sailor captured or killed off the Massachusetts coast.97  
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What was extraordinary about this law was not only that it was the first time a colony 
promised financial rewards to other colonies’ provincial navies, but also that it essentially copied 
elements of the British government’s 1740 “Act for the better Supply of Mariners and Seamen to 
Serve in His Majesty's Ships of War.” The act promised £5 prizes “unto the Officers, Seamen, 
Marines...Onboard such of His Majesty’s Ships of War, as also of Privateers…” that followed 
the aforementioned 1740 privateering act.98  While the British act mentioned Royal Navy ships 
and privateers, the Massachusetts law specifically targeted the crews of provincial “Vessels of 
War.” For the first time, authorities from one colony offered to support the provincial navy of 
another. 
While Massachusetts may have adapted imperial standards for its own provincial naval 
establishment, the similarities with Parliamentary legislation caught the attention of the Board of 
Trade. What ensued was the first of many inconsistent imperial rulings on the status of provincial 
navies. In October of 1744, the Board of Trade requested Francis Fane—a member of Parliament 
and a commissioner for the Board—to compare Massachusetts' law with the British 
government’s various bounty laws, and to decide if the Prince of Orange and similar vessels “are 
to be deemed ships of war or privateers, and whether they are entituled to the bounties given by 
the said British acts.”99 Fane did not oppose the act by “point of law,” but worried over the 
vagueness of the act. He argued that the “Province Snow and the other Vessells mentioned in the 
said Massachusetts Act, will be Entitled to the Bounty given by the said British acts...as 
Privateers because they are not in his Majesty's Pay.” Fane also noted that he worried that the 
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colony's legislature had “gone a little too far in disposing of His Majesty's right to the Prizes 
taken from the Enemy, solely by their own Authority…”100 Ultimately, Fane argued that 
provincial ships were privateers if they were not on the Royal payroll—perhaps an oblique 
reference to the government’s recent funding of the Georgia navy.  
 While Fane dismissed Massachusetts' provincial navy as a fleet of privateers, the Board 
of Trade was still uncomfortable with simply dismissing the law and decided to table the debate 
until Governor Shirley and Massachusetts’ agent in London could better explain it. By the spring 
of 1747, the King’s Privy Council reviewed the act that had been in bureaucratic limbo for two 
years. The Privy Council concluded that the act “relates to the public service & security of the 
said Province and therefore We see no reason why His Majesty may not be graciously pleased to 
confirm the same…” The king ultimately agreed with the Privy Council and confirmed the act by 
June of 1747.101 
 Even though the Royal approbation of the Massachusetts law took several years, it 
highlighted two conjoined trends in the latter years of the War of Jenkin’s Ear: Whitehall’s 
increasing  recognition of provincial navies, and its confusion over how to classify them or 
incorporate them in the larger war effort. At the same time, Admiralty officials continued their 
age-old “laissez-faire” attitude towards provincial navies, particularly when a ‘hands-off’ 
approach to colonial naval defense could save them money. For instance, in the spring of 1745, 
Thomas Corbett—the secretary to the Admiralty—informed Commodore Peter Warren that their 
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“lordships hope that your letter to Gov. Clinton, about the province of New York supporting a 
guard vessel as the other neighbouring colonies did, has had its due effect.”102  
 While Admiralty officials generally continued their hands-off policy in regards to 
provincial navies, some Royal Navy officers—particularly Warren—began to lobby for greater 
imperial support for provincial naval forces. He called for colonists to begin: 
“…arming some proper vessels to guard their own coast and trade. [Such] vessels should be in 
some measure on the foot[ing] of the king's ships, or at least [should] never be molested by 
them…Where the colonies are not in a capacity alone to bear the expense of such vessel, two or 
more of them might join in it...This I believe, the colonies [might] be brought to, if strongly 
recommended by the ministry to their different governors, and by them to their legislatures 
[italics mine].  New England has shown the others a very laudable example, by fitting out two or 
three. If this could be effected, then his Majesty's ships of force...might be employed in 
distressing the enemy more effectually…”103 
 
 Warren’s support for provincial navies would be evident in the 1745 joint provincial-
Royal attack on Louisbourg. This siege, holds historian W.A.B. Douglas, “demonstrated the 
surprising strength and homogeneity of combined regular and provincial forces.”104  While the 
siege itself proved to be the best example of provincial-Royal Navy cooperation, interservice 
rivalries and post-war legal battles related to prizes captured during the siege also highlighted the 
limits to which Anglo-American and Royal forces could cooperate.  
After the British government refused to spearhead an attack on Louisbourg in 1744, 
Governor William Shirley (with the lobbying of Maine merchant William Vaughan) convinced 
the Massachusetts legislature to lead an assault on the French stronghold in the spring of 1745. 
Without direct guarantees of British military assistance, he hoped that neighboring colonies 
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would lend military assistance, and that the British government would reimburse the colonies for 
taking France's Canadian privateering base. The Massachusetts government's plan called for a 
joint land and naval assault with troops and vessels from every northern colony stretching to 
Pennsylvania. The colony's leaders were perhaps too enthusiastic. Outside of New England, New 
York forces merely provided an artillery battery. Massachusetts's neighbors, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut did, however, send several provincial guard sloops as well as 
units. By May, New England’s provincial governments had assembled a fleet of nearly one 
hundred vessels to carry its large provincial army to attack the French port.105 Aside from scores 
of transport vessels, this flotilla would ultimately include a squadron of fifteen provincial naval 
vessels and privateers from every New England colony, with a combined strength exceeding one 
thousand sailors.106 Undoubtedly, one of the most impressive provincial vessels was 
Massachusetts’ recently constructed 400-ton, twenty gun frigate Massachusetts.107 
 Even with the largest provincial naval force assembled to date, Shirley did not believe the 
expedition could be successful without Royal Navy assistance. In a late March letter to the Duke 
of Newcastle, Shirley described the New England colonies' vast military preparations, and 
complained that Royal Navy officers in the West Indies were not able to assist the expedition. He 
continued: “I shall hope that Providence will favour the small Naval Force, which I have been 
able to muster up here, with Success; and that our Land Forces will still be able to maintain their 
ground on Cape Breton 'till I shall receive his Majesty's Royal Pleasure upon this matter…”108  
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Luckily for Shirley, changes in the Admiralty’s administration (including the Duke of 
Bedford’s appointment as the First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as Admiral George Anson as 
one of its commissioners) may have played a role in policy changes in North America. In early 
1745, the Duke of Newcastle ordered the creation of the first ever North American Squadron that 
coordinated the Royal Navy guard ships north of North Carolina. By March, the Lords of the 
Admiralty received word of Shirley’s preparations, and ordered Commodore Warren—a 
longtime advocate of a stronger Royal Navy presence in the northeast—to assist the provincial 
forces in taking Louisbourg. When Warren arrived with ten Royal ships of the line and 
instructions from the Duke of Newcastle to take command of provincial “shipping,” Governor 
Shirley and the provincial military leader William Pepperell placed the Anglo-American vessels 
under Warren’s command—the same decision made by South Carolina authorities during the 
campaigns of 1740-2.109 
In many ways, Warren (himself a veteran of the disastrous St. Augustine campaign) 
reversed the trend so common in southern colonies wherein Royal and provincial naval forces 
failed to cooperate. Historian W.A.B. Douglas contends that “there is strong evidence that both 
Warren and Shirley intended to consider the armed colony cruisers and king's ships as a 
homogenous squadron attached to the expedition.” Douglas highlights Warren’s inclusion of 
provincial ships in his line of battle, his inclusion of provincial commanders in councils of war, 
and the fact that Warren ordered Royal Navy and provincial navy crews to distribute captured 
prizes equally—a conciliatory tactic never tried by other Royal Navy commanders.110  
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After a month of deadly assaults, bombardments, and raids, the French garrison at 
Louisbourg surrendered to the Royal-provincial invasion force on 17 June 1745. Governor 
Shirley bragged to the Massachusetts legislature that Louisbourg “was won, under the most 
signal Favour and Direction of the Divine Providence, by the indefatigable Toil of His Majesty's 
New-England Subjects (chiefly of this Province) supported by a Squadron of his Ships of War at 
Sea…”111 Perhaps one of the most concrete examples of the fruits of this partnership was New 
England privateer Captain John Rous’s promotion. Rous was a New England privateer that had 
previously acted as a coast guard for South Carolina authorities, and now served in the provincial 
navy of the New England invasion force at Louisbourg. Admiralty authorities were so impressed 
by news of his fight with a French frigate during the siege that they commissioned him as a 
captain in the Royal Navy, purchased his vessel the Shirley, and made it an official part of the 
navy.112  
To be certain, Rous’s rise from part-time provincial navy captain and privateer to an 
officer in the Royal Navy highlights the imperial government’s growing appreciation for 
provincial naval capabilities. This is evident in the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Duke of 
Bedford’s plans for an abortive 1746 conquest of French Canada, in which he ordered that Royal 
forces should be accompanied by “such ships of war, sloops and such other armed vessels (which 
may be furnished by the provinces) as his Majesty's admiral commanding in chief shall please to 
appoint.”113  Even when this joint expedition was cancelled by imperial authorities, Parliament 
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still reimbursed the New England colonies for their military expenses (including naval 
expenditures) for the siege of Louisbourg and the cancelled 1746 expedition.114  
The evidence presented thus far may create the appearance of a growing and unreserved 
spirit of support and approbation of provincial navies in the imperial center. However, this 
growing imperial enthusiasm for provincial forces was inconsistent and often shallow.  
Chief among the flaws in the arrangement was the fact that the British government never created 
a permanent legal standard or definition for these provincial fleets. Legal uncertainties over the 
status of provincial fleets fostered bitter transatlantic legal battles, particularly after the victory at 
Louisbourg. A few weeks after the city fell, provincial naval forces captured several French 
prizes both independently and alongside the Royal Navy. With Commodore Warren’s promise 
that the joint fleet would share in the “common stock” of any prizes captured, questions 
immediately arose over whether seamen in Royal Navy ships and provincial vessels should have 
an equal share of the booty. Beyond mere disputes over plunder, major controversy arose over 
the very nature of provincial navies themselves, and whether provincial vessels should receive 
the same prize shares as Royal Navy ships or privateers.115  
 The first salvo in the transatlantic dispute over the definitions of provincial navies came 
in the Massachusetts vice admiralty court of Robert Auchmuty in the early months of 1746. 
Auchmuty, like the vice admiralty judges of other colonies, was not merely a provincial justice, 
but “officially appointed at Whitehall with Admiralty warrants.”116 Auchmuty himself was a 
veteran jurist with training at the Middle Temple in London,  but was still ill prepared for the 
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prize claim of Captain Richardson and the crew of the Resolution—a private sloop leased to the 
Massachusetts government for the expedition against Louisbourg.117 On 2 September 1745, 
Richardson and his crew recaptured an English vessel called The Two Friends from the French.  
Richardson and his men declared themselves the crew of “his Majesty's Vessel of War and in his 
Majesty's Pay,” and thus entitled to “one Entire Eighth” of the vessel’s value as a salvage fee.118 
They based their claim on Parliament’s 1744  “Act for the Better Encouragement of Seamen in 
his Majesty's Service” which guaranteed Royal Navy vessels ⅛ the value of a recaptured English 
vessel no matter how long it had been in enemy hands. Conversely, the act merely granted 
privateers that recaptured English vessels shares (“moieties” of the value) that decreased by 
percentage  the longer the English vessel had been controlled by the foe.119 
 It was clear to Richardson and his men that it would be more profitable to be counted as 
part of the King’s Navy rather than as mere privateers. Unfortunately for these provincial sailors, 
Judge Auchmuty was not convinced by their claim, and held that “Every Kings Ship is in his pay 
and Service and part of his Royall Navy but Every Ship in the Kings pay and Service is not the 
Kings Ship or part of the Royal Navy.” The judge examined the history of private ships in the 
Royal service as far back as Edward III’s reign, more recent parliamentary legislation, and then 
Captain Warren’s specific prize agreement for his joint fleet before the Siege of Louisbourg, and 
found nothing to support the argument that the Resolution was a Royal ship of war. Auchmuty 
reasoned that Warren’s instructions could not be construed to equate the Resolution with Royal 
Navy ships in the fleet because he “treats those Vessels in Contradistinction to his Majestys 
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Ships by sometimes Calling them private Ships & Vessels of War and at other Times Colony 
Cruizers…” Furthermore, the Resolution’s owners still expected a share despite contracting her 
to the government—a move that highlighted her status as a privateer rather than a vessel of war. 
Auchmuty would only grant the Resolution’s crew a moiety of the value of the prize.120 
At least some provincial elites were taken aback by the ruling. Nathaniel Sparhawk, the 
son-in-law of William Pepperell (the overall commander of American soldiers at the siege of 
Louisbourg who evidently also had some financial interest in the Resolution), wrote his father-in-
law to lament that “She is, contrary to the expectation of every one, deemed a privateer instead 
of a King's ship…” and worried that appealing the case in London would cost Pepperell more 
money than it was worth.121 
 While Auchmuty’s ruling was unpopular with some of the expedition’s provincial 
leaders, it also pointed to larger legal uncertainties over the legal status of provincial navies on 
both sides of the Atlantic, and wider tensions between provincial and Royal military forces over 
prize distribution. To contextualize the disputes between provincial and Royal Navy forces one 
must also note the concurrent agitation between New England’s land forces and the Royal Navy. 
While Warren and Massachusetts General Pepperell argued over which force should receive the 
French surrender, New England troops rioted and brawled with Royal Navy sailors in the streets 
of occupied Louisbourg. They were angry at alleged condescension from Royal marine officers, 
not being allowed to plunder French homes, and being left out of prize distribution from captured 
French ships.122 Whatever tensions existed between the American land forces and Royal Navy 
forces during and after the siege, subsequent battles between provincial and Royal Navy officers 
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would take on a transatlantic dimension.  
  Much of this tension surrounded the prize-court disputes over the French ship Notre 
Dame de Deliverance. The Deliverance was one of three French merchant vessels (including the 
Heron and Charmante)  that fell prey to Anglo-American forces at Louisbourg in the weeks after 
the city’s capture. In August of 1745, Captain Benjamin Fletcher of the provincial brigantine 
Boston Packet spotted what he thought was a French frigate. Realizing his small crew could not 
take on such a vessel alone, he raised a French flag as a decoy, fired guns to alert the Royal Navy 
ships nearby, and fled for the protection of Louisbourg. The Royal Navy frigates Chester and 
Sunderland quickly captured the “frigate,” which turned out to be a treasure-laden vessel worth 
nearly £400,000.123 
For more than four years after this lucrative capture, agents for the Boston Packet, 
Chester, Sunderland and other nearby provincial and Royal Navy ships tried to convince various 
admiralty appeals courts in London of their competing claims to the rich prize.124 While 
interested parties argued over which vessels were most responsible for the Deliverance’s capture, 
questions over the legal status of the provincial vessels arose time after time. In fact, proctors for 
the provincial vessels argued in London courts that their clients belonged to vessels that were 
essentially ships of the Royal Navy. For instance, in one of the earlier hearings in May of 1749, 
Charles Pinfold, one of the advocates for the Boston Packet, argued that the vessel was no 
privateer as the colony had purchased her. Pinfold continued that “Privateers are fitted out at 
Private Expence with Letters of Marque, Security is given, and an Agreement made with the 
owners.” He pointed out that the Boston Packet was a government-controlled vessel without 
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private owners at the time. Additionally, Pinfold made the accurate observation that no recent 
Parliamentary legislation differentiated between a “Man of War and a Vessel in his Maty’s 
Pay.”125 
 In a subsequent hearing, agents for some of the other provincial vessels interested in the 
case echoed Pinfold’s argument when they said their clients were “not Privateers, belonging to 
particular Owners, but were Ships of War, of considerable Force, fitted out by the Colonies of 
the Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Island…” As ships of war, they had played a signal role in the 
siege and as part of Warren’s fleet.126 While these arguments were made by English barristers in 
London, they clearly represented the belief among many provincial authorities and sailors that 
they were vital members of a military mission rather than a privateering enterprise.  
Agents for the Royal Navy frigates involved in the Deliverance’s capture had a different 
understanding of the role of provincial vessels in the expedition. In one hearing, some of the 
Royal Navy’s legal representatives argued that the “American Privateers, by their Junction with 
Sir Peter Warren, became no otherwise Part of his Squadron, or subject to his Command…” 
While spending much time decrying the provincial men as mere privateers, the agents for the 
Royal frigates did make one sound accusation against their opponents: If the point of the 
expedition was to capture Louisbourg, and the capture of the Deliverance occurred after the fact, 
why should the provincial ships be considered part of a joint squadron? After all, the provincial 
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governments had been “reimbursed by the Parliament of Great Britain” for fitting out warships to 
take Louisbourg.127  
Ultimately, after several years of lengthy litigation, on 5 July 1750, the Lords 
Commissioners of Appeal for Prizes (including members of the Admiralty’s new cohort of 
reformers,  Lords Anson and Sandwich) ruled that the Royal Navy vessels in Louisbourg harbor 
(“in sight” of the Notre Dame de Deliverance), as well as the two Royal Navy frigates that 
captured the French vessel were all entitled to shares of the prize.  The Lords specifically 
excluded the other American “privateers” that made claims on it. Nevertheless, by November the 
Lords did declare that the “armed vessel” Boston Packet  and the Royal Navy warships should all 
receive equal shares.128 The Admiralty had awarded an American provincial crew an equal share 
to the Royal crews, but had also successfully avoided calling the American vessels “Ships of 
War.”   
Some historians have made the case that the Admiralty’s decision to exclude the other 
provincial ships was problematic. J. Revell Carr makes the case that while the Admiralty 
excluded other provincial vessels from the prize, it rewarded Royal Navy vessels that barely 
participated in the Deliverance’s capture. Carr brings to light an anonymous 1748 essay 
(possibly written by the Boston firebrand Samuel Adams), which he believes exemplifies 
contemporary provincial anger. The anonymous colonial author lambasted the British 
government for inadequate naval patrols off the New England coast, not sharing plunder from 
the three captured French vessels with New England infantrymen, and British soldiers for 
                                                           
127“The Case of his Majesty's Ships Chester and Sunderland, the actual and sole Captors of the Prize” 5 
July 1750, in   Lee, ed. Prize Appeals, 1736-1751, Vol. I, Fol. 70-73 
128 Untitled Written Notes Below Title Page on “The Appellants Case,”  in  Lee, ed. Prize Appeals, 1736-
1751, Vol. I, Fol. 75-76, and The Gentleman’s Magazine and Historical Chronicle, Vol. XX, For the Year MDCCL  
(London: Edward Cave, 1750), p. 328.  
158 
 
abusing Anglo-Americans during the siege. Britain’s most damning affront, the author argued, 
was its recent decision to return Fortress Louisbourg to the French in the peace negotiations at 
Aix-la-Chapelle. Carr contends that the letter demonstrated the growth of the “seeds of 
discontent that brought the Americans to the brink of revolution.”129  
While Carr’s description of Anglo-Americans ready to revolt in 1748 is probably 
excessive, his description of the Deliverance prize case as a major hurdle to the Anglo-American 
defensive partnership is sound. The years of legal battles over the prize’s fate demonstrated two 
diverging imperial and provincial views of the importance of provincial navies. While imperial 
officials were finally starting to encourage the colonies to build provincial fleets (and even 
occasionally funding them), they still only thought of these vessels as auxiliaries for the Royal 
Navy. Thus, they never even made room for provincial navies in imperial legislation.130 
 On the other hand, many Anglo-Americans were increasingly coming to see their 
provincial navies as equals to (if not superior to) the Royal Navy. This mood is best illustrated in 
a late 1747 letter from the young South Carolina merchant, Henry Laurens, to his colony’s agent 
in London. Laurens (who would one day be a founding father of the United States), bragged that  
“we are fitting out two fine Bermuda Sloops on purpose to Cruize on this Coast...As to Men of 
War, they are out of fashion here.”131 In other words, local provincial fleets were more useful to 
Laurens than the best-armed Royal Navy guard ships. 
It is important to note that North Americans were not alone in commissioning provincial 
navies throughout the conflict. Even though the Admiralty and Parliament devoted more Royal 
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Navy warships to the West Indies (and even favored Caribbean governments with lax 
impressment laws), Caribbean governments still felt the need to fit out local ships when Royal 
Navy vessels were far away. For instance, in the summer of 1746, England’s Gentleman’s 
Magazine published a letter from an Antiguan who lamented that because of the “indolence of 
his majesty's ships...the country have fitted out a guard de costa…” The correspondent, echoing 
contemporary complaints on the North American mainland, further alleged that “pretend that 
they cannot sail well enough to catch the privateers; but all the world knows, that they can sail 
well enough to protect and retake the merchant ships, if they would keep cruizing in proper 
stations.”132  
Whatever complaint some West Indians had over Royal Navy inactivity, the Royal 
Navy’s longstanding policy of stationing more Royal Navy ships in the Caribbean, recent 
expansion of Royal dockyards throughout the West Indies, and legislation banning Royal Navy 
impressment in the West Indies all illustrated London’s growing naval commitment to its most 
lucrative provinces in the Americas. With London’s increasing commitment to the protection of 
West Indian commerce throughout the 1740s, the War of Jenkin’s Ear would prove to be the last 
major time West Indian governments would fit out provincial navies for maritime defense.  
While the British government’s failure to create a consistent legal policy regarding 
provincial navies threatened future cooperation between provincial forces and the Royal Navy, 
its 1746 decision to allow Royal Navy impressment in North America inspired violent resistance 
to the Royal Navy throughout the northeast, and set a precedent for future violent resistance to 
impressment in North American ports. Of course, this tension did not begin in 1746. Royal Navy 
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commanders had long impressed sailors from North American merchant vessels, privateers, and 
even their former provincial naval partners with impunity.  
One such case occurred in Boston in November of 1745 when Lt. Governor Spencer 
Phips allowed Captain Arthur Forest of the H.M.S. Wager to impress a few men, provided they 
were nonresident aliens and had not served in the Louisbourg expedition. Ignoring this 
prohibition, the ship’s press gang (along with local sheriffs) attempted to capture several sailors 
that had served on the provincial vessel Resolution. A subsequent melee left two provincial 
sailors dead, and three members of the press gang in provincial custody (the rest of the press 
gang escaped with the Wager as it left Boston harbor). Historian Jack Tager holds that this 
violent encounter would be a “rallying cry” for the rioters in the Knowles Riot two years later.  
While Governor Shirley vocally opposed the violence, local officials in Boston criticized 
him and his administration for allowing impressment in the first place, and called it a violation of 
the Magna Carta and Parliamentary legislation. While Shirley convinced Commodore Warren to 
cancel calls for impressment throughout the northeast, Royal Navy commanders ignored this 
directive and continued to rely on the unpopular practice to keep their ships fully crewed. Even 
locals were not safe from resistance to impressment. When newly minted Royal Navy Captain 
John Rous (himself a New Englander, former privateer, and former provincial naval hero) tried 
to impress sailors for the H.M.S. Shirley in February of 1746, angry locals (along with a 
privateer crew from New York) assaulted Rouse and his press gang.133    
 None of these violent clashes in the final years of the War of Jenkin’s Ear could compare 
to the Knowles Riot of 1747.  When Commodore Charles Knowles prepared to sail to the West 
Indies in late 1747, he stopped to impress sailors in Boston because of the recent Parliamentary 
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legislation that had banned impressment in the Caribbean. Nearly three hundred angry privateers 
fought the press gangs—an act that would ultimately inspire a general urban riot that would last 
for three days. Bostonians imprisoned Royal Navy officers, destroyed one of the Royal frigates’ 
barges, and forced Governor Shirley to provide refuge for some Royal Navy commanders in his 
home.  
Rioters demanded that Shirley not only deliver them the officers hiding in his house, but 
also that he execute one of the still-imprisoned members of the press gang that had killed men 
from the Resolution two years previously. Shirley declared he would wait for the king’s 
instructions before putting anyone on trial, and did his best to coax the crowd by promising to get 
the recently impressed men released.134 Shirley later reported that along with other local 
dignitaries,  Captain Edward Tyng of the provincial Massachusetts frigate “stood some time at 
the Door parlying [sic] and endeavouring to Pacify ‘em…”135 In a moment of pure historical 
irony, a prominent provincial navy captain attempted to defend Royal Navy officers from a 
crowd still angry that Royal sailors had killed provincial sailors.  
 As the violence of the riot escalated, Governor Shirley only barely convinced 
Commodore Knowles not to order his ships to fire on Boston. Ultimately, representatives from 
several factions convened a town meeting, condemned the mob (much to the dismay of the 
young firebrand Samuel Adams), and arranged for the release of the impressed sailors. While 
some historians such as Denver Brunsman have seen the riot as the last major violent movement 
against impressment in North America, Christopher Magra has made the case that the Knowles 
Riot was the precursor to the violent riots of the Revolutionary-era less than two decades later.136  
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Whether or not the riot inspired later riots during the Imperial Crisis of the 1760s, it is 
certain that much of the original animus that led to the Knowles Riot surrounded Royal Navy 
abuse of provincial navy veterans. Ultimately, Parliament’s decision to condone impressment in 
North America in 1746 undermined its own limited efforts to support provincial naval warfare 
throughout the North American colonies and inspired colonial opposition to the Royal Navy’s 
presence in general.  
 Even as Anglo-American resistance to Royal Navy impressment increased in Boston in 
the final years of the War of Jenkin’s Ear, imperial authorities began to slowly cut back their 
support for large provincial navies and developed a laissez-faire attitude towards the few small 
provincial naval forces they did bankroll during peacetime. Even after General Oglethorpe had 
returned to England, the British government had continued to pay for Georgia’s provincial 
flotilla (including Oglethorpe’s provincial marine corps, a merchant ship converted into a frigate, 
a schooner, a sloop, a periagua, and sundry boats). With peace overtures already beginning by 
1746 and in response to shoddy book-keeping by provincial officers, the War Office suspended 
all support for provincial naval forces in Georgia outside the crew of one scout boat, the Prince 
George.137 The Crown did offer South Carolina authorities three boats in 1749, but the local 
assembly (much to the chagrin of the Royal Governor John Glen)  decided to take the expense of 
fitting out the vessels themselves in order to expedite naval patrols for runaway slaves south of 
Charles Town.138  
While Parliament did agree to finance some scout boats on the southern borderlands of 
the continent, it continued to bankroll a more substantial fleet on the Nova Scotia frontier.  
                                                           
137  Ivers, British Drums, pp. 195-202 and James M. Johnson, Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats: The 
Military in Georgia, 1754-1776 (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1992), Google Play eBook, p. 12.   
138 Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina, p. 276  
163 
 
Provincial vessels had assisted the Royal Navy off of Nova Scotia for several years after the 
campaign at Louisbourg in 1748. Nevertheless, by 1748, the Admiralty ordered Governor 
Shirley of Massachusetts to disband two hired vessels (the Anson and Warren) as it planned to 
cut costs. Shirley refused to follow the order as he believed they were still necessary for coastal 
security, and the Board of Trade eventually agreed to help find funds for the vessels.139 In fact, 
when Lord Halifax—the new president of the Board of Trade—planned a new settlement in 
Nova Scotia after the war, he consulted provincial naval (and Royal Navy Captain) John Rous, 
and even agreed that the new colony needed to employ three provincial guard sloops. Rous 
would later be appointed the “senior naval officer” of the new port.  
Even with Rous at the helm in Halifax, the ever-parsimonious Admiralty refused to 
station many Royal Navy vessels at Nova Scotia in the postwar years, and Rous and local 
political officials relied on a “sea militia” of several small sloops and other vessels to guard the 
coasts. This was especially important as tensions with the Mi’kmaq led flared up in the early 
1750s. From 1749 to 1755, the Board of Trade and Parliament funded eleven provincial 
schooner, sloop, and boat crews on the empire’s northern American borderlands. However, 
imperial authorities barely inquired into the actions of this fleet, and local officials likely avoided 
mentioning it too much in letters to London as they worried it would convince the Admiralty that 
Royal Navy warships were not needed in the area. Historian W.A.B. Douglas argues that the 
Admiralty’s noninvolvement was the “essential ingredient of success” in this arrangement.140 In 
essence, imperial funds were important for the Nova Scotia sea militia, but London’s 
noninterference allowed local officials to control the fleet to their best advantage. 
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By the end of the War of Jenkin’s Ear, the Board of Trade and Parliament agreed to fund 
a few provincial small craft and sloops on British America’s northern and southern borderlands. 
While this imperial intervention was novel, the British government never fully respected or 
harnessed America’s provincial maritime potential to its full potential. By excluding provincial 
navies from major legislation, and by overlooking Royal Navy excesses throughout major port 
cities, imperial officials soured Anglo-American opinions towards their partners in the Royal 
Navy. 
From 1739 to 1748, the British government agreed to recognize and finance some 
provincial navies for the first time, thereby creating the potential for a mutually beneficial naval 
defense partnership between periphery and center. Nevertheless, the British government’s failure 
to include provincial navies in major sea-prize legislation and its failure to limit Royal Navy 
impressment damaged any potential joint-Royal-provincial naval defensive alliance. Imperial 
inconsistencies and Royal Navy overreach would continue to plague Anglo-American relations 











Chapter IV. The Decline of Provincial Navies and the Rise of Royal Navy Maritime 
Hegemony in America, 1754-1763 
 
 The War of Jenkin’s Ear/King George’s War ended in 1748 the same way many of the 
earlier colonial conflicts had: a return to the status quo ante bellum. On the tense imperial 
borderlands, particularly in Nova Scotia where Britain had returned Louisbourg to the French, 
Anglo-Americans feared future violence with their French, Acadian, and Native neighbors. To 
shore up the British position in Nova Scotia, the Board of Trade (led by the Earl of Halifax) 
created the port town of Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1749. In response to British expansion, Acadian 
Catholic priest Jean-Louis Le Loutre and his Maliseet, Mi’kmaq, and Franco-Acadian allies led a 
bloody uprising against British authorities in what became known as ‘Father Le Loutre’s War.’ 
Between 1749 and 1755, Royal Navy Captain John Rous and Nova Scotia officials continuously 
augmented the few Royal Navy ships  in the area with several small vessels and crews from the 
region’s provincial ‘sea militia.’  
While the Lords of the Admiralty did little to support these provincial forces, funds from 
the Board of Trade allowed these provincial crews to bridge communication gaps, support 
Anglo-American infantry forces campaigning against Le Loutre’s forces, and helped prevent 
smuggling on contested waterways around Nova Scotia. Naval scholar W.A.B. Douglass 
contends that this provincial naval force’s petite guerre against Franco-Indigenous forces paved 
the way for future larger Royal Navy campaigns on the northern borderlands during the Seven 
Years War.1 
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Despite successful coordination between a few Royal Navy vessels and Nova Scotia’s sea 
militia during the fight with Le Loutre’s forces, substantial Royal Navy involvement would be 
necessary to secure Britain’s loose foothold on its northern American peripheries. This was 
especially true considering the French government’s reestablishment of Louisbourg as a major 
military base after 1749. After Captain Rous seized French vessels accused of smuggling in 
1751, both British and French authorities began to send large frigates each year to Halifax and 
Louisbourg to compete for naval hegemony in northern waters.2 Ultimately, mutual military 
escalation in Nova Scotia echoed both empires’ larger territorial fights in North America, 
including the vast swath of land between the Ohio River and the easternmost Great Lakes.3 By 
the mid-1750s, with ongoing territorial disputes and active border wars, war with France was 
inevitable.  
  Even as the stage was set for renewed imperial struggle with France, a battle raged within 
the British government itself over the proper role of the Royal Navy in society.  By the end of the 
War of Jenkin’s Ear in the late 1740s, Great Britain’s new Lords of the Admiralty—including 
Bedford, Anson, and Sandwich—had initiated dramatic administrative reforms that would 
transform the Royal Navy into a hegemonic and disciplined fighting force for the rest of the 
eighteenth century and beyond. The Admiralty’s centralization program faced several immediate 
challenges in the years leading up to the Seven Years War. First and foremost, while having 
jurisdiction over its own personnel, the Admiralty did not control the empire’s general naval 
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policy itself and followed orders from the King’s cabinet ministers such as the First Lord of the 
Treasury (the period’s equivalent of the prime minister) and various Secretaries of State 
(including the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, who oversaw the empire’s 
Western European and American affairs). In the interwar years between 1748 and 1754, the 
parsimonious Henry Pelham dominated the ministry, and much to the chagrin of naval reformers 
called for military spending reductions and favored diplomatic solutions in foreign affairs.4 
During Pelham’s tenure, French King Louis XV’s government massively expanded its battle 
fleet while British authorities failed to refit decaying ships or to keep up the pace with their  
archrival.  Even though the British fleet would eventually catch up with their foes, naval 
unpreparedness would create several logistical problems at the beginning of the Seven Years 
War in 1756.5 
In the first few years of the Seven Years War, Anglo-American governments planned to 
utilize provincial navies on the same scale as they had in the previous imperial conflict. 
However, by 1758 the Royal Navy’s aggressive expansion and campaigning in the New World 
made the existence of substantial provincial navies unnecessary, and they gradually fell out of 
use by the early 1760s. While the Royal Navy’s expansion and novel aggressive campaigning 
saved colonists from provincial naval defense costs, the Royal Navy’s aggressive enforcement of 
impressment and postwar imperial trade policies angered American dissidents, and paved the 
way for the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s.    
 
 
                                                           
4 Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, pp. 259-263.   
5Baugh, The Global Seven Years War, 1754-1763 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), Loc. 6165-6350. Kindle 
eBook edition.   
168 
 
Provincial Naval Planning and the Decline of Provincial Naval Operations, c. 1754-1758.  
 
 
 Throughout the Seven Years War, Anglo-American governments from Nova Scotia to 
Barbados deployed a few provincial ships to assist Royal Navy forces and to defend their own 
shores when Royal ships were far away or incapacitated. For the first time, this cooperation even 
extended to a joint provincial-Royal Navy fleet on the Great Lakes. Despite initial expectations 
that colonial governments would have to contribute large provincial naval forces to support the 
imperial war effort as they had done in previous conflicts, the Royal Navy’s expanding presence 
and naval supremacy after 1758 made the existence of extensive provincial navies unnecessary. 
 By 1754, the British government and Anglo-American governments faced the dual crisis 
of French military expansion and increasingly strained relations with their traditional Iroquois 
allies. To solidify the Anglo-American partnership with the Iroquois as war clouds loomed and 
to facilitate defense plans, the Earl of Halifax and the Board of Trade called on the northern 
colonial governments to hold a joint conference at Albany, New York that summer.6 Historians 
throughout the last two centuries have frequently cited some of the conference participants’ calls 
for a general colonial political union as early birth pangs of the future United States. More 
recently, however, scholars such as Andrew D.M. Beaumont have made the case that both 
British and Anglo-American authorities were equally eager to create an organized American 
political union for mutual military assistance.7 
 While scholars may disagree over connections between the various plans for colonial 
union at the Albany Congress and the future American Revolution,  they have seldom noted the 
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importance of one precocious element of these proposals: an early drive for a multi-colony 
provincial naval force of some kind. All told, Anglo-Americans and imperial officials seemed 
interested in a pan-colonial naval force to contest the French on the Great Lakes and on the 
Atlantic. The most visionary naval plan at Albany came from Pennsylvania delegate Benjamin 
Franklin. Franklin had previously defied Philadelphia’s Quaker elite when he campaigned for the 
commissioning of a provincial naval warship to guard the colony from French raids in 1747 at 
the end of the War of Jenkin’s Ear.   
Expanding on his proposal from seven years before, at Albany Franklin suggested that a 
prospective American grand council and congress (under the authority of the British government, 
of course) would fund and construct “guard-vessels to scour the coasts from privateers in time of 
war, and protect the trade.” In his defense of the final Albany Plan, Franklin argued that “small 
vessels of force are sometimes necessary in the colonies to scour the coast of small privateers. 
These being provided by the Union, will be an advantage in turn to the colonies which are 
situated on the sea, and whose frontiers on the land-side, being coverd by other colonies, reap but 
little immediate benefit from the advanced forts.”8 While other delegates, including Thomas 
Pownall—an unofficial representative of the Earl of Halifax at the conference and future 
governor of Massachusetts—made vague arguments for a provincial naval force on the Great 
Lakes and seacoast, Franklin’s proposal—which would ultimately be the basis for the final draft 
of the Albany Congress’s Plan of Union—was the only plan that called for a centralized colonial 
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navy.9 This plan clearly demonstrated the fact that Anglo-American leaders expected that they 
would need substantial provincial naval forces in the coming fight with the French.  
Despite his plan’s novelty, Franklin’s proposal for a proto-Continental Navy was 
premature. On the one hand, the Albany Congress itself met with little support from colonial 
legislatures who prized local autonomy over a united colonial military alliance.10 On the other 
hand, imperial officials seemed to be just as disinterested in a major colonial maritime force as 
their Anglo-American constituents. The Board of Trade’s own simultaneous proposal for a 
colonial union omitted discussions of naval defense. Additionally, for reasons that are unclear, 
the Board reported to the king that Albany commissioners had planned a “Naval establishment 
upon the Lake to secure the navigation,” but the Albany Congress’s calls for provincial coastal 
warships as well.11 While Halifax’s Board was not opposed to supporting provincial navies (as 
evidenced by their support for Nova Scotia’s ‘sea militia’ throughout the interwar period), they 
were also not prepared to support a pan-colonial provincial navy.  
Even though the plans for colonial union came to naught, one element from the 
discussions survived: imperial support for a naval force on the Great Lakes. In 1755, the Duke of 
Newcastle ordered British Army General Edward Braddock to take charge of all land-based 
military operations in the colonies. By April, Braddock met with the governors of Massachusetts, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia in Alexandria, Virginia to coordinate war 
plans. Braddock informed the governors that imperial officials had called for a multi-pronged 
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attack on both French frontier forts as well as French Canada itself.12 The various governors 
agreed with Braddock that a naval force was necessary on New York's contested borderlands, 
and “advised the building of two Vessels of Sixty Tons upon the Lake Ontario...according to a 
Draught to be sent By [Royal Navy] Commodore Keppell, who desired that an Account might be 
laid before him of the Cost of 'em, and undertook to defray it…” The attendees delegated 
Massachusetts Governor William Shirley (who had substantial provincial naval experience 
himself) with coordinating the naval plan. The attendees also planned for similar vessels to be 
built at Lake Erie, with the expenses of naval and land defenses there to be covered by the 
provincial governments of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania.13  
 The plans at the Alexandria, Virginia meeting between Braddock and the colonial 
governors reflected larger British and French concerns over naval mastery of the Great Lakes—a 
goal that both imperial governments saw as key to winning the war in the northwest. While 
imperial officials ordered the construction of lake warships to counter the French fleet 
(particularly on Lake Ontario), lake crews on small craft typically avoided large fights with 
enemy vessels. Instead, they transported troops and supplies, warned of enemy advances, and 
attempted to intercept enemy communications.14 These vessels involved the Royal Navy to an 
extent, but largely fell under the British Army’s aegis as it struggled to force the French out of 
the American colonies’ northwestern frontiers.  
The Lake Ontario navy of 1755-6 was a rare example of a fusion between the Royal 
Navy and colonial provincial naval forces. While Commodore Keppel (and by extension, the 
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Crown) paid the wages of the fleet’s predominantly Anglo-American sailors, provincial 
governments themselves largely financed the construction of the seven-vessel fleet on Lake 
Ontario. Whereas Royal Navy Captain Housman Broadley served at the small flotilla's 
“commodore,” Governor Shirley—acting as temporary commander of Anglo-American forces—
hired merchant captains to act as Broadley’s subordinate officers. In late 1755 Shirley even 
convinced a council of fellow Anglo-American governors to underwrite the expansion of the 
Lake Ontario fleet without any assistance from the Royal Navy when French naval expansion 
seemed imminent.  
This fusion of provincial and Royal naval resources extended to the Lake George-Lake 
Champlain theatre as well. Captain Joshua Loring, a former Massachusetts privateer that had 
transitioned to the Royal Navy organized a similar fleet while British forces laid siege to Fort 
Carillon—later known as Fort Ticonderoga. While Loring drew on both provincial and Royal 
financial assistance to construct vessels such as the twenty-gun brig Duke of Cumberland, many 
of his “sailors” included officers and soldiers drawn from provincial and regular Anglo-
American and British infantry regiments. British Army commanders such as General Amherst 
were also largely responsible for metropolitan funds for the eastern lake fleet. Despite Loring’s 
presence, the lake naval forces were largely under the purview of the British Army in that 
theatre.15  
 While joint provincial-Royal construction and manning of armed vessels on the Great 
Lakes was certainly novel in the history of provincial naval activity, Massachusetts Lt. Colonel 
John Bradstreet’s “Batteaux Service” in that same theatre of operations reflected some of the 
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southern colonies’ scout boat services.  Batteaux were flat, shallow-water cargo boats that had a 
lengthy pre-war service history on New York’s inland waterways and lakes. Bradstreet’s flotilla 
of several thousand provincial bateaux men, which has been characterized by one historian as the 
“contemporary sister organization” to the famed Roger’s Rangers, transported soldiers and 
supplies to frontier outposts such as Fort Oswego on Lake Ontario. Occasionally, these 
backwoods sailors even disembarked to fend off large groups of Franco-Indigenous raiders.16 
While often compared to Roger’s Rangers, it might also be said they were a distant cousin of 
South Carolina’s provincial scout boat navy.  
 Convinced by the success of the hardy mariners, in late 1757, Bradstreet—in much the 
same manner as Franklin’s proposed colonial navy—asked the British government to bankroll an 
even more extensive multi-colony bateaux service led by American officers (Bradstreet reasoned 
they would hesitate to serve under British officers), and bankrolled by imperial funds. While the 
British commander of North America at the time, Lord Loudoun, did not accept the petition in its 
full form, he did promise Crown reimbursement for personal costs for Bradstreet’s proposed 
1758 naval assault on Fort Frontenac.17 In fact, British army commanders frequently drew on 
imperial funds to support lake navies, though various issues with credit and delays in payment 
had the potential to hamper the Empire’s war efforts at times.18 Nevertheless, by the end of the 
conflict in 1763, Anglo-American and imperial officials had cooperated to construct or purchase 
nearly thirty small war and cargo vessels on Lakes George, Ontario, Champlain, and Erie.19   
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While combined provincial and Royal efforts maintained fleets near the most active 
fronts of the war around the Great Lakes, there was no such large-scale naval cooperation on the 
coasts of North America and in the West Indies. The main reason for this was likely Britain’s 
near-domination of the maritime theatre of the war after 1758, but a survey of those few colonial 
provincial naval forces that operated up to that point is still warranted. Though on a smaller scale 
than in the previous imperial conflict, Anglo-American governments throughout the British 
Atlantic commissioned provincial navies to fight French privateers. This naval effort was 
understandably more potent in regions directly affected by warfare with the French, particularly 
in New England. For instance, after news of the 1756 declaration of war against France, 
Governor Shirley’s administration in Massachusetts spearheaded an effort to use local tax money 
to fund two provincial warships: the Prince of Wales snow (captained by Nathaniel Dowse) and 
the King George frigate (captained by Benjamin Hallowell, Jr).  
The aptly named Massachusetts frigate King George was a particularly useful adjunct for 
Royal Navy forces operating in northern waters throughout the Seven Years War.20 In the 
summer of 1757, Lord Halifax’s ally and Shirley’s successor as governor, Thomas Pownall, 
reported to Prime Minister William Pitt that Massachusetts had a  “naval Establishment (which 
no other Province has).” While Pownall apparently did not realize that most British colonies had 
established provincial navies at some point throughout their history, he did realize their utility, 
and expressed the hope that they would be useful adjuncts to the Royal Navy.21 Indeed, near the 
end of the conflict in October of 1762, the next Massachusetts Governor; Francis Bernard, 
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bragged that the King George was instrumental to Royal Navy Admiral Lord Colville's victory 
over the French in Newfoundland. Even though the “junction of the King George with Lord 
Collville appeared to be an accidental meeting instead of a Concerted Measure...I recd from Ld. 
Colville such an high testimony of Capt.. Hollowel [sic]...”22 
Whereas provincial governors of Massachusetts envisioned the colony’s navy as a useful 
adjunct for an ever-expanding Royal Navy presence in the North Atlantic, colonies to its 
immediate south and in the West Indies deployed provincial naval forces on a much more 
temporary basis in order to stop the widespread threat of French privateers. Even though the 
Royal Navy effectively eliminated the French navy as a serious threat by the late 1750s, it was 
unable to fully control elusive French private men of war. By the end of the conflict, French 
privateers had captured 1,400 British ships in the Caribbean theatre alone.23  
Between 1757 and 1759, there appeared to be a minor “provincial naval” fever 
throughout the Atlantic that echoed Anglo-American naval planning in the last conflict. 
Nevertheless, within a few years, much of the impetus to fit out local provincial forces faded as 
Royal Navy patrols and fleets gained momentum against the French throughout the Atlantic 
world.  In 1757, the Connecticut government purchased a brigantine, Tartar, and assigned 
Michael Burnham as its captain. Burnham, who had been one of the last captains of the colony 
sloop Defence during the previous imperial war, led his crew on a journey to the West Indies to 
protect Connecticut trade interests there. By 1758, without any significant debate, the provincial 
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government decided to sell the Tartar.24  To the east in 1757, Rhode Island’s government took 
charge of two vessels (including the privateer brigantine Abercrombie), and ordered them to hunt 
for a French privateer that was harassing English commerce off of Block Island. While Rhode 
Island’s government commissioned numerous private men of war throughout the conflict, it 
abandoned its only attempt at a provincially-funded guard vessel in late 1758.25  
Farther south in 1757, the traditionally pacificistic Pennsylvania government agreed to fit 
out a 22-gun provincial vessel known as the Pennsylvania Frigate, with the express purpose of 
the “Protection of our Trade.”26 Far from answering this purpose, the Pennsylvania Frigate’s 
captain John Sibbald faced accusations of inaction and cowardice in colonial newspapers in New 
York and Pennsylvania. By late 1758, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Committee of 
Correspondence wrote the Lords of the Admiralty to complain about the “Losses sustained by 
the Merchants of this colony...notwithstanding the great Expence they have for some Time past 
been at in supporting a Ship of War to guard the Coast, and humbly pray the Assistance from our 
Mother Country, of a Vessel or Vessels of superior Force…”27 Despite early disappointment 
with the frigate, the Pennsylvania government kept the vessel cruising to protect the colony’s 
trade for the rest of the conflict. Pennsylvania would prove to be the only colony other than 
Massachusetts to keep a provincial frigate cruising for this long in the war.28 
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Provincial naval patrols also occurred in the Southern colonies, although the immediate 
French threat was much more muted there, and Spain’s late entry in the war in 1762 also delayed 
concerted provincial naval expeditions in the Southern colonies along the Florida borderlands. 
Nevertheless, South Carolina and Georgia did fit out some provincial naval forces. In South 
Carolina, a committee of concerned merchants and elites discussed creating a voluntary fund 
from which “one or two Vessels of War may upon any sudden Occasion be immediately fitted 
out” in case French privateers were to attack Charles Town. They contended that “his Majesty's 
Ships cannot at all Times go over the Bar, the Consequences of which we need not mention.”29  
Even though locals continued to manage their own coastal defenses when needed, an 
episode in the summer of 1757 demonstrated just how intermeshed provincial and Royal defense 
efforts had become. When a French privateer attacked local merchant vessels in the waters of 
Charles Town, the local government fitted out an emergency fleet of two small vessels to pursue 
it. While one provincial vessel had a crew of local volunteers and infantrymen from Lt. Colonel 
Henry Bouquet’s 60th Regiment of Foot (the ‘Royal Americans’), the other provincial vessel 
was manned entirely by Royal Navy sailors and marines from the H.M.S. Arundel.30 
 Even though the Royal Navy (and elements of the British Army) demonstrated 
willingness to assist South Carolina’s provincial forces in 1757, this cooperation seems to have 
ended by 1758. A Charles Town correspondent reported that even “Tho' we have not a Man of 
War or other Vessel cruizing from Port in this Province, to protect our Coasts against the Insults 
of the French Privateers that may be upon it, we are assured that the Province of Georgia has—a 
fine Sloop having been impressed there…” Georgia Governor Henry Ellis  put the vessel (Tryal) 
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under the command of a privateer captain, assigned the captain of the colony’s scout boat as a 
pilot, and added the sailors from the scout boat as well as several volunteers to its crew. The 
source reported that in a subsequent battle with a French privateer crew (that included escaped 
African slaves from South Carolina),  the Tryal’s crew suffered many casualties, but successfully 
withstood several boarding attempts. With this pyrrhic victory in mind, the South Carolina 
correspondent declared that: GEORGIA has made its Effort; and surely it must now be our Turn! 
'Tis true, the Event of our Sister-Colony's Endeavours carries some Disappointment in it, but we 
cannot think they have been fruitless. We cannot conclude this account without this Observation, 
that those who go with a sincere Intention of finding the Enemy, seldom fail to meet them.31 It is 
likely that the correspondent’s conclusion was an acerbic commentary on what he believed to be 
the Royal Navy’s alleged inactivity in patrolling for French privateers. 
 While it is tempting to see Ellis’s provincial navy as an example of colonial self-reliance 
in the wake of imperial negligence, scholars have largely noted that this period saw increasing 
colonial reliance on imperial military initiatives. Even independent provincial naval expeditions 
during the late 1750s should be seen within the context of Britain’s growing military strength 
throughout the Atlantic world. For instance, historian Andrew D.M. Beaumont has argued that 
Governor Ellis’s ability to “act decisively upon his own initiative” was precisely why the Board 
of Trade’s Lord Halifax had made him the governor of Georgia. Beaumont contends that 
throughout 1756 and 1757, ministerial infighting and military inaction by British commanders 
such as Lord Loudoun damaged Britain’s war effort. To counter this, Lord Halifax depended 
upon the colonial governors to carry on the fight against the French with local resources. In 
short, Beaumont holds that even colonial authorities acting on their own initiative could still 
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advance metropolitan military goals.32 By 1759, provincial naval forces in South Carolina and 
Georgia had made some strides against French privateers, but these minor naval forces paled in 
comparison to the large Southern provincial navies of the War of Jenkins Ear.  
 Just as in the last war, provincial navies were only moderately active in the West Indies. 
In fact, within the first few years of the war, political infighting, arguments over finance, and the 
overwhelming presence of Royal Navy guardships limited the service lives of even those few 
provincial ships in the region.33 That is not to say that there was never any  use for local defense 
vessels in island provinces. For instance, late in the war in 1761, the Bermuda government fitted 
out two sloops to chase after French privateer sloops. The emergency fleet successfully forced 
the raiders away.34 Despite occasional utility for emergency fleets and provincial guardships, the 
Jamaica governor’s 1757 speech to a joint session of his council and the island’s assembly 
provides a poignant picture of the decline of provincial navies in the West Indies:  
...I apprehend there will be no Occasion for an Island Sloop, two Vessels having been already 
commissioned, by an Order from the Lords of the Admiralty, for the immediate Protection of our 
Coasts[;] The great Sums of Money usually expended in Time of War for that Service will now 
be saved, the Country relieved from so heavy a Burthen, and the purpose more fully 
answered…35  
 
The decline in provincial naval warfare throughout the Atlantic world in the late 1750s 
coincided with the decline of its sister institution: privateering. Though Parliament initially 
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encouraged widespread privateering at the beginning of the conflict, and even though it allowed 
privateers to raid neutral merchant ships that carried French goods, by 1759 the British 
government decided to limit the issue of Letters of Marque when tensions arose with neutral 
powers concerned about British assaults on their shipping. 
 Aside from diplomatic concerns over privateering excesses,  Royal Navy vessels were 
also more efficient in commerce raiding during the Seven Years War than privateers. In his study 
on British privateers throughout the eighteenth century, historian David Starkey calculated that 
between 1739 and 1751, British authorities condemned 408 enemy vessels captured by privateers 
and 449 vessels captured by the Royal Navy. Between 1756 and 1763, British courts condemned 
382 privateer prizes and 794 Royal Navy prizes. Starkey connects the decline in British 
privateering to the Royal Navy’s victories in the 1750s and 1760s.36  
The decline in privateering after 1759 was noticeable in America as well. New York 
merchants had fitted out three times as many privateers in the Seven Years War than they had in 
the War of Jenkin’s Ear. By 1759, however, over-hunting of enemy commerce reduced the 
number of prizes available for privateers. New York’s Vice Admiralty Judge Lewis Morris—a 
veteran administrator that had overseen privateering cases since the War of Jenkin’s Ear—
condemned more prizes in 1758 than in any year in his long career, but saw fewer and fewer 
cases as British victories and “over-fishing” of French prizes continued.37  All in all, Royal Navy 
military victories throughout the Atlantic world by the end of the decade disincentivized 
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provincial governments from outfitting large provincial navies, and private merchants from 
pursuing privateering.  
 
Royal Navy Supremacy at Sea, 1758-1763  
 
Even though provincial governments initially believed that they would have to create 
extensive provincial navies as in the previous conflict, the Royal Navy’s expansion and victories 
over its French enemies after 1757 (coupled with Spain’s belated entry into the conflict in 1762) 
made the creation of extensive provincial navies unnecessary. To fully appreciate why colonial 
governments consciously decided to cut back on provincial navy spending, one must fully 
examine the reasons behind the Royal Navy’s growing hegemony in the Atlantic world in the 
late 1750s. 
The seeds of Royal Navy squadrons replacing private naval squadrons at sea were sown 
as early as the mid-1750s, but imperial naval strength would only fully be realized by the end of 
the 1750s. Historian W.A.B. Douglas argues that when Royal Navy Captain John Rous led a 
force of Royal ships to help take French Fort Beausejour in Nova Scotia in the summer of 1755, 
it was “perhaps symptomatic of that state of affairs that [Rous's squadron was] composed 
entirely of King's ships rather than a mixed force of provincial and [Royal] naval vessels.”38   
The Royal Navy’s ultimate maritime hegemony by the end of the 1750s did not come 
easily. The Duke of Newcastle, Sir Thomas Pelham-Holles (the brother of Prime Minister Henry 
Pelham, and his successor after 1756)  initially hoped to contain French aggression to North 
America and to avoid an all-out European conflagration. The Newcastle administration feared 
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that if another worldwide imperial war broke out, the battle fleets of the recently expanded 
French and Spanish navies would potentially outnumber and overpower the Royal Navy. While 
important members of the Whig opposition such as William Pitt (and naval reformers in the 
Admiralty such as Lords Bedford and Sandwich) called for an aggressive maritime assault on 
France, Newcastle and his allies insisted that diplomatic solutions in Europe and limited warfare 
against the French were preferable. Ultimately, the ministry did not dedicate enough Royal Navy 
vessels to intercept French reinforcements sailing for the New World—a misstep that played a 
major role in the expansion of the war beyond the North American continent in 1756.39 
 What had begun as border skirmishes in North America quickly became a major world 
war between 1756 and 1758.  In the English Channel and on the French coast, the Royal Navy’s 
Western Squadron made a few patrols along the French coast and into the Atlantic throughout 
1756 and 1757 but failed to stop three major French squadrons sailing for the Caribbean and 
Canada. The Western Squadron's inactivity allowed the French to heavily reinforce 
Louisbourg—a fact that delayed the long-planned Anglo-American assault on French Canada. 
To calm public anger over mediocre progress in the war effort, William Pitt (then the Southern 
Secretary of State) planned for a major Royal Navy-army assault on the port of Rochefort, 
France in late 1757. Infighting between the British Army and the Royal Navy, faulty 
intelligence, and bad weather forced the invasion force to withdraw. A subsequent joint raid on 
the French port of St. Malo in the summer of 1758 was more successful, and resulted in the 
destruction of 80 French privateer vessels and merchant ships (along with four French naval 
vessels under construction).40   
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In the Mediterranean, the French captured the island of Minorca in the spring of 1756. A 
Royal Navy relief force led by Admiral Byng failed to recover the island, and Byng himself was 
executed by the Admiralty for his alleged inaction. By early 1758, however,  the Royal Navy 
was able to contain and overpower the main French fleet in the Mediterranean, and prevented it 
from sailing across the Atlantic to reinforce Louisbourg.41 Between 1758 and 1759, Royal Navy 
forces also slowly seized France’s West African possessions in Senegal. While the British 
government considered the Mediterranean an important strategic theatre, the seizure of French 
slaving colonies in Africa clearly was designed to harm France’s economy while also bolstering 
Britain’s transatlantic commerce.42 
In the East Indies, the French and British East India Companies (along with their 
respective Indian allies) had long been at war with one another. A Royal Navy force had already 
been sent to India in 1755 to assist the East India Company's own naval forces (the Bombay 
Marine) in a fight against their enemies in the Angrian Indian kingdom, and was prepared for the 
larger fight against the French when news of war arrived in 1756.  Between 1756 and 1759, 
British and French forces (alongside their Indian partners) fought a largely inconclusive war of 
attrition. Both British and French squadrons fought each other to a standstill on numerous 
occasions, and both sides captured important trading outposts from one another. By 1761, 
however, British forces had largely forced the French out of India with the capture of 
Pondicherry.43  
While clashes between the British and French empires occurred throughout the world, 
Prime Minister William Pitt’s decision to focus the British war effort on the North American 
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theatre after 1757 proved to be one of the war’s major turning points, and the Royal Navy was a 
key component in this plan. Historian Eliga Gould has made the case that growing resentment 
against long-standing Whig concerns with political and military involvement in continental 
European affairs encouraged Prime Minister William Pitt to focus on a “Blue Water” vision of 
British empire. This vision utilized naval power to expand the British imperial reach into the 
Americas—a move that would both bolster British wealth and harm the empire’s French 
enemies.44 
The positive effects of this renewed British attention to the North American theatre 
became apparent in the summer of 1758 when Admiral Boscawen led over twenty-one battle 
ships and two frigates—the first Royal Navy fleet that had ever wintered in Nova Scotia—
alongside 12,000 soldiers in a successful assault on Fortress Louisbourg. This act would serve as 
the first step in the larger conquest of Canada that would occur throughout the next two years. It 
is telling that Massachusetts’s government, which had spearheaded a large provincial flotilla in 
the siege of 1745, did little more for the naval assault on the city than to utilize the provincial 
frigate King George as a scouting vessel and commerce raider on the coast surrounding 
Louisbourg.45 The capture of Louisbourg demonstrated that the Blue Water Strategy hinged 
more on Royal than provincial naval resources.  
Even though fighting continued in every corner of the world,  the Royal Navy held the 
advantage over the French in North America and in the West Indies after the 1758 seizure of 
Louisbourg and subsequent 1759 capture of Quebec. While Pitt’s adoption of more aggressive 
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naval warfare against French interests certainly aided the British war effort, one other factor 
worked in the British empire’s favor: Spain’s continued neutrality. King Filip VI of Spain had 
long sought to maintain peaceful relations with the British empire. However, when the king died 
in the summer of 1759, the Spanish government’s devotion to neutrality died with him.  His half 
brother and successor, Charles III, hated Britain and sought to restore his kingdom's traditional 
alliance with France. Charles III oversaw a further expansion of the Spanish navy and sent 
squadrons to reinforce garrisons in the West Indies.  
At the same time, ongoing peace talks between Britain and France proved to be 
unfruitful. Pitt's desire to continue the war at any cost and to welcome a fight with the 
increasingly belligerent Spanish was unpopular to the war-weary British public, and the prime 
minister resigned in the autumn of 1761. Despite his resignation, Spain belatedly formalized a 
military alliance with France in the winter of 1761.Within weeks of the declaration of war, 
officials in London planned to use the large British infantry and naval forces already 
campaigning against the French in the Caribbean to capture Havana, Cuba. They were to be 
assisted by Anglo-American provincial regiments, volunteer units of free blacks and French 
Huguenots. On 6 June 1762, the British invasion force surprised Havana's defenders, and began a 
massive siege. After hundreds of casualties and months of fighting, the weary Spanish garrison 
finally surrendered to the British on 13 August 1762. The siege of Havana would be the only 
major British or Anglo-American expedition against the Spanish during their short period of 
participation in the conflict. News of the British victory would also play a major role in 
strengthening the British hand in the ongoing peace talks in Paris in the autumn of 1762.46 
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During Spain’s brief participation in the conflict, Britain and its Anglo-American subjects 
faced their traditional French and Spanish enemies together for the first time since 1748. 
Nevertheless, the military situation was much different at the end of the Seven Years War than 
during the War of Jenkin’s Ear. By 1762, the Royal Navy had overpowered its French rivals in 
almost every corner of the globe and was more than prepared to take part in an assault on 
Havana.  
It is interesting to note that Southern provincial governments did not engage in any major 
military campaigns against Spanish Florida. While Anglo-Americans undoubtedly fitted out 
privateers and occasional provincial fleets, a policy of proactive defense at this late stage in the 
conflict was preferred over major campaigns against the Spanish. This sentiment was best 
expressed in a Spring 1762 issue of the South Carolina Gazette, which reported that “The 
general assembly of this province have [sic] resolved to continue both the scout-boats, and the 
look-outs, during the continuation of the present war with France and Spain.”47 British victories 
over Franco-Spanish forces throughout the Atlantic world and ongoing peace talks likely  made 
the need for expensive expeditions against St. Augustine (such as had been planned in the 
previous conflict) unnecessary.  
All told, the Royal Navy played a key role in achieving Britain’s first imperial victory 
over its foes in half a century. In London, the Admiralty Board’s continued insistence on 
professionalization, insistence on aggressive strategies, new battleship designs, the capture of 
large numbers of enemy mariners, British assaults on neutral ships carrying French goods, and 
French economic collapse all contributed to Britain’s growing naval advantage as the long war 
blazed on.  Behind aggressive military expansion throughout the war, new methods for 
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distributing supplies to ships, and Whig Prime Minister’s William Pitt's ability to get consistent 
credit and funding for both the navy and army also played large roles in the British naval 
victory.48  
The Admiralty’s growing interest in overseas conquests paralleled an even larger shift in 
the British government’s relationship with its overseas empire in America. Throughout the last 
several decades, a number of scholars have noted an increased metropolitan interest in colonial 
military defense with the onset of the Seven Years War. Kurt Nagel has argued that by the late 
1740s, the British government had begun to take the reins of colonial military defense policies 
while also continuing to insist on colonial self-defense measures—a contradiction that would 
play a role in fostering the imperial crisis of the 1760s. London’s total involvement in colonial 
military affairs would crystallize by the Seven Years War with William Pitt’s aforementioned 
adoption of a Blue Water strategy that increased military involvement in America.49 Thus, the 
Royal Navy’s growing presence in American naval warfare represented a growing metropolitan 
interest in the governance and defense of its American colonies at midcentury.  
Even if the Royal Navy’s expanded operations in the Atlantic world supplanted the need 
for provincial navies, British naval dominance over the French and Spanish required significant 
American assistance and sacrifice. For instance, in 1759, after Royal Navy Admiral Durell 
requested men for his ever-undermanned squadron at Halifax, Nova Scotia, Rhode Island’s 
government promised bounties “out of the general treasury, over and above the King’s, of forty 
shillings sterling” for all men who would join the Royal fleet.50 This sort of spending did not 
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come easily. For instance, even though Parliament had reimbursed some of Massachusetts’s war 
debts by 1759, the colony continued to employ more than 25% of its adult male population in 
infantry and naval services (including on bateaus, privateers, and on the King George) on its own 
coin. Even though these charges sapped the colony’s economic strength in the short term, the 
promise of future Parliamentary reimbursement encouraged Massachusetts and other colonial 
governments to provide thousands of soldiers and sailors for the imperial cause.  
While economic reimbursement from London was vital in securing Anglo-American 
military expenditure throughout the conflict, another force also drove colonial governments to 
continue to support the imperial cause: a growing belief among Anglo-Americans that they were 
equal “partners” with the British army in the war against the French. Scholars have noted that 
this growing patriotic fervor was not shared by British army leaders (particularly General 
Amherst) who saw colonial governments and their forces as fickle subordinates rather than as 
imperial partners.51 While these tensions had existed on land for sometime, they also continued 
to plague provincial-Royal cooperation at sea. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the early 
1750s, Anglo-Americans had failed to convince imperial authorities that their provincial 
warships at Louisbourg had been the equals of Royal Navy frigates.  
As ever, the main controversy between Anglo-Americans and the Royal Navy was 
impressment. In the aftermath of the 1747 Knowles Riots, Royal Navy captains typically only 
impressed American sailors already at sea rather than in port. This new strategy did little to 
assuage colonial authorities, and met with violent resistance near Boston Harbor in 1758 when a 
merchant vessel fired on a boat carrying a press gang from the  H.M.S. Hunter.52 Despite early 
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reservations, the Royal Navy did not always limit its impressment to sea—a fact that would bring 
about significant resistance throughout the Northern port cities. 
Anger at Royal Navy impressment on land and sea during the Seven Years War must be 
understood within the wider context of unsavory recruitment policies by imperial infantry and 
naval forces. Throughout Colonial America’s towns and cities, British Army recruiters often 
relied on coercion and violence to force Anglo-Americans into personnel-depleted regiments. 
Thus, Anglo-American mobs frequently assaulted regular army recruiting parties; mob violence 
against Royal Navy press gangs was a simultaneous occurrence.53 For New Yorkers, these two 
threats coalesced in the spring of 1757 when Lord Loudon’s troops assisted the Royal Navy in 
impressing over 800 men. While mariners could not resist Royal Navy press gangs that had large 
red-coated units at their disposal, individual crews did put up hefty resistance when they had the 
chance. One representative example occurred in 1760, when the crew of the privateer Samson 
engaged in a naval shootout with a Royal Navy crew that tried to impress them. Even though 
local lawmen tried to help the press gang, the privateer crew was largely able to escape from 
New York Harbor.54 It should be noted that sailors also resisted local officials’ attempts at 
impressment, including a case from 1758 in which mariners fired on a New York militia 
company that tried to force them into the colony’s transport service.55 Nevertheless, as will be 
seen in the conclusion to this dissertation, Anglo-American anger over Royal Navy impressment 
would play a major role in the postwar imperial crisis.  
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While colonists resented the Royal Navy for its impressment policy, they also grew to 
despise its role in suppressing illicit Anglo-American trade with the French. As early as 1755, 
Admiralty officials took note of the widespread North American trade with the French in 
Louisbourg and the West Indies, and ordered Admiral Augustus Keppel to patrol for smugglers. 
Anglo-American smugglers often had patronage from colonial governors, including 
Pennsylvania Governor William Denny. Denny sold ‘flag-of-truce’  passes to merchant captains 
who would tacitly go on diplomatic missions to French territories with the understanding that 
they would engage in illicit trading with the enemy. Metropolitan anger over this smuggling 
coupled with provincial anger over British attempts to end the practice further strained relations 
between periphery and center. When British commanders such as Lord Loundon placed 
embargoes on colonial ports to prevent this trade, Anglo-Americans raised hues and cries over 
financial losses. By the early 1760s,  Parliamentary anger at this widespread trade would prove 
to be fundamental in its decision to curb provincial autonomy with numerous imperial reforms, 
beginning with legislation surrounding Writs of Assistance (which will be discussed below).56 
By the early 1760s, Parliamentary leaders had come to the conclusion that to secure their 
new possessions in the Americas and to crack down on excessive provincial economic and 
political autonomy, they would have to expand Royal military forces throughout the colonies 
while also enacting numerous reforms that would fund these forces. These reforms included 
expanding vice admiralty court jurisdiction and enforcing customs laws with a fleet of purpose-
built coast guard vessels. Historian Eliga Gould argues that Britain's decision to strenuously 
enforce trade laws and tax policies began to make enemies of important merchants and ordinary 
sailors who had “cut their political teeth resisting the navy's wartime press gangs during the 
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1740s and 1750s.”57 Ironically, the imperial laws destined to bring Anglo-Americans closer in 
line with British maritime policies would alienate the colonies’ sailors to the point of all-out 
rebellion. 
Between 1754 and 1757, provincial governments planned for major provincial naval 
campaigns against the French as they had in the previous imperial conflict. However, beginning 
with the capture of Louisbourg in 1758, William Pitt’s ‘Blue Water Strategy’ (which relied on 
the Royal Navy to spearhead the conquest of French possessions in North America) made the 
existence of large provincial navies unnecessary.  With dozens of Royal Navy warships actively 
pursuing French privateers and capturing French ports, provincial governments felt that they 
could finally delegate the responsibilities of coastal defense to their imperial overlords. While an 
expanded Royal Navy presence may have made Anglo-Americans feel secure while the war 
raged on, the imperial fleet would play a major role in exacerbating the postwar imperial crisis of 
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Conclusion: Provincial Navies and the Imperial Crisis, c. 1762-1775 
 
Even though provincial navies had played only a small role in the British victory in the 
Seven Years War, the century-long legacy of provincial naval service (coupled with long-held 
colonial anger at Royal Navy excesses) would play a significant part in shaping Patriot resistance 
during the imperial crisis of the 1760s-70s. In particular, Anglo-Americans would use stories of 
their provincial naval service to contest British taxation and would also draw on familiar 
maritime defense tactics to oppose Royal Navy enforcement of imperial policies.  
Unsurprisingly, the first major connection between pre-Revolutionary provincial navies 
and the imperial crisis occurred in the ever-turbulent port city of Boston. By the middle of 1760, 
Boston, like many other northeastern ports, faced an economic recession as the war with France 
began to wind down. It also faced political infighting between conservative elites (and supporters 
of extending Governor Francis Bernard’s prerogative powers) such as the colony’s Chief Justice 
Thomas Hutchinson and populist politicians such as James Otis. Among the sharpest disputes 
that arose between these political factions was the battle over Writs of Assistance, one of the first 
controversial imperial reforms of the 1760s. The British government had equipped customs 
officers with greater authority to utilize search warrants (writs) on vessels suspected of 
smuggling. Otis’s campaign against the writs of assistance and Hutchinson’s attempts to ban the 
popular Boston town meeting endeared him to poorer laborers and merchants concerned with 
increasing imperial trade restrictions.1  
Aside from Otis’s resistance to what he considered growing imperial overreach, he also 
opposed Governor Francis Bernard’s handling of the colony’s provincial navy in the final year of 
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the war against France—a case he documented in the 1762 pamphlet A Vindication of the 
Conduct of the House of Representatives of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay. One early 
nineteenth century historian made the bold case that this pamphlet “has been considered the 
original source, from which all subsequent arguments against taxation were derived.”2 With the 
French having commenced an assault on Newfoundland that summer and with coastal fishermen 
fearing a renewed assault on the New England fisheries, Governor Bernard and his council 
expanded the crew of the provincial sloop Massachusetts and sent it on various patrols without 
consulting the colony’s assembly. Bernard’s unilateral strategy may have appeared harmless to 
the governor, but what may have seemed like a small quibble over the defense of the coast set 
the pace for larger constitutional arguments that would resound throughout the next few decades.  
Overall, Otis’s larger argument was not with the existence of a provincial navy in 
Massachusetts, though he questioned if “the province's trade has truly received a Benefit from 
those Vessels equal to the Tax...paid for their Support.” Rather, Otis characterized Bernard’s 
fitting out of the sloop without approaching the assembly (coupled with other extra-
parliamentary expenditure) as a symptom of arbitrary executive power. A legislative committee 
responded with the claim that  “No Necessity therefore can be sufficient to justify a house of 
Representatives in giving up such a Priviledge; for it would be of little consequence to the people 
whether they were subject to George or Lewis, the King of Great Britain or the French King, if 
both were arbitrary, as both would be if both could levy Taxes without Parliament.”3 Ultimately, 
as in so many cases throughout the Atlantic world in the preceding century, battles over 
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provincial navies reflected larger sociopolitical divisions and tensions within colonial society 
rather than squabbles over naval policy.  
While Otis and his colleagues equated Bernard’s naval expenditure with taxing the 
populace without representation—a clarion cry that would resound throughout colonial protests 
for the next decade--they also expressed an anxiety common throughout seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century British politics: that an executive would keep a standing military force to 
arbitrarily oppress his subjects. This fear was evident when Otis wondered “If the Governor and 
Council can fit out one man of war, inlist men, grant a bounty and make establishments, why not 
for a navy, if to them it shall seem necessary, and they can make themselves the sole judges of 
this necessity.”4 Historian Sarah Kinkel has made the case that later in that decade, Anglo-
Americans dissidents—like their compatriots among the Patriot Whigs in Britain—protested 
Royal Navy enforcement of metropolitan trade laws partly due to their “preexisting fears about a 
professional military…”5 While men like Otis did not oppose provincial navies on principle, they 
did fear that excessively powerful governors could wield them in the same manner as a standing 
army to squash the rights of the citizenry.  
While it may seem hyperbolic to assume a governor could maintain a private navy to 
enforce his will (or imperial laws), there were some cases where provincial navies supported 
unpopular British policies during the imperial crisis. For instance, the Georgia scout boat Prince 
George was fundamental in securing the delivery of stamps after Parliament’s infamous 1765 
Stamp Act. This act was one of Parliament’s first major attempts at external taxation on internal 
colonial commerce and required colonists to pay a stamp duty on various official documents and 
licenses. This wildly unpopular act met immediate resistance throughout the American colonies. 
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5 Kinkel, Disciplining the Empire, pp. 164-165.   
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In Georgia, merchants were furious that they could not export rice (the colony’s cash crop) 
without customs papers with the stamps affixed and took to the streets to protest the policy 
throughout the autumn of 1765.  
Throughout the next several months, Wright mobilized the colony’s Royally-funded 
ranger force, elements of the Royal Navy, and volunteers to defend the stamps and his own 
safety when the local chapter of the Sons of Liberty threatened numerous violent riots. Along 
with a few colonial rangers, the crew of the Prince George, transported and guarded the colony’s 
stamp collector during his initial landing.6 After the governor’s swift response, one anonymous 
Georgian who opposed the Stamp Act lamented that “Our liberty here is at a very low ebb.” 
Undoubtedly, the governor’s ability to utilize a Royally-funded infantry force (and provincial 
scout boat) in support of the Stamp Act did little to quell colonial fears that their rights were 
threatened by standing military forces.7 
While the imperial crisis raised larger questions over the ability of  the governor to use 
provincial navies to enforce unpopular imperial mandates, the legacy of provincial naval service 
from previous conflicts also shaped the way Anglo-Americans protested British policies. For 
example, as early as 1764, a committee of Massachusetts politicians from the governor’s Council 
and Assembly (leery of reports that the British ministry and Parliament were plotting a round of 
taxes on the American colonies) drew on their colony’s century-and-a-half of military service to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown and to decry imperial taxation. In response to  
Parliament's reason for raising taxes on the colonists, to “defray the charges of a war undertaken 
for [the colonists'] defence, to which it is said they have never yet sufficiently contributed, the 
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Province of Massachusetts Bay deem it proper briefly to set forth their own...exertions and 
expenses in the common cause…”  
Among the major expenses the committee delineated were the various attacks on Canada 
throughout the previous imperial wars, contributions to campaigns in the Seven Years War, and 
the commissioning of “armed vessels for the protection of trade, [which] cost 34,795 [pounds].” 
While still in debt from the most recent conflict, the colony's government could still declare that 
“From its infancy to the present age, this colony, with no expense to the Crown, has defended the 
territory granted to it; and thereby mightily extended the British empire and immensely increased 
the British commerce.”8 While provincial naval expenses were only one factor in the colony’s 
long list of complaints against recent British trade acts, this complaint reiterated long-held 
provincial anger at bearing the brunt of the costs of naval defense. If the colonies were willing to 
build their own fleets to defend trade and to advance the cause of the British Empire, why were 
they being singled out by discriminatory imperial policies?  
While Massachusetts explicitly listed its provincial naval expenses as evidence that the 
colony should not be taxed by Parliament, other colonies drew on more general descriptions of 
their military exertions to justify their protests.  For instance, in his 1764 pamphlet The Rights of 
the Colonies Examined, Rhode Island politician Stephen Hopkins (a future signer of the 
Declaration of Independence and founder of the Continental Navy) detailed various colonies’ 
historical wartime sacrifices  as evidence that they should not be taxed by Parliament. For 
instance, Hopkins argued that: 
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....in the year 1746, when the Duke D'Anville came out from France, with the most formidable 
French fleet that ever was in the American seas, enraged at these colonies for the loss of 
Louisbourg, the year before, and with orders to make an attack on them; even in this greatest 
exigence, these colonies were left to the protection of heaven, and their own efforts...9  
 
While Hopkins made no explicit mention of his colony’s naval service in this example, 
he must certainly have considered the fact that Royal Navy Admiral Warren had personally 
requested Rhode Island’s colony sloop Tartar to scout for DuCasse’s squadron during the 
invasion scare.10 In the mind of Anglo-American dissidents, Parliamentary taxation to fund 
standing military forces punished colonial governments that had funded their own defense 
measures for generations. 
Whereas Anglo-Americans drew on their history of provincial naval expenses and 
general military costs to argue against British taxation without representation, this same legacy 
also defined how many disaffected colonists opposed the metropole’s expansive maritime 
enforcement policies. One critical component of Parliament's plans to levy taxes on American 
colonists in the years following the Seven Years War was the Admiralty's desire to expand the 
North American Squadron’s peacetime fleet to twenty six vessels (and 3,290 sailors). While 
France's empire in North America had essentially come to an end in 1763, the British 
government hoped that maintaining a peacetime garrison of thousands of red-coated regulars 
(along with an expanded naval presence) would prevent future imperial competition over its new 
American territories. Aside from military fears, imperial authorities also hoped the Royal Navy 
could crack down on widespread American smuggling—a potentially lucrative service that 
would serve immediate imperial interests and allow for peacetime prizes for Royal Navy crews. 
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The first peacetime commander of the newly expanded squadron, Lord Colville (who had 
recently utilized Massachusetts’s provincial warship King George in the attack on 
Newfoundland), zealously embraced his new powers to seize and confiscate illicit cargo and 
trading vessels.11 
By 1764, Admiralty officials funded the construction of six small sloops and schooners 
for the Royal Navy to use in the pursuit of North American (and occasionally French) smugglers. 
While the Royal Navy did fund this small cutter fleet, the most effective (and unpopular) anti-
smuggling vessels were “peacetime privateers” commissioned by the American Board of 
Customs Commissioners. Their crews lived off the proceeds of their captures and tarnished the 
reputation of the Royal Navy in American waters even though they were independent of the 
imperial fleet. For many Whiggish American traders and smugglers, Britain’s new “sea guard” 
was little better than the guarda costas that had prowled their shores throughout the recent 
imperial conflicts.12 
For many traders in Rhode Island (which depended heavily on the molasses trade with 
the West Indies that was now threatened by Parliament’s 1764 Sugar Act), British coast guard 
vessels were a major threat to lucrative trade routes. Such warlike threats to the colony’s 
commerce had warranted a warlike response. This military response, particularly in the 
traditionally rebellious colony of Rhode Island , drew on nearly a century of commissioning 
“emergency fleets'” to face immediate piratical and imperial threats. With ongoing Royal Navy 
captures of sugar smugglers  and rumors of impressment plans, Rhode Islanders began to stage 
violent resistance to Royal Navy guard ships as early as 1764. Historian Michael R. Deriderian 
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has accurately called this violence pre-revolutionary “maritime skirmishes.”13 When Lt. Thomas 
Hill and the crew of the revenue schooner St. John tried to recruit sailors in Newport,  local peer 
pressure and threats of violence stalled recruiting. To make up for this loss, Hill seized a local 
smuggling vessel. Soon thereafter, a rumor arose that when Royal Navy sailors went on shore to 
claim a deserter and plundered a local farm, the locals had planned to fit out an armed vessel to 
attack the St. John. Allegedly they were only deterred from this attack by the presence of the 
nearby Royal warship Squirrell. 
While some scholars have made the case that the planned attack on the St. John was a 
mere rumor, it is clear in Lt. Hill’s correspondence that he believed a mob had almost overtaken 
his vessel. Although Hill had been absent during the violence, some of his subordinate officers 
reported that a “mob filled a sloop full of men, and bore right down to board us…” While Royal 
Navy firepower prevented this mob from attacking the St. John, gunners at the local fort fired at 
the mainsail of the schooner and forced it to fall back.14 The violent battle for navigation in 
Rhode Island had commenced, and impromptu fitting out of warlike vessels would serve Rhode 
Islanders in their fight against the Royal Navy just as it had with pirates and other maritime foes 
before.  
Throughout the rest of the 1760s, Rhode Islanders violently resisted impressment 
attempts by the Royal Navy, and even burned the Liberty—the former sloop of the elite 
Bostonian smuggler which the Royal Navy had captured and turned into a revenue cutter.15 It is 
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important to note that the customs officer who seized the Liberty, Benjamin Hallowell, was the 
former provincial navy captain of Massachusetts’s province ship  King George. Hallowell’s 
actions led to the plundering of his home during an ensuing riot in Boston, and his loyalty to the 
Crown ultimately led him to flee to Canada when the Revolutionary War broke out. While 
riotous traders and Whigs drew on traditional provincial naval strategies  to resist the British 
during the imperial crisis, Hallowell’s case reminds us that previous service in Anglo-American 
provincial navies did not always correlate with resistance to British authority.16 
Whereas Rhode Islanders used mob violence to secure their shipping and sailors from the 
Royal Navy throughout the late 1760s, they transitioned to all-out naval assaults on Royal 
revenue cutters by the early 1770s. This elevation of violence occurred after Lt. William 
Dudsington and the Gaspee schooner (already unpopular in other colonies) seized numerous 
Rhode Island smugglers and brought them to the vice admiralty court in Massachusetts. In 
response to these seizures and Dudingston’s refusal to show proof of his authority, Governor 
Wanton of Rhode Island  engaged in a vicious war of letters with the lieutenant and his superior, 
Admiral Montagu.17 In a letter to Wanton, Montagu claimed that the Gaspee was stationed at 
Rhode Island to protect the locals from piracy and to end smuggling. He also claimed that he had 
been informed that “the people of Newport talk of fitting out an armed vessel to rescue any 
vessel the King's schooner may take carrying on an illicit trade. Let them be cautious what they 
do; for...any of them are taken, I will hang as pirates.” Even though Wanton denied knowledge 
of local preparations to assault the Gaspee, Montagu warned that any provincial mob would meet 
deadly force if they molested the king’s ships.18 
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Even though Montagu feared an attack by a Rhode Island vessel, he could never have 
fathomed the multi-boat attack that would occur against the Gaspee in the summer of 1772. 
Many decades after the raid, the last survivor, Ephraim Bowen, recalled that on one June night in 
1772, the Gaspee grounded when chasing a suspected smuggler. A Providence merchant by the 
name of John Brown had a local shipmaster get eight long boats ready to assault the schooner. 
About the “time of the shutting up of the shops...a man passed along the main street beating a 
drum, and informing the inhabitants of the fact that the Gaspee [italics mine] was aground on 
Namquit Point...inviting those persons who felt a disposition to go and destroy that troublesome 
vessel, to repair” to the rendezvous point. The armed mob, including future Continental Navy 
Admiral Abraham Whipple, ambushed the Gaspee by sea, wounded Dudingston, and burnt the 
schooner.19 
While one might argue that this was merely an angry mob of Whiggish merchants that 
burnt a King’s vessel, this strategy which utilized a drummer rallying volunteers on a whim to 
fight off an imminent maritime threat actually fit within the region’s long history of emergency 
fleets. Take for example a case from 1704 when a French privateer was reported off the coast, 
Governor Samuel Cranston was “immediately caused the Drum to beat for Voluntiers, under the 
Command of Capt. [William] Wanton, and in 3 or four hours time Fitted and Man'd a Brigantine, 
with 70 brisk young men well Arm’d…” Two years later, when Rhode Island came under 
numerous legal attacks, Cranston would cite Rhode Island’s frequent “fitting and sending out 
vessels upon the discovery, and to secure the coast” as evidence of the colony’s utility and 
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loyalty to the Crown.20 How ironic that Rhode Island elites would use the same strategy to resist 
the Crown sixty-eight years later.  
For many reasons, the 1772 attack on the Gaspee mirrored Rhode Island’s emergency 
fleets of Queen Anne’s War. On a familial level, the 1704 emergency fleet captain, William 
Wanton, was the father of Governor Joseph Wanton—the provincial politician who continually 
denied that Rhode Islanders had planned a naval assault on the British and who would deal with 
the immediate fallout from the Gaspee riot.21 On a strategic level, both naval expeditions relied 
on a local authority (or elite) having a drummer rally volunteers on a whim, and piling them into 
boats or a vessel to fight off an immediate threat to colonial commerce. Rhode Island, like so 
many other colonies, had traditionally raised (or impressed) emergency fleets when Royal Navy 
vessels were absent in order to defend the coasts during the emergency, and had now turned that 
same strategy on the Royal Navy itself. 
For some scholars, the Gaspee Affair fits into larger discussions of mob violence in the 
decade leading up to the American Revolution. In her famous study on pre-Revolutionary War 
mob violence, historian Pauline Maier argued that the Gaspee Affair was one of many typical 
eighteenth century crowd uprisings throughout the Atlantic world. These uprisings involved 
elites and commoners acting in concert to solve a local problem (i.e. to fight impressment) rather 
than to advance “revolutionary goals.” Nevertheless, Maier argues, Anglo-American riots against 
British authorities during this era took on a new meaning as they were fights against impositions 
from an “external power.”22 While the Gaspee riot may have demonstrated how an angry Anglo-
                                                           
20For more on this case, see the first chapter of the dissertation. Boston News-Letter no. 1, April 24, 1704: 
[2]. Readex: America's Historical Newspapers. and Governor and Company of Rhode Island to the Council of Trade 
and Plantations, 14 September 1706, in Cecil Headlam, ed. CSP, Vol. 23, 1706-1708,  pp. 213-230.  
21 Chapin, Privateer Ships, pp. 69-70, and John Osborne Austin, The Genealogical Dictionary of Rhode 
Island (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1887), pp. 215-218.   
22 Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American 
Opposition to Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 11-16.  
203 
 
American crowd could use traditional patterns of mob violence against imperial officers, it also 
demonstrated the continuity of provincial naval defense strategies throughout the eighteenth 
century. It should be noted here that while Anglo-American dissidents drew on historic examples 
of provincial naval service to protest British taxation and employed traditional naval tactics to 
combat Royal Navy commerce vessels, none of these activities or examples would have been 
possible without a large pool of common sailors willing to resist British authority. For decades, 
scholars have asserted that the opening moves on the path to the Revolutionary War began on the 
docks of colonial ports where common sailors had so long taken part in disorderly riots against 
authorities.23  
All in all, there were numerous other factors that led Jack Tars to spearhead violent 
protests against British authority. On a macro-scale, economic issues plagued Northern port 
cities in particular during the final years of the Seven Years War and after. Just as provincial 
naval and privateering expeditions declined after 1759, wartime industries in port cities that had 
blossomed to support the war-effort (i.e. ship building) declined as Anglo-American forces 
conquered French Canada.24 Historian Jesse Lemisch has noted that a perfect storm arose for 
maritime discontent in the mid-1760s: post-war unemployment for tens of thousands of former 
privateers, new British trade restrictions, and reduced shipping opportunities thanks to colonial 
nonimportation protests and the Stamp Act Crisis.  In New York City during the late 1760s and 
early 1770s, unemployed sailors engaged in violent protests and riots against the British garrison. 
Aside from political qualms with the red coated garrison, sailors competed with off-duty British 
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infantrymen for part-time jobs and resented the competition. In essence, common sailors had 
personal economic and political motives to protest British policies and taxation without 
representation.25 It is important to note that Jesse Lemisch has found that one of the many 
unifying factors for these common seamen was their shared experience of serving on privateer 
vessels during the Seven Years War. While the difference between privateers and government-
funded provincial navies has been maintained throughout this dissertation, it is worth noting that 
the legacy of private naval warfare—whether involving colonial navies or privateers—continued 
to shape the way Americans protested British authority throughout the imperial crisis.  
Whereas economic and political concerns unique to the 1760s drove some sailors to resist 
British authority in the streets of port cities, one traditional bogeyman continued to foster 
common sailors’ resentment to British authority: impressment. Numerous scholars have pointed 
to the 1747 Knowles riot as the prototype for maritime crowd actions against Royal Navy press 
gangs in later decades. By the late 1760s, violent brawls with authorities, effigy burnings, and 
bonfires became common tropes in sailor-initiated riots in ports from Maine to South Carolina.26 
It will be recalled that the Knowles riot, one of the largest pre-Revolutionary riots of this sort, 
had its own roots in the Royal Navy’s violent attempts to impress Massachusetts provincial navy 
sailors. Whether members of privateer crews, provincial guard ships, or merchant vessels, 
common sailors could find much common cause in the fight against Royal Navy conscription.  
 This violent resistance to impressment would continue throughout the imperial crisis. 
With the 1746 impressment act still in place, Royal Navy ships impressed hundreds of American 
sailors, sometimes even sending them back to Britain. Just as it had in Boston in 1747, this 
policy led New Yorkers to form a violent mob and burn a Royal Navy tender in the summer of 
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1764, and inspired similar riots throughout the colonies as far south as Virginia. Violent 
resistance to impressment could occur on the water, as well. As late as 1775, armed American 
mariners in whaleboats in Marblehead, Massachusetts surrounded a Royal Navy vessel and 
rescued their impressed compatriots.27 Even if provincial navies had largely ceased to function 
by the 1760s, the vital participation of provincial naval veterans in the Knowles riots of the 
1740s helped to stoke the flames of provincial anger against the Royal Navy that still burnt hot 
two decades later.  
All told, Britain’s taxation policies and the Royal Navy’s attempts at orderly control 
failed to reduce Anglo-American dissidents to submission. While the customs authorities and the 
Royal Navy did make some headway in enforcing the Sugar Act, the costs of maintaining a large 
peace time Royal Navy fleet were probably higher than any revenue made by subsequent 
imperial tax-laws such as the Townshend Acts. The larger goal of connecting the American 
colonies to the metropole through increased imperial domination also failed as the thirteen 
mainland American colonies became more and more alienated.28 Although Anglo-Americans 
could not convince the metropole to lighten its taxation policies by invoking their decades of 
provincial naval service to the Crown, they did use old provincial naval strategies and techniques 
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 It would be impossible to draw a direct line between the provincial navies of the colonial 
era and the Continental and State Navies of the Revolutionary War. Nevertheless, one can find 
some echoes of the legacy of provincial navies in the American war effort at sea in the fight for 
Independence. This connection becomes even more evident when one realizes that historians 
throughout the last century have typically placed coastal New England—the region with the 
earliest and largest provincial naval establishments—as the birthplace of the Continental Navy. 
While the first shots of the war were fired at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill throughout 
the spring and summer of 1775, New Englanders in whaleboats attacked British shipping near 
Boston. When the Second Continental Congress formed the Continental Army out of New 
England militia units, and placed General George Washington as commander, the Virginia 
military veteran drew on the Congress’s limited funds to fit out merchant ships as warships to 
challenge the British stranglehold around Boston.1  
The initial fleet of New England vessels, like the provincial fleet that attacked 
Louisbourg in 1745, was one of merchant ships.  Historian Christopher Magra has argued that 
despite their civilian origins, this merchant fleet was “the first American navy” of the war. In a 
method that “defies classification as privateers,” patriotic merchants leased their vessels to the 
Continental Congress, making them “temporary property of the United Colonies…” As this fleet 
grew, the need to clothe, feed, and pay sailors and shipwrights were some of the many factors 
that elevated the Congress’s role as a central power.2 One might recall that in 1690, the costs 
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associated with the New England assault on Quebec—largely a naval campaign—led the 
Massachusetts government to issue the first ever paper money in the colonies. Just as with 
provincial navies of decades past, fitting out what would become the Continental Navy would 
inspire lasting governmental and financial change.  
While the fitting out of merchant ships as warships in Boston in the summer of 1775 
would start the slow process of the formation of an American Navy, the concept of 
commissioning a continental fleet was just as controversial at the beginning of the American 
Revolution as it had been during the Albany Conference of 1754. That summer, Rhode Island's 
provincial government—still dealing with ravages by Royal Navy ships—urged its delegates to 
the Continental Congress to campaign for a Continental Navy to help deter these attacks.3 Some 
congressmen such as Pennsylvania’s John Dickinson were hesitant to escalate the war effort 
anymore when there might still be a chance at peace through diplomacy. Firebrands such as 
Massachusetts's John Adams and his cousin Samuel Adams contended that creating a 
Continental Navy would be a show of force that would stand a better chance of achieving peace 
through strength. While one of Pennsylvania’s delegates plied for diplomatic resolutions to the 
violence, one of the colony’s other representatives—Benjamin Franklin—backed John Adams 
and other hawkish congressmen who called for a pan-colonial navy to contest the Royal Navy’s 
growing stranglehold in the northeast. It should come as no surprise that Franklin, who had come 
up with the idea of a continental navy to support the British war effort twenty-one years before, 
would be more than willing to use the same idea while fighting them in 1775.4  
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By October of 1775, Congress created a Naval Committee of men representing several 
colonies, including South Carolina's Christopher Gadsden—a veteran of the Royal Navy, 
himself, and Stephen Hopkins—the former governor of Rhode Island. Hopkins, then nearly 
seventy years old, would have been well aware of the benefits of provincial naval warfare, 
having served as governor while his colony hired a guard vessel during the Seven Years War, 
and having attended the Albany Congress where talk of a proto-Continental navy had occurred.5   
While the Continental Congress worked on making a national fleet a reality, eleven of the 
thirteen state governments (excepting New Jersey and Delaware) took the initiative themselves 
to build local fleets. While the Continental Congress had greater resources to build larger 
warships with larger crews than state fleets, local governments bankrolled large flotillas of 
smaller vessels (i.e. galleys) to defend regional coasts and ports. Just as with colonial provincial 
navies of previous wars, these state-funded fleets were widely outnumbered by locally 
commissioned privateers.6 Nevertheless, regionally focused state navies carried the legacy of 
provincial navies forward into the fight against the British even more than the Continental Navy.  
 Even though one can find echoes of provincial naval traditions in the Continental and 
state navies of the Revolution, it is equally striking that a number of provincial navy veterans 
served in both state and national naval branches throughout the war. One of the most well-known 
examples is South Carolina’s Captain John Joyner. His experience also exemplifies the 
contemporary tensions between many American officials over the importance of regional versus 
national maritime defense needs.  Near the end of the Seven Years War, Joyner commanded one 
of the colony's scout boats, but saw little service other than making coastal surveys. By 1775, 
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however, a provincial government committee ordered Captain Joyner and his compatriot Captain 
John Barnwell to coordinate an assault with Georgia forces on a British supply ship near 
Savannah.  Forces from both colonies captured over 20,000 pounds of gunpowder from the 
British ship and sent at least 5000 pounds to help George Washington's army then surrounding 
Boston. Ultimately, both colonies’ local naval forces scored a local victory for both their 
respective governments and the Patriot cause in general.7 
 Although Joyner’s Revolutionary career began with promise, it would end in tragedy. By 
1778, South Carolina's government hoped to use valuable local staple crops (indigo and rice) and 
credit to purchase a few frigates from the French government. The state sent its commodore 
Alexander Gillon and several representatives for the transaction, including the well-experienced 
Joyner.  On the journey over, Joyner faced a mutiny and temporary imprisonment by the British, 
but was luckily able to take advantage of family connections in Bristol to secure his release.8   
Unfortunately for Gillon and the state government, it would take three years to acquire even a 
single frigate. After much haggling, Gillon secured the lease for L’Indien—later the South 
Carolina— a frigate that the French government had ordered to be constructed in neutral 
Amsterdam, and which had been placed under the temporary guardianship of the Chevalier de 
Luxembourg.9 The French had initially built the frigate with the intention of selling it to the 
prominent American envoy Benjamin Franklin and his compatriots, but various economic and 
diplomatic issues (including Dutch neutrality until 1780) delayed this plan. It is interesting that 
Franklin himself had secured the initial audience with the French government for Gillon, 
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especially since he had criticized the commodore for seeking such a large vessel for local 
defense purposes.10  
 By mid-1782, Commodore Gillon reached Philadelphia and there became enmeshed with 
the Chevalier in legal battles over some of his transactions in Europe. With these troubles in 
mind, the commodore placed John Joyner as its commander. While the vessel's new captain 
aimed to bring it back to South Carolina, three Royal Navy vessels captured his vessel and its 
450 man crew that December. Only a few months later, the war would be over.11 Ultimately, 
Joyner’s tenure as captain of the South Carolina was brief, disastrous, and limited to the final 
months of the Revolutionary War. What is noteworthy for this study, however, is that a state 
which had previously only built provincial navies for regional campaigns in the southeastern 
colonies now had the ability to secure warships from European powers, and to do all this while 
depending on the experience of a provincial navy veteran. 
 South Carolina’s provincial sailors were not the only veterans who saw service in the 
Revolution. For instance, historian Philip Chadwick Foster Smith has argued that 
Massachusetts's provincial navy  of the Seven Years War  set a “precedent for the Massachusetts 
State Navy of the Revolutionary War.” While Captain Hallowell of the King George frigate 
stayed loyal to the king, his lieutenant Daniel Souther became a major captain in the state's 
Revolutionary navy, his pilot Eleazor Giles became a Patriot privateer, a twelve year old servant 
onboard named Samuel Tucker later captained two of General Washington's schooners and a 
Continental frigate.12 Ultimately, provincial naval veterans throughout the colonies provided a 
small but significant officer corps for the Continental, state, and privateer fleets.  
                                                           
10 Lewis, Neptune’s Militia, pp. 6-18.  
11 Smith, “Commodore Alexander Gillon,” pp. 215-217.   
12 Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, King George, pp. 176-185.  
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While the legacies and veterans of pre-Revolutionary provincial naval shaped the 
development of the Continental and state navies, at least one surviving provincial navy vessel—
the Georgia scout boat Prince George—was still in service during the War for Independence. At 
more than thirty years old, the Prince George had long exceeded the lifespan of most wooden 
vessels of the era.13 At the beginning of the conflict, Patriot rebels had forced its  Loyalist 
captain, John Lichtenstein, to surrender the aged boat.14 Researcher Gordon Burns Smith has 
found that not long thereafter, Captain John Stanhope of the H.M.S. Raven recaptured the vessel 
during an engagement with Georgia naval forces.15 Despite this loss, by 1778, Georgia’s Patriot 
House of Assembly ordered the state’s commissary general to “make Enquiry whether the Scout 
Boat which before the revolution was in the Service of this State (then province) can be got 
up...and also the repairs of the said Boat at the public Charge.” While it is not clear if this was 
the Prince George or an earlier scout boat, the fact that Georgia officials recognized the utility of 
the scout boat service to “this State (then province)” demonstrated an acknowledgement of the 
importance of the legacy of provincial navies years into the American Revolutionary War.16 
With likely dozens of provincial navy veterans assuming high commands in both the 
Continental and state navies, it might be tempting to see provincial naval service as a pipeline 
into support for the American cause. The case of the Braddock-Lyford family of Georgia and 
South Carolina challenges this simple assumption and demonstrates how family legacies of 
provincial naval service had little bearing on one’s allegiance. While John Braddock commanded 
                                                           
13 Johnson, Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats, p. 12. For life expectancy of 18th-century vessels, see 
Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. II: The Wheels of Commerce, trans. Sian 
Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 369.    
14 Maya Jasanoff, Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2011), p. 42.   
15 Gordon Burns Smith, Morningstars of Liberty: The Revolutionary War in Georgia, 1775-1783 
(Milledgeville, G.A.: Boyd Pub., 2006), p.334.   
16 Legislature Minutes, Georgia, 10 February 1778 in The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia, 
Vol. II , ed. Allen D. Candler, (Atlanta: The Franklin-Turner Company, 1908), pp. 43-44.  
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one of the Georgia state navy galleys in 1776, his maternal uncle William Lyford, Jr. was a 
Loyalist exile that acted as a pilot for numerous Royal Navy vessels throughout the war. Both 
men’s fathers (David Cutler Braddock and William Lyford, Sr.) had been captains in the 
provincial navy of South Carolina during the 1740s.17 Even though their fathers fought in the 
same fleet against the Spanish, differing political loyalties in the 1770s would tragically drive 
these close relatives to join opposing navies.  
The legacy of provincial naval service was also evident beyond the Patriot cause. For 
example, the governor of Loyalist-aligned East Florida, Patrick Tonyn, faced a traditional 
dilemma between 1776 and 1778 when Royal Navy vessels either failed to protect his colony’s 
coast, or their vessels were in ill shape to assist him. To defend St. Augustine and the rest of 
Britain’s only fully loyal colony south of Nova Scotia, Tonyn created a fleet of privateers, 
impressed vessels, and purchased warships that some historians have called the “East Florida 
provincial navy.” Despite the absence of the Royal Navy, the Loyalist provincial navy of East 
Florida successfully repelled numerous rebel American invasions until the British secured the 
province by capturing Savannah, Georgia in 1778. In the end, Tonyn’s “provincial” navy was no 
different from historical provincial navies in the now-rebellious colonies, or his opponents’ state 
navies.18  
Ultimately, while one cannot draw a direct line of continuity between the provincial 
navies of prior decades and the American fleets of the Revolutionary War, echoes of the 
colonies’ long history of maritime self-defense continued on in some form in the guise of the 
Continental and state navies of the 1770s and 1780s. For a long period between 1689 and 1754, 
                                                           
17  J.G. Braddock, “The Plight of a Georgia Loyalist: William Lyford, Jr.” The Georgia Historical 
Quarterly 91, no. 3 (2007), pp. 247-265.  
 18George E. Buker, and Richard Apley Martin. “Governor Tonyn's Brown-Water Navy: East Florida 
during the American Revolution, 1775-1778.” The Florida Historical Quarterly 58, no. 1 (1979): pp.58-71.    
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Anglo-Americans fitted out their own semi-permanent and temporary provincial navies to secure 
their coasts from French, Spanish, piratical, and Native American maritime threats with limited 
Royal assistance. During the Seven Years War (c. 1754-1763), the Royal  Navy finally gained 
maritime hegemony in the Western Atlantic world, and made the existence of costly colonial 
naval establishments unnecessary. Nevertheless, when the British government used the Royal 
Navy to enforce unpopular trade policies in the 1760s, Anglo-American antipathy for the navy’s 
heavy-handed impressment policies and enforcement of trade laws coupled with a long legacy of 
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